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From the emergence of the 'modern' Socialist movement in the 1880s through
to the First World War, the majority of socialists in Britain regarded the
achievement of particular reforms and the ultimate goal of Socialism itself, as
being realisable only through the ballot box. The subject of this thesis is how
that movement, i.e. for independent labour representation, was conducted and
with what success in Glasgow prior to the First World War. The whole basis
of this electoral strategy, however, is called into question by the sex and
class biases inherent in the franchise system, as defined by the Reform Acts
of the nineteenth century.
The focus of the study falls upon local, municipal politics and particular
attention is paid to the Independent Labour Party (ILP), as the largest socialist
organisation and the body most associated with the movement of
independent labour representation. Glasgow was chosen because of its
working class complexion, the militant reputation it receive during and
immediately after the First World War, and its emergence as an electoral
stronghold of the Labour Party in the post-war period.
To achieve its aim of securing elected representation, the ILP sought to
promote alliances with other democratic' forces which were regarded as part
of the working class movement: the trade unions, the co-operators, and the
Irish. An alliance of this group was achieved in the 1890s and secured a level
of Labour representation on Glasgow Town Council. The elements of this
alliance, however, were fissiparious and the coalition eventually collapsed and
with it Labour representation, until a more structured Labour Party was
established in Glasgow in 1910-12.
Even at its most successful, this electoral challenge was limited. This
limitation is examined in relation to the franchise system. The class bias of
the system operated most forcefully against the poorer working class, and the
failure of British Socialism, and particularly the ILP, to campaign for complete
democracy is seen as emanating from respectable' fears of the residuum or
'slum dwellers'. The limited impact made by Labour prior to 1914 is thrown
into sharper relief by the massively expanded support it enjoyed post-1918
amongst the new mass electorate, which meant that Britain, for the first time,
at least approximated to being a full democracy. That the forces of Labour
had signally failed to make adult suffrage an important plank of its platform is
seen as indicative of a Labour movement and politics unable to transcend the
divisions within the working class, and posing only a limited and self-limiting
challenge to the established order.
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Introduction
This thesis is a study of Labour and Socialist politics in Glasgow between
1880 and 1914: from the origins of the first Socialist societies to the position
of the Labour Party at the outbreak of the First World War. In general terms,
this is a terrain the broad contours of which are well-known at both the
national and local level.1 However, so far as Glasgow is concerned, there has
been little attention paid to the electoral challenge of Labour prior to 1914,
certainly insofar as local, municipal elections are concerned.2 This is
surprising since the majority of Socialists in Glasgow, as elsewhere in Britain,
believed that Socialism would only be achieved through the ballot box.
Furthermore, the bulk of this effort was conducted at the level of the
municipality, where elections were held annually, unlike the periodic and
uncertain instances of Parliamentary elections, and where Labour might be
expected to gain some practical influence, if not power.
Labour and Socialist politics cannot be reduced to elections only, and studies
which seek to examine and highlight the influence of specific organisations
and 'alternative strategies' are valuable in contributing to as full a picture as
possible of the complexities of the Labour and Socialist movement on
Clydeside.3 However, such attention should not distort our perspective on
what was the dominant strategy of Labour and Socialist activists - the effort
to secure working class representation on local and national organs of
government. For this reason, our focus falls primarily upon the Independent
Labour Party (ILP), as the largest Socialist organisation and the body most
associated with the movement for independent labour representation.
The whole basis of this electoral strategy is called into question by the
limitations - both of gender and class - of the franchise system, as defined
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by the reform Acts of the nineteenth century. While there is now a significant
literature and debate on the extent of disenfranchisement prior to 1918, and
of the significance on the Fourth Reform Act, there has been, as yet, little
attempt made to incorporate these findings within general overviews of
labour and political history. This 'gap' is evident even in as resolutely critical
an approach to Labour politics as Eric Hobsbawm's, The Forward March of
Labour Halted?. While Hobsbawm's concern is with the decline of the Labour
vote post 1945 (or 1951 to be more precise), the rise in support for Labour in
the first half of the twentieth century is presented as, more or less,
unproblematic:4
The number and percentage of Labour voters (including
Communist ones) grew without interruption (except for 1931)
between 1900 and 1951 when it reached a peak of 14 millions
or just under 49 per cent of all votes.
It is impossible to deny that this increase of votes actually occurred yet, it is
surely as important to recognise that this was not a gradual accretion of
support, but a development in which there were breaks and sudden leaps.
The transformation of the electorate under the terms of the Representation of
the People Act (1917) represents a major discontinuity in British politics;
under the terms of this Act an (almost) democratic electorate was created in
Britain for the first time. It was only then that the Labour Party emerged as a
major political force in its own right, and yet Labour previously had not made
suffrage reform a significant part of its programme. Unless the complexities
and indeed, uncertainties, of Labour's progress are integrated into the
long-term view of its emergence, there can be a danger of viewing Labour
history, and the history of the Labour Party, in terms of a pre-determined
trajectory.5
It is intended that this study will break new ground by a detailed examination
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of Labour's electoral progress prior to the First World War, and by referring
this directly to the existing franchise system. Thus the franchise and the
electorate are not assumed to be unproblematic, but are regarded as limited
and as obstacles to working-class political representation. In addition, the
attitude of Labour to the franchise is critically examined.
Much of the approach adopted here echoes that of Matthew, McKibbin and
Kay, who first attempted to relate the franchise to the emergence of the
Labour Party.6 Their arguments have been criticised on the grounds that the
pre-1918 franchise was not biased against the working class,7 and that
Labour's support post-1918 did tend to come from the 'old' pre-war
working-class Liberal voters.8 The argument that it was the
newly-enfranchised electorate of 1918 which was responsible for Labour's
relative success in the post-war years has been further questioned by a
recent attempt to qunatify how these 'new' voters actually voted.9
However, this study is distinct in a number of ways: Existing studies of the
franchise have tended to operate at a 'macro' level using Parliamentary
boundaries and elections, aggregated mainly at a national or purely English
level, while we have been able to identify the Glasgow electorate at a much
smaller quantitative level, i.e. Municipal Wards, and relate enfranchisement
rates to social indicators for these precise geographical areas (it should also
be noted that the literature dealing with the emergence of Labour in Glasgow
makes little or no mention of the franchise): Unlike 'static' national approaches
which compare the results of the General Elections of 1910 and 1918, our
arguments are based upon a detailed examination of the political history of a
specific locality, which permits us to take into account factors such as the
specific role of the Irish community and of women. Whereas Matthew et al
discount the impact of the First World War, we emphasise the radicalising
social and political consequences of the War upon Clydeside, which are
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considered in an epilogue. Furthermore, we assess Labour's attitude to the
pre-1918 electorate and seek to explain its acceptance of the gender and
ciass biases inherent in the franchise system. Ultimately our findings support
the view, on the basis of the Glasgow experience at least, that there was an
enormous gap between Labour's position before and after the First World War,
and that this was crucially connected to changes in the franchise. However,
in order fully to understand how this development occurred it is necessary to
examine the actual course of historical events, and for this reason our study
also attempts to follow a narrative structure.
Chapter One deals in detail with the formation and activity of the Socialist
societies of the 1880s, namely the Socialist League (SL) and Social Democratic
Federation SDF). These organisations are significant in that they represented
a break with dominant liberal ideology as well as having had close links to
the movement for land restoration, or land nationalisation, and the input they
later maue to the movement for independent labour representation.
Examination of their political practice also indicates, most clearly in the case
of the SL, how involvement in actual working-class struggles cut across a
strategy which was opposed to 'political', or 'electoral' activity. In attempting
to resolve this tension, members of the SL joined the fledgling Scottish
Labour Party (SLP). The SDF in Glasgow also contributed to the SLP, though
its members retained a dual membership.
Chapter Two focusses upon the role of the Independent Labour Party and its
relationship with other forces in the effort to promote working-class
representation. The independent existence of the SLP between 1888-1894 is
discussed with an emphasis upon the ad-hoc nature of early attempts to
construct a Labour party. The electoral campaigns of Labour, both
Parliamentary and Municipal, are discussed and the role of the Glasgow
Trades Council, the Co-operative movement and the Irish Nationalists
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considered. Throughout the various fluctuations in Labour support, the ILP
continued to promote candidates, either alone or in a workers', or 'democratic'
coalition. The attempt is made to locate the ILP - in terms of membership
and branches - within Glasgow, and some light is shed on its membership by
examining the occupations of its Branch Secretaries.
Chapter Three continues the discussion of Labour's municipal campaign. The
policies upon which Labour stood and its success in returning candidates to
the Town Council are examined. The local opposition to Labour is also
considered, as are the ideas and policies with which Labour made successful
appeal to the working-class electorate. The role of John Ferguson and the
'single tax' in the 1890s is dealt with, and special emphasis given to housing
an increasingly important concern for Labour and the Glasgow
working-class. The location and extent of Labour support in the City are
identified geographically and implications drawn as regards the social basis of
that support. Labour's electoral fortune is seen not to have been one of
uninterrupted progress, but to have suffered considerable setbacks. Even
after considerable success in the years preceding the First World War,
Labour's position on Glasgow Town Council remained that of a minority
pressure-group.
Chapters Four and Five break off the narrative to consider the position and
role of the Irish and of women in Glasgow. The 'Irish vote' has been regarded
as peculiarly significant to Labour's electoral ambitions in Scotland, with some
commentators regarding it as an obstacle in Labour's path. By concentrating
on the local political scene and the debates over Labour candidates for
Municipal honours (though with reference to Parliamentary elections), it is
argued that significant elements of the Irish community were enthusiastic, if
conditional advocates of labour representation. The occupational structure of
the Irish population in Glasgow is examined, and the Irish nationalist
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organisations seen as providing a voice for a section of the poorer, unskilled
working-class. At the same time the electoral power of the Irish is seen as
having been qualified by the fact of the sociai position of most Irish.
The role of women is discussed, despite their limited electoral role. Attention
is paid both to the part played by women in the Labour and Socialist
movement, and to what that movement expected of them. Despite male
hostility to their involvement, women did gradually take a more active role in
Labour politics throughout this period, a development in which the ILP was
supportive, although attention is drawn to the tension between the rhetoric of
sex-equality and more deeply imbued attitudes toward women. The women's
suffrage movement is considered, in particular its relationship with the ILP in
Glasgow. The low proportion of married women employed in Glasgow is
pointed out, and it is argued that, as far as working-class women were
concerned, the most important organisation was the Co-operative Women's
Guild, a body, primarilly, run by and for housewives. The relation of women's
domestic concerns to class politics are then discussed.
Chapters Six and Seven look more closely at the franchise itself. Chapter Six
details the actual levels of adult male enfranchisement for the Parliamentary
Divisions and Municipal Wards of the City. The wide variations in levels of
enfranchisement, i.e. the proportional adult male electorate, are related to a
descriptive categorisation of the different areas of Glasgow and then a
correlation is made between the proportion of adult males with the vote in
the Municipal Wards with social statistics on housing and health for the same
areas. In addition, enfranchisement levels of the delegates to Glasgow Trades
Council are examined. It is argued, on the basis of this evidence, that the
franchise was biased, not only against women but also against the working
class and, in particular, the poorer working class.
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Chapter Seven then broaches the political question: What was the effect of
this restricted franchise upon Labour and what was the Labour and Socialist
view of the franchise? Labour's reticence to campaign for adult suffrage or
make a priority of further franchise reform is discussed at a number of
inter-related levels: A predominant anti- feminism, acceptance of the 'Liberal'
view of the franchise as a 'trust' and mark of citizenship, and the fears of the
'respectable' working class of the 'residuum' or 'slum-dweller' - a recurring
phantom in Labour's demonology. As regards the electoral fortunes of the
Labour Party in the pre-1914 period, it is reiterated that Labour's challenge
was not only limited but also self-limiting, through its acceptance of the
existing franchise system.
The limited electoral advance made by Labour in these years is thrown into
sharper relief by a brief look at the post-war situation in which, within a very
short time, Glasgow had become a stronghold of the Labour Party. In terms of
its electorate, Glasgow was almost completely altered - the proportion of
adult men alone who had the vote had almost doubled in the decade between
1911 and 1921. The Labour vote could now be counted in the hundreds of
thousands as opposed to the four-figure totals of the pre-war period. Along
with this massively expanded Labour constituency, the war-time experience
was also a crucial factor in the development of Labour as a major political
force. Direct involvement in political activity had become a reality for large
sections of the population, especially women. Membership of working- class
bodies like the Trade Unions and Co-operative Societies expanded rapidly as,
to a lesser degree did the membership of the ILP. At the same time there
were definite continuities across the War and, in Glasgow, none more so than
in Housing. The years after 1918 did not see Labour emerge as the
undisputed or unanimous choice of a united working class, and it was able to
build upon pre-existing bases of support. Nevertheless, Labour's actual level
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of support had reached a new height from which broader horizons could
glimpsed, and which had simply not been possible before.
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Chapter One
The Modern Socialist Movement 1880-1888
Histories of the modern Labour and Socialist movement generally begin in
1893 with the formation of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) or, perhaps as
early as 1888, with Keir Hardie's independent candidature at Mid-Lanark.1 In
Scottish terms, 1888 is the more logical starting point since, apart from Mid-
Lanark, it was also the year of the formation of the Scottish Labour Party
(SLP), which developed out of Hardie's campaign.
The whole decade of the 1880s is significant, however, since it was during
this period that socialism - as an intellectual and organisational force -
emerged. Born out of the radical, land-restorationist campaign of the late
1870s and early 1880s, socialism offered a distinctive analysis of society
based upon the ideas of Marx and the theory of surplus value, i.e.
Social-Democracy. Though without electoral significance and operating
mainly at a propQcjandist level, the Socialist movement of the 1880s did
represent a break with established political practice and ideas, as well as
offering an alternative vision of how society might be organised.2 In direct
political terms Social-Democracy became an influential force within the labour
movement, but its significance also lies in the crucial inolvement of socialists
within the movement for independent labour representation which, ultimately,
produced the Labour Party.
The modern Socialist movement of the 1880s was based upon the perceived
common interests of the working class - not simply that the working class
had certain rights which society ought to recognise, but that the working
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class represented the basis of society since it was Labour which was the
creator of wealth. However, a class analysis of society and a politics based
upon class representation faced stony ground in a system which emphasised
individual values and responses and assumed middle and working class
co-operation in terms of the 'masses' against the 'classes' (i.e. the landed
aristocracy).3 From the Reform Act of 1832 until the First World War, Scottish
politics were dominated by the Liberal Party. Only once, at the General
Election of 1900, did the Liberals fail to win a majority of Scottish seats.
In Glasgow, the Liberals won every single seat at every election between 1832
and 18&S, the first Conservative victory occurring at the General Election of
187V. This dominance was not expressed solely by a numerical superiority in
the number of MPs - it could be said that Liberalism set the parameters of
political debate within Scotland. The challenge to the Liberal ascendency
between 1886 and 1900 was more Unionist than Conservative, on their own
the Conservatives never held as many as a third of Scottish seats. Moreover,
it has been argued that, in Scotland, Conservatives promoted their cause in
terms of Liberalism and that the breakaway Liberal Unionists of 1886, who
claimed to remain Liberals, "absorbed the Conservative Party in Scotland."4 At
the other end of the spectrum, "many of the Labour politicians were
accustomed to claim that they were also Liberals."5 As far as the Glasgow
working class or, rather, the organised Labour movement, was concerned,
their world view was inherently Liberal. What Joan Smith refers to as the
'commonsense' of the Glasgow Labour movement, which was expressed in
terms of conscious political beliefs and in the organisations that people
joined, was part of a Liberal tradition.6 Under a restrictive, property-based
franchise system, in which less than half the working class had the vote, the
political incorporation of the working class appeared almost total.7 The
socialist movement which emerged in the 1880s had, therefore, little space in
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which to manoeuvre. One of the early Glasgow 'pioneers' described the
situation confronting him and his comrades at that time:8
Socialist ideas had not assumed any political form in this
country. The working class in the bulk were completely under
the sway of the capitalist political parties - whose most
advanced projects were embodied in Mr. Gladstone's
Midlothian speeches of 1879-1880, in which no reference
whatever to Socialism, or even to Labour in a political sense,
occurs. There were no Socialist meetings, no Socialist
literature.
The 'Land' Movement as a Precursor to Socialism
In Glasgow, as elsewhere in Scotland and Britain, at the end of the 1870s
there were few indicators of independent working-class political activity.
There were still some old Chartists and Owenites around who had been active
in the agitation of the 1830s. There was also a number of Secularists, whose
roots also went back to the 1830s, who organised the Sunday Lectures
Society in the face of strong disapproval by the Kirk.9 Opportunities for
discussion and debate were provided by Radical Associations, the Glasgow
Parliamentary Debating Society (est. 1876), local Young Men's Debating
Societies and Irish Land League Branches.10 On a directly political level (as
distinct from mere political discussion) it was the Irish Land League that was
the most important organisation. The 'land for the people' agitation was given
a tremendous boost by the propaganda tours of Michael Davitt and Henry
George, and it was in the land restoration movement that many were to
become politically active for the first time and, especially for those who
supported land nationalisation, to make their initial break with laisser-faire
liberalism.11 This movement was particularly strong in Glasgow due to the
large number of immigrant Irish and displaced Highlanders. Immediate interest
was aroused by the 'land war' in Ireland of 1879-1882 and the Government's
response of Land Acts and coercion, and the beginnings of an organised
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Crofters' movement in Scotland and the Highland 'land war'.12
The nascent socialist movement had an almost symbiotic relationship with the
land movement. The first socialist body in Britain, the Social Democratic
Federation (SDF), was originally founded in 1881 as an advanced radical
society called simply the Democratic Federation. Its founding programme
more or less embodied the People's Charter (though calling for adult suffrage,
not just votes for men) and included legislative independence for Ireland and
nationalisation of the land; in its early years Ireland dominated its activities.13
The leader of the Federation, H.M. Hyndman, had a close political friendship
with Henry George, though by 1885 both had to recognise that the demands
of Socialism were not compatible with the solutions offered by George's
demands for a Single Tax. However, for a period in the early 1880s, there was
much common ground over immediate policy, particularly over Ireland.14 Many
of those who were to join the socialist movement and to play prominent
parts in it, had first served their political 'apprenticeship' in the Irish and Land
campaigns.15
The move from a radical-liberalism to socialism is exemplified in the careers
of two Glasgow men, John Bruce Glasier and James Shaw Maxwell, both of
whom became prominent in the Independent Labour Party (ILP): Glasier
became Chairman of the ILP in the 1900s, while Maxwell, a slightly older man
was the first Secretary of the ILP's National Administrative Council (NAC) and
became a Labour Councillor in Glasgow.16 In the early 1880s both were
members of the Scottish Land Restoration League (SLRL).17 In 1883 they
became involved in producing a small weekly paper, Voice of the People,
Maxwell as editor and Glasier as a regular contributor. In his memoirs of this
period Glasier described the Voice as, "a little Radical and 'land for the People'
weekly".18 The Voice only managed to survive for a couple of months and left
little impact on the political life of Glasgow. However, its significance does
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not lie in its circulation figures but as an indicator of dissatisfaction with
Liberalism and the search, however cautious, for an alternative. Within the
columns of the Voice were embodied elements of radical liberalism, land
leagueism and labourism, and viewed from the perspective of Maxwell and
Glasier's later trajectories, it can be regarded as representing a half-way
house between Liberalism and Socialism.
The intention behind the Voice of the People was to challenge the Liberal
Party supremacy and to act as a tribune for the working class whose
interests, it argued, could never be represented by even, "the most Liberal
daily newspaper".19 Alongside of the "magnificent increase" in national wealth,
which had doubled since 1852, "chronic pauperism" had scarcely diminished.20
Such problems as Labour faced (the terms "Labour", "the people", "the main
body of the people", "the working class", were all used interchangeably)
demanded "radical treatment", and the key was for Labour to increase its
representation in the corridors of power.21 According to the Voice the,
"so-called representation of the people in Parliament is one of the greatest
shams which delude the people of this country." Labour had only two
representatives in the House of Commons, as against the representatives of,
"the Fighting Interests", "the Law and Liquor interests", and:22
the Aristocratic and Moneyed interests ... represented in
overwhelming numbers with a House of Peers wholly composed
of landlords to back them."
Yet, it was Labour which, "produces wealth and profit for all and bears the
whole social fabric on its broad patient back."23 This acceptance of the labour
theory of value and a desire to see the international solidarity of labour did
not, however, lead to an acceptance of the class struggle. The Voice equated,
"antagonisms between class and class" with that between "nation and nation"
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and saw both as, "substituting the narrow motive of self-interest for the
broader and cumulative inspiration of general well being."24 The Voice sought
to carry weekly trade union reports and in the event of strikes it intended
that, "the case for the men will be as fully and explicitly stated in our pages
as that for the masters is sure to be in other newspapers". However, the
influence of the paper would be used to bring about, "a friendly settlement.
We will denounce all attempts to stir up a needless strife between employers
and employed."25
The Voice called for an increased political role to be played by the trade
union movement; the Glasgow Trades Council it regarded as the most
obvious organising force to achieve Labour representation on the Town
Council. At a practical level the Voice suggested that polling booths be kept
open from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m., rather than close at four in the afternoon, to make
it easier for the working class electorate to vote. Similarly, it called for
evening meetings of the Town Council, since day-time meetings effectively
disbarred working class representatives. It did not, however, make any
mention of further extension of the franchise.26 The Voice of the People did
recognise and approve of the self-organisation of the working class or, at
least, the minority of unionised workers, and attempted to champion the
"interests" of Labour. As the term "interests" implies, however, it did so
within a liberal-individualist framework and distinguished itself from socialism.
Commenting on the International Trade Union Congress at Paris, the Voice
was pleased that the sober judgement of Henry Broadhurst had prevailed over
the "hotter spirits".27
The English leader embodies the best spirit of reform -
that which gives full value to sturdy individualism, and refuses
to ask the State to do that which diminishes, in any degree, the
workman's consciousness of independence ... Hitherto the
foreign workmen who met for council have dwelt chiefly on
visionary schemes, which lead to vapouring talk and no forward
movement. They do not as a body share the healthy distrust of
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large social theories which characterises Englishmen, and which
will keep at arms length such comprehensive impossibilities as
are aimed at in the programme of the Democratic Federation..."
Yet, despite this opposition to the Federation, the Voice regarded it as a force
to be taken seriously and debated with. It published the Federation's
Manifesto, Socialism Made Plain (which marked the Federation adopting
socialism) and spoke of its "respect" for the leaders of the Federation, in
particular the "remarkable" William Morris whose, "practical sympathy with the
proletariat, now being expressed in activity for the SDF", was likened to
Mazzini.
The land restoration or, nationalisation, movement remained popular for a
long time in Glasgow and exerted a strong influence on Labour politics. John
Ferguson, the leading Irish Nationalist in Scotland, remained a life-long
proponent of the single-tax policy and through him it became the central
plank of early Labour municipal campaigns. It was only in 1906 - after
Ferguson's death - that the ILP in Glasgow could attempt to "expose" the
"popular fallacy" of Henry Georgism.30 Despite the undoubted influence and
popularity of Henry George31 , even in the early 1880s some of his erstwhile
supporters were beginning to look for a more systematic doctrine than the
"panacea" of land nationalisation.32 For many the attraction of the land
movement was not that it provided the final word on economic matters but
that it provided a forum for discussion of economic and social issues, which
was singularly absent in both of the major political parties.33 According to
one contemporary, Henry George's visit to Scotland in 1882 was largely a
disappointment, especially to his working class audience:34
There were not many working men in the Land Restoration
movement; but to those who were in it, George appeared to be
dominated by middle-class points of view, notwithstanding the
fact that he had himself been a working man. Those who
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looked upon land nationalisation as a mere stepping-stone to
something else, whatever that might be, were disappointed at
the finality of George's views.
In this perspective, the importance of George, and the land movement
generally, lay in stimulating economic thought not in producing any original
economic theory. In particular, it broke new ground by pointing to a positive
role that could be played by the State, notwithstanding appeals to "sturdy
individualism".35
The Land Restoration movement had no importance in
itself ... but it indicated clearly that there was gradually arising
among the people, especially in Scotland, a feeling of hostility
to both political parties and a contempt for the negative
character of their domestic policies. Limited as was its range,
the Land Restoration movement implied a breaking down of the
antagonism to economic action by the State which
characterised the period of laisser faire, and in that sense it
prepared the way for the Socialist movement which began
about 1884 among groups of people of a character similar to
that of the groups which were affected by the Land
Nationalisation propoganda, and indeed very many passed from
one movement to the other."
The First Sociaist Societies - and the 'Split'
H.M. Hyndman, the founder and major figure of the SDF, spoke alongside
Henry George on the latter's visit to Glasgow in 1882 and immediately after
the meeting a branch of the Democratic Federation was formed.36 It appears
to have been totally inactive, however, until the summer of 1884 when it
re-activated itself and began to hold regular meetings on Sundays in a small
hail in the City.37 In December 1884 Hyndman returned to Glasgow to publicly
inaugurate the branch - now part of the avowedly socialist SDF - and
lectured to some 1200 people at the Albion Halls: "The first official statement
in Glasgow of modern 'scientific' Socialism."38 Later in the same month
William Morris, the Treasurer of the SDF, also lectured in Glasgow, on "Art
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and Labour".39 Just at this moment, however, when the budding Socialist
movement was beginning to establish itself, the SDF split.
The reasons and circumstances behind this split have been well detailed.40
Essentially, the dispute was over two issues: the autocratic pretensions of
Hyndman, and the value of struggling for immediate reforms which could (or
could not) alleviate the present condition of the working class, the 'dreaded
palliatives'. The 'opposition' group, which congregated around William Morris
and which was to breakaway to form the Socialist League (SL), argued that
the Federation should not have a permanently established leader, which they
suspected Hyndman of attempting to become, and they did not want any
policy of 'stepping stones' to Socialism to become all, or even part, of
Federation policy. Though it is difficult to identify any insuperable differences
between the two sides, the position of Morris and what was to become the
SL can be regarded as the more 'left wing' or 'purist', in terms of the
positions they took on reforms, parliamentarianism and foreign policy. At the
time, however, there was great suspicion of Hyndman and what were
perceived as his opportunist political tactics, and this 'personal' side to the
dispute became decisive and affected the Scottish socialists quite crucially.
As the two factions grouped around Morris and Hyndman began to emerge
within the London SDF during 1884, and Austrian exile named Andreas Scheu,
who urged Morris to take a leading role, became prominent within the
opposition to Hyndman. Scheu had experience in European Social-Democracy
and was a highly talented and capable man.41 Whether this provoked
Hyndman's latent Germanophobia and for whatever precise reason, it is clear
that some time late in 1884 Hyndman made an attempt to discredit Scheu,
now resident in Edinburgh, in the eyes of the Glasgow members of the SDF.
The Edinburgh branch had approached their Glasgow comrades with a
proposal that they work together and that Glasgow also adopt the title that
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Edinburgh had adopted, i.e. the Scottish Land and Labour League (SL&LL). This
name, however, was a moot point within the SDF and the Glasgow branch
contacted Hyndman for advice or, as Morris saw matters, "some of the
members seem to have approached Hyndman for orders as to what to do."42
Hyndman in his reply appears to have attacked Scheu as an anarchist who,
"had tried to destroy the organisation of the German comrades and would do
the same in Scotland if the comrades were not cautious of such foreigners."43
At just this moment Morris appeared in Scotland. He had been in Edinburgh
twice before but this was his first visit to Glasgow where he hoped he would
be able to smooth things over. Ironically, his meeting with the Glasgow
branch served to highlight the schism and to hasten its conclusion. After
witnessing Hyndman's interference Morris determined to see matters through
to an end.44 Bruce Glasier has left a vivid, though untrustworthy account of
this meeting.45 Whatever the true nature of the debate between Morris and
the Glasgow stone-mason William Nairne, the meeting was divided between
the two. Although, according to Glasier, "the meeting felt drawn toward"
Morris, yet, "the greater number present were ... ranged with Nairne on the
Hyndman side."46 By the beginning of January 1885 the split was complete,
with Glasier and others leaving to form a branch of the SL, while in Edinburgh
the SL&LL changed its affiliation to the new organisation.
Strange as it may seem - and it puzzled socialists at the time - Edinburgh
was ahead of Glasgow in establishing a socialist presence. In late 1883 a
Republican Society was formed in Edinburgh by John Lincoln Mahon and
Robert Banner which, by early 1884, had become affiliated to the Democratic
Federation.47 Though this Society was identifiably socialist, by way of being a
branch of the Democratic Federation, the actual change of name to Social
Democratic Federation seems to have caused the Edinburgh members some
concern and they decided on a different title for themselves; something "more
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homely, concrete, alluring, less abstract and foreign looking", than the SDF.48
This choice of name was deliberately intended to exploit the growing
agitation in Scotland over the land issue, particularly with the direct action of
the Highland Crofters being to the fore and the apparent success of the
Scottish Land Restoration League. Furthermore, J. L. Mahon was of the
opinion that the SDF, "as an organisation did not stand a chance in
Scotland",49 and so the Edinburgh socialists designated themselves as, The
Scottish Land and Labour League, the Scottish section of the SDF. This was
regarded with suspicion in London and Morris wrote to Edinburgh that, "it will
be looked on here as a secession I am afraid."50 Edinburgh could claim an
established precedent through the previous Republican Society but this
decision, especially as Andreas Scheu had only recently moved to Edinburgh,
added to the tension within the London SDF. Come the split the title of the
Edinburgh branch was accepted by the SL but it did provide a point of some
contention and not just between London and Scotland but also amongst
socialists within Scotland.51 Despite its name, however, the SL&LL did not
immerse itself in agrarian issues (nor did it have anything particular to say
about the Scottish situation), in fact quite the reverse. As E.P. Thompson has
commented:52
Despite the prominence given to the land in the League's
objects, the Manifesto of the League (drawn up in October) was
addressed almost exclusively to the industrial workers and
might indeed had been open to criticism more for neglecting to
include a specific paragraph relating to the crofters' struggle,
than for breaking with the general line of propaganda of the
SDF.
However, there were benefits gained.
Nevertheless the slight acknowledgement to national
feeling brought immediate returns: Scheu made propoganda
visits to Glasgow and the West of Scotland "with good
success":and in Edinburgh the League began to gather
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strength."
Part of the reason behind Edinburgh's greater initial progress was due to the
activity of Andreas Scheu. Scheu's experience in the continental socialist
movement marked him off from the rest of his comrades, apart from the
exiled Frenchman Leo Melliet, veteran of the Paris Commune. Although both
men were resident in Edinburgh, and Melliet had been and remained for a
good deal longer than Scheu, it was Scheu who was the more important.
Meliiet was regarded as, "one of the most persuasive of speakers",53 but it
was Scheu who was, "the leading spirit in the movement at that time."54
Scheu arrived in Britain about 1874 and he had lived in Edinburgh during
1879-82. He did, apparently, maintain some form of socialist propaganda at
that time and succeeded in converting Robert Banner, then a young
bookbinder, to socialism. Banner eventually followed Scheu to London and
became an executive member of the SDF and then the SL.55 It is interesting
to note that the other co-founder of the Edinburgh Republican Society, John L
Mahon, also moved to London and played a significant role in the split, and
became the first national secretary of the SL.56 Scheu returned to Edinburgh
in the summer of 1884 and immediately set about galvanising the Federation
branch; he organised regular meetings and even got the members to pay
regular dues. Although Scheu returned to London once again the following
May he had, in a short space of time, made a lasting impression. Looking back
to this period one of his Edinburgh comrades described him as:57
... that tall and commanding form, that striking personality
... he was filled to overflowing with energy and enthusiasm, - of
the nervous temperament, excitable and exciting, he put vim
into a meeting and everything he put his hand to."
Scheu, in later life, considered that he had been a member of four socialist
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movements, the Austrian, German, English and Scottish.58 A furniture designer
to trade, which may have encouraged his friendship with Morris, Scheu
managed to get money from a variety of sympathisers and hired a hall -
which he furnished himself - as a meeting place for the branch. The stylish
result made the young Bruce Glasier envious of Edinburgh and he sadly
contrasted this, "handsome meeting place" to the "dingy little hall in the
slummiest quarter of the city", which the Glasgow branch usedT9 The major
fin
contributor was (as so often) Edward Carpenter. In a letter written to
Carpenter in September 1884, Scheu outlined the position of socialism in
Edinburgh and the potential for its future development. Carpenter wanted
details presumably to decide if it was worth giving any money and though
perhaps tempted to exaggerate, Scheu, in fact, gave a very straightforward
fi 1
account of the situation.
As to the number of persons here interested in Socialism i
may not be positive; but I think they are by no means very few,
actual members of the SDF there are at present no more than
25. Of "Justice" between 100 & 150 were sold by Mahon every
week. There is a Socialistic Debating-Society at the University,
which counts about 70 members and some of these students
have joined our League. They have invited Morris and & [...] to
lecture them in the ensuing winter and seem to be very earnest
in the matter. Of course, our chief support we shall have to get
from among the wage-workers and from amongst the
audiences I used to have on former occasions - I feel entitled
to expect a good number to join our society as soon as we
have quarters of our own. Up to my arrival here nothing in the
way of actual organisation had been done, but since i have
started it, I see that they are quite willing to contribute their
mites regularly. Like wise I am convinced that they will join us
as soon as they see actual work performed.
In his efforts to establish a meeting place Scheu made overtures to the
Edinburgh Land Restoration League to share a hall. Though he admitted to
Carpenter that he had done so without "much hope",62 it is interesting to look
at how he approached the subject. This is contained in a letter to a Miss
Reeves:63
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Madam, encouraged by what I learn of you from J. Mahon,
I take the liberty of addressing you on a subject which, I have
reason to think, interests you much and had already enlisted
your sympathy: I mean the subject of Socialistic Propoganda in
Gt. Britain and more especially in Scotland. ...
Not that I believe you to be a Socialist, but I am aware
that you are supporting a movement which goes very far in the
direction of Socialism. ...
Now, I need not say that as a Socialist I agree with Mr. G's
[i.e. Henry George] efforts re. the solution of the Land Question;
but I am one of those who go farther and claim also the
socialisation of the means of Transit and production.
You may not agree with us there, but it is evident that
Socialists and Land Restorers go a good length in the same
direction. And if so, why should they go separated and not
together; united in one purpose without quarrelling about the
other and without doing one another damage.
This was the, more or less, standard view on the relations between land
reform and socialism, i.e. that the former (nationalisation of the land) was
correct in its own right but simply did not go far enough. As Scheu also
commented:64
Two years ago I heard Mr. H George admit that himself (in
the Memorial Hall, London) by saying that he knew full well the
nationalisation of the land would not solve the social question;
but that he was convinced that it was a sure step towards
bringing that solution about.
Scheu could hardly have been surprised, nontheless, that the Edinburgh Land
Leaguers refused his offer and, as he admitted to Carpenter, he actually had
high hopes that, "the best of them" would soon join the SL&LL anyway.65 Like
the Socialists the Land Restoration League was not strong, at least in
Edinburgh, but wrote Scheu, "in Glasgow they are very strong."66
This comparison brings us closer to a more fundamental political distinction
between Glasgow and Edinburgh. In both cities Liberalism was dominant but
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in Glasgow this was a relatively radical Liberalism, while Edinburgh was the
power base of Scottish Whiggism. The Glasgow Liberals were more
concerned with party organisation, along the lines of Chamberlain's
Birmingham, and it was they who were behind the setting up of a Scottish
Liberal Association. Their concern with political activity allowed them to be
more sympathetic, though only to a limited extent, to working class
fi7
involvement in political affairs. It has been argued that it was Whig
antipathy to the working class which encouraged Edinburgh Trades Council to
be more politically active in the early 1880s than Glasgow Trades Council.68
So, in Edinburgh there was a 'space' within the politics of the city which
socialism could exploit, while in Glasgow, with a radical Liberal Party and a
sizeable Land Restoration League, there were more alternatives for the
politically conscious and the 'space' for socialist or labour activity was that
much more limited.
When the 'split' took place the group around Morris, which actually comprised
a majority of the SDF Executive, decided simply to resign rather than argue
their case throughout the organisation. E.P. Thompson has commented upon
Morris, whose role was crucial, that his actions were, "dictated far less by
policy than by passion", and that, "it almost seems as if Morris, in his fury,
had forgotten that the SDF had a membership." The important consequence of
this was that the membership did not get a chance to understand fully the
nature of the division and were "alienated" by the 'majority's'
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"precipitateness". In Scotland, however, the SL came out of the split
stronger than the SDF, and this may have been due, again, to Scheu's more
realistic grasp of affairs, he recognised the limited resources available to the
emerging movement and was unwilling to surrender valuable human capital to
Hyndman, at least without a fight. In early January he wrote to Mahon (now
Secretary of the SL):70
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I doubt whether your plan of letting the present branches
of the SDF alone is a good one. I could do so only after a
bona fide attempt has been made to win them over. It is
certainly worth while and - although a somewhat disagreable
job - would be the more profitable one of the lot.
Why should H. have the Branches or even their names to
puff himself up with? And where to find the new forces and
organise new branches.
Scheu took a leading part in the debate in Glasgow where an attempt was
made by the Morris sympathisers to win over the branch. In Scheu's opinion,
"the better men ... are decidedly in our favour", while the leaders, "are not to
be convinced of course, and are not worth having."71 Whereas in Edinburgh
the SL&LL went over to the SL, more or less as a body, in Glasgow the SDF
branch split in two, with Scheu being active in founding the new branch and
preparing its initial agitation.72 By January 1885 the socialist movement had
become established in the manner in which it was to operate over the next
few years: there were the two rival parties of the SDF and the SL which,
though they had their differences, do, nevertheless, have to be treated as part
of the same movement.
Establishing the Socialist Propaganda
Initially the Glasgow branch of the SL adopted the designation of Scottish
Land and Labour League (Scottish Section of the Socialist League) and had
membership cards supplied from Edinburgh. This led to some confusion over
where authority lay, with the secretary of the Glasgow branch arguing with
Mahon in London that he saw no reason for Glasgow, "seeking any
authorization from your Executive".73 This does not, however, prove that the
SL81LL offered any uniquely Scottish perspective on Socialism, nor was there
any, "bitter row ... between the English and Scottish socialists over the
questions of policy and party autonomy."74 The Scottish socialist branches
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gave little or no importance to the land question or to the position of
Scotland vis-a-vis England in their propoganda.75 The title of SL&LL was
really an Edinburgh phenomenon, largely the choice of Mahon, which could be
seen as an opportunist device for not specifically referring to Socialism. The
Glasgow branch soon dropped the designation and was happier with just
identifying itself straightforwardly as a branch of the SL. Moreover, when
Mahon attempted to resurrect the name SL&LL a few years later he met a
good deal of hostility from Glasgow.76
Where there was a difference between the London leadership and the Scottish
members was over religion. The Manifesto setting out the aims and
principles of the SL was sent round the branches for discussion and the
statement, "Socialism the only religion the Socialist League professes", gave
offence to members of both the Glasgow and Edinburgh branches. Glasgow
was "unanimously of [the] opinion" that such a remark was "unnecessary and
injudicious", and wanted it changed to, "Single-hearted devotion to the cause
of Socialism".77 The Edinburgh branch was not unanimous but still wanted the
phrase altered:78
In religious Scotland you may rest assured that ... [it] will
create unnecessary bitternes against us. It appears to several
members of the League possible to be a Socialist without being
a materialist or an atheist ...
The difference of opinion may not have been a difference between Scotland
and England so much, as a difference between London and the Provinces.
The Liverpool branch of the SL also wanted the offending statement dropped
and so,79
Avoids what causes many people to distrust and
misunderstand us.
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Within the cosmopolitan milieu of London and for people like Morris, Bax,
Engels, the Marx-Avelings, acceptance of materialism and hostility to religion
was relatively unproblematic. For those in "religious Scotland" and provincial
England, such ideas were much newer and the weight of established religion
on public opinion that much stronger. One of the young academics who
joined the SL wrote to a fellow comrade of his desire to leave Glasgow
University for something "decent", which he explained:80
by 'decent' I mean largely that will not oblige me to
knuckle down too much to conventionality in religion or politics.
Another source of offence to the Scottish membership was the SL view on
"property marriage", which they also wanted to see dropped from the
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Manifesto. It is interesting to note that Scheu did not share the criticisms
and misgivings of his Scottish comrades, but wanted the manifesto to be
more explicit on the differences with the SDF and to take Hyndman more to
task for his jingoism.82 However, the Socialist movement in Scotland could
not avoid coming into conflict with established religion at some point since
they were implicitly, if not explicitly, rivals for popular support. Bruce Glasier
made the point in a letter to the Executive Council:83
Sunday meetings in Scotland of a political character can
only be attended by those who are prepared to suffer a degree
of family and social ostracism
[but he went on to say]
we feel it our duty however to insist on Sunday
propoganda as we will never reach the masses until we have
made Sunday propaganda popular.
Socialism shared with other 'collectivist' movements, like land restoration, an
emphasis on social issues rather than constitutional matters. What was
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distinctive about the socialist propaganda, however, was its emphasis upon
labour as as the source of all wealth, and as the basis of a future equality.
84
As William Morris expressed it:
The first step to be taken then is to abolish a class of
men privileged to shirk their duties as men, thus forcing others
to do the work which they refuse to do. All must work
according to their ability, and so produce what they consume -
that is, each man should work as well as he can for his own
livelihood, and his livelihood should be assured to him; that is
to say, all the advantages which society would provide for each
and all of its members
Thus, at last, would true Society be founded. It would rest
on equality of condition.
Such a vision of a classless society came straight from Marx and the early
socialist movement was, basically, in terms of its analysis of society and its
emphasis upon the political role of the proletariat, Marxist. While Marx's
works had not been widely distributed those who were familiar with his
writings, "included a majority of the effective leaders of the [socialist]
movement".85 Figures like Hyndman, Morris, Bax, Scheu, the Marx-Avelings
were the political and intellectual leaders of the first generation of British
socialists and from them the influence of Marxism or Social Democracy,
extended into a national movement. As regards the SDF:86
there was scarcely a pioneer of modern British Socialism
who did not pass through it or owe some debt to it, and ... the
fact remains that it was Marxism popularised at various levels
by Hyndman and his handful of disciples which created the
mass Socialist movement in this country.
The fact that people did not refer to themselves as Marxists is not the point
since, as E P Thompson has commented of the 1880s:87
all Socialists accepted a certain body of principles which
to-day would be known as "Marxist" but which at that time
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went under no other name than "Socialism".
Branches of the SDF and the SL organised classes for the study of Capital
though using Marx as a tool of analysis did not, necessarily, mean becoming a
Socialist. Liberal academics like Russell Smart of Glasgow could use Marx to
appeal to the "upper classes" to follow Carlyle's advice to "become real
Captain's of Industry".89 Just as most academics were hostile to the new
movement so were most of the clergy but there were a few who were
attracted by the call for basic human equality. A great deal of early socialist
propaganda was based on allusion to Christian principles of love and charity
and it is not surprising that some clergymen found socialist ideas more in the
spirit of the Gospels than the individualist ethos of Capitalism. In early 1884
the Minister of the Tron Kirk in Edinburgh gave a series of lectures on
"Christian Socialism" during which he "candidly acknowledged] his
indebtedness to Karl Marx for the economic ideas which he held": one of his
lectures was entitled, "Labour is the source of wealth and the source of
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capital is surplus labour". While this Minister only went as far as Marx's
"economic ideas", the Minister of Greyfriars, John Glasse, went further and
joined the SL&LL, remaining with it after the split.91
Initially the socialist effort had to be an intellectual one of arguing their case
in public and attempting to make people think critically of the existing order.
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Thus Scheu advised his comrades:
Socialists might do worse than become members of
debating societies, and endeavour to infuse some earnestness
into them. Make them give up debating who wrote Eikon
Basilike? or was Elizabeth justified in killing Mary Queen of
Scots? and in place of such questions as these let them study
and discuss the social question.
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Scheu's own experience of debates in Edinburgh was mixed. At one Society
he was able to convert their best speaker but, generally, he was not sure if it
was worth the trouble since, he complained to Mahon, "I never had to deal
with such ignorant snobs in all my life."93 Nevertheless, the attempt had to be
made, the movement had to start somewhere and Scheu, a vastly experienced
debater, expected to find some, "young and intelligent workers" among the
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audience."
The main task which the movement set itself at this point was to, 'make
Socialists'. This was expressed most clearly by the more consciously
anti-political SL which was opposed to any partial reforms, and concentrated
almost exclusively on the educational side of propaganda. The SL's founding
document stated the issue unequivocally:95
our view is that such a body [i.e. a socialist party] has no
function but to educate the people in the principles of
Socialism.
The methods adopted by the Socialists to publicise their message were
simply the established methods that went back to the Chartists and before:
the journal and pamphlet, the public meeting in public halls and on street
corners. The extent of the socialist input, however, gave their activity a
particular resonance and the hostility they encountered led to a series of 'free
qe
speech' campaigns up and down the country. Until well into the twentieth
century and the development of a more extensive and privatised mass media
these methods remained the basis of socialist propaganda. The most
consistent activity was public outdoor speaking. Regular 'pitches' had to be
established and maintained by the branches. In Glasgow the most famous
pitch was Jail Square at the entrance to Glasgow Green - an extremely
popular venue where would be a host of other speakers and keen competition
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for an audience.97 Propoganda 'tours' were made by leading figures from
London which were of great benefit in promoting interest and enthusiasm but
the branches in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen also provided speakers for
their surrounding areas. Members in Glasgow would visit mining and industrial
towns like Hamilton, Baillieston and Coatbridge on Saturdays to speak, sell
literature and establish new branches.98 The propaganda 'season' was roughly
divided in two: winter and summer. The latter was taken up with open air
activity and travelling while, in winter, propoganda would be moved indoors
for lectures and classes in branch rooms or small halls, and large public
meetings organised for the visits of well-known speakers, where the
audiences could be reckoned in the hundreds, if not thousands. Such activity,
as well as selling the Party newspapers (Justice for the SDF, and
Commonweal for the SL) provided the mainstay of branch activity, but
gradually dissatisfaction and a desire to make more concrete links with the
working class affected the membership.
Membership
The actual membership of the socialist societies was extremely small. By
1887 the national membership of the SL stood at around 700.99 In early 1885
the membership of the Glasgow branch was 55100 and there is no evidence
that it ever grew much beyond this.101 There was also the SDF and by 1887 it
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had three branches in Glasgow. After the SL&LL changed its affiliation the
SDF took some time to re-establish itself in Edinburgh but by the end of 1886
a new branch had been formed with a second established in Leith the
1 02
following year. Both organisations managed to form branches in other
areas, e.g. Paisley, Hamilton, Blantyre, Motherwell, Coatbridge, Kilmarnock,
Rutherglen, Greenock, Dundee, Creiff, Carnoustie, Arbroath, Galashiels, Dysart,
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There has been a tendency amongst some commentators on the socialist
movement in this period to regard it as being basically middle class, and with
few working class members.105 However, examination of memoirs and
contemporary sources reveals the Socialist movement in Scotland to have
been primarilly working class. James Leatham, one of the founders of
socialism in Aberdeen, and himself a printer to trade, recalled that the
Glasgow branches of both the SDF and the SL, "were primarilly for the
workmen ... [the] petty-bourgeois ... had their single tax movement."106 A
founder member of the Glasgow SDF remembered that, "The original
membership of the branch consisted of a few working men, one or two
designers in cast iron and a few clerks."107 In January the SL&LL in Edinburgh
had increased its membership to 52, "of whom 26 are artisans, 9 students,
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and the rest clerks, warehousemen, artists and one woman." William Nairne,
"the founder and pioneer of the SDF in Scotland", was a stonemason from the
North. His brother-in-law, Bob Hutchinson, was a shoemaker. There were also
a number of Irishmen, mostly unskilled, who joined the movement, these
included John Toole, Pete Curran, Jim Connell, author of the "Red Flag" and
John Leslie. The most famous of Scotland's Irishmen was James Connolly
who, with his brother John, also a socialist, was a carter with Edinburgh Town
Council.109
It is one thing, however, to identify the members of the socialist societies as
mainly working class, but it does not follow that they were presagers of a
mass 'conversion' to socialism. William Morris regarded those early working
class members as,110
there by their special intelligence, or of their eccentricity;
not as working men simply. ... As a friend ... once said to me,
We are too much a collection of oddities...
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The 'conversion' to socialism was primarilly an individual response, not a
collective one, despite belief in collectivism. At the same time, though, the
early socialists should not be regarded as an incoherent group of individuals
whose common intellectual response to the 'social question' was purely
coincidental. As E.P. Thompson has commented:111
And yet their conversion to the Socialist cause was a
sympton of those deep upheavals in the economic and political
life of Britain which were, in the next few years, to prepare
many thousands for their message.
Making Contact With the masses - The need to "Do Something"
The main problem confronting the Socialist movement was the working class
itself. At one level there were the organised, skilled workers, representing
only a minority of the working-class and, in the main, committed to the
Liberal Party but who were the existing Labour movement. At the opposite
end of the scale were the most poverty-stricken, the unskilled, casually
employed 'slum dwellers', possibly given to riot but often regarded as likely to
be moved by appeals to jingoism as by radical sentiment.112 Much of the
early socialist propaganda appears enthusiastic and naive in its clarion call to
"the proletariat" to revolt. The unity of the working class was assumed to
operate at an immediate level, not only in terms of historic perspective. What
was lacking, in a strategic sense, was an understanding, certainly an analysis
of, the consequences of divisions within the working class. The Socialists
were not unaware of these divisions but were unable to provide a political
strategy to overcome sectionalism and promote immediate joint or common
interest between the broad groups of skilled and unskilled. The Socialist
League approached the Trade Unions with the message that the role of their
organisations was, more or less, defunct. Unions were the preserve of the
"aristocracy of labour", and had made what gains they had due to British
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industry's initial monopoly of world markets, but this period and its
concomitant benefits to the labour aristocracy was now over.113
The general result, we repeat, is that trades' unions do not
grow in strength and numbers, but appear to have reached their
zenith and to have achieved all they are capable of under
present conditions.
It was apparent that union organisation could not be extended to the unskilled
and, moreover, "the vast increase in the numbers of labourers [presented] an
insuperable barrier to any solid advantage being gained by trades' unions."
The question then now arises. What useful function can
unionists still fulfil? We would, in reply, urge upon all unionists
to direct all their energies towards consolidating and federating
with the distinct end of constituting themselves the nucleus of
a Socialist commonwealth...
Such an appeal was really no more than a hopeful exhortation and was
extremely unlikely to meet any positive response from the Trade Unions,
though individual trade unionists may have responded positively. It is
significant, however, that the effort was made at appealing to a particular
section of the working class, the organised, in fact "the aristocracy of labour"
itself. More than this, the SL was talking in terms of trades unions' operating
as some sort of vanguard, they were to make themselves the "nucleus of a
Socialist commonwealth". Here then, was an implicit assumption that the
important element was the organised working class. As for the poorer
workers, lacking their own organisations, it was impossible to make such a
direct appeal, apart from through demonstrations and meetings, and even
then there was no guarantee that they would be reached. In one of his visits
to Glasgow William Morris spoke at a meeting in the East End. his speech
was well received by an audience of some 200 but he remained concerned
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about who exactly he was, or was not speaking to.114
The last lecture was on Monday 28th, at Bridgeton, the
east end of Glasgow, and to speak plainly a most woeful abode
of man, crying out from each miserable court and squalid,
crowded house for the abolition of the tyranny of exploitation.
But here we did not score a success, There were election
meetings going on all about us; and I fear that our audience
was just not that what we wanted - to wit, the poor folk of the
district, who, if they only knew it, do so sorely need showing
what it is that has doomed them to their special form of
hell-upon-earth - one of the worst forms in existence I should
think.
The upsurge in New Unionism in the late 1880s showed that ideas of the
Trade Unions being incapable of further growth were completely at variance
with the actual experience of both the 'old', established unions and groups of
workers previously considered beyond organisation. However, many of the
leading activists of the New Unionism were Socialists, members of the SDF in
the main. As an organisation, the SDF had a more considered attitude to the
existing labour movement and political activity in general.
Apart from the 'personal' question of leadership the main reason for the
socialist split had been the vexed issue of involvement in elections and
electioneering in pursuit of partial reforms. Commenting upon a statement by
Morris in March 1888 that "political action" (as electoral politics were
constantly described) had been the main difference which had led to the
formation of the SL, Hyndman indicated that rivalry between the two bodies
was being replaced by co-operation (while admitting that the old
unpleasantness was not due solely to theoretical differences), but also took
the opportunity to re-state the SDF position:115
First and foremost we utterly distrust politics, and we
distrust politicians as they are to-day. But we cannot separate
ourselves from our epoch in this respect, any more than we can
in the matter of dealing with capital and capitalists, much as we
detest the existing economical system. If we do not act
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politically we must act militarilly or anarchically. Men and
women must be doing something beyond mere theoretical
education and propoganda for a remote future. That, at any
rate, is our opinion. You cannot keep an organisation healthy
and vigorous without having some immediate work, as well as
some immediate aim. Therefore, for propagandist purposes,
and for purposes of criticism, and even to help on
reconstruction pacifically as far as possible, we adopt political
and municipal action, running Social-Democratic candidates
wherever we can.
The whole issue of Socialists standing for election, however, had been
muddied by the "Tory Gold" scandal of the 1885 General Election, when the
SDF stood three candidates on the basis of money 'laundered' through the
Conservative Party. The "miserable totals" polled by the three candidates only
made matters worse, once the true source of the money was revealed and
the SDF suffered a fresh haemorrhage of members.116 The affair also led to a
reaction against 'political action', even within the ranks of the SDF.117 On
other issues like the campaign for the eight hours day, trade union
organisation and unemployment the SDF was more involved. However,
though more active than the SL and more sympathetic to campaigns for
specific aims short of socialism itself, it did not then follow that the SDF had
a consistent strategy in regard to the existing Labour movement. Despite the
prominent role taken by SDF leaders like Will Thome and Harry Quelch in
trade union activity, others, such as Hyndman, "regarded the growth of
unionism as unimportant compared with the opportunities provided for the
advancement of Socialism."118 Moreover, just as the SDF did not have a single
view on such matters, the SL was, if anything, even more divided.
On the occasion of the split from the SDF the 'opposition' stated their views
on what a socialist organisation should be. In their polemic against
Hyndman's ambition to become an "indispensible leader", they argued that
what was required was, "only a band of instructed men, each of whom can
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learn to fulfil, as occasion requires it, the simple function of the leader of a
party of principle."119 Such an approach did not solve the problem of
leadership but only avoided the question. The same approach, however, was
adopted in regard to party activity. Arguing against the false, "hopes of
amelioration of the conditions of the workers," they expressed the view that a
socialist party could or should, at the moment, "only educate the people in
the principles of Socialism, and to organise such as it can get hold of to take
their due places, when the crisis shall come which will force action upon
1 2fi
us." Such an 'insurrectionary' view became, for many, simply untenable as
no evidence of any crisis of capitalism emerged. A 'Parliamentary faction'
was formed which sought to grasp the nettle of 'political action'. This group,
involving the Marx-Avelings, Bax, and Thomas Binning and (from the sidelines)
Engels eventually brought matters to a head at the Fourth Annual Conference
of the SL in 1888. The result, however, was that the 'Bloomsbury Group' was
expelled and, from then on, the out-and-out anarchist faction grew in
influence until it eventually dominated what remained of the League.121
However, how these ructions and divisions affected Scotland is a somewhat
different matter.
Although both the SL and SDF were national organisations, at a very practical
level - due to distance, lack of finance and communications - branches had a
tendency to follow their own lines of development. The history of Aberdeen
is instructive here: formed as a branch of the SL in October 1887 by Mahon
and James Leatham, the Aberdeen group actually followed a political practice
more akin to that of the SDF, getting involved in the eight hours question,
trade union organisation, and unemployed agitation; it became closely
involved with H.H. Champion and his Parliamentary candidatures, and in 1893
eventually joined the SDF.122 The differences of the national leaderships were
never that clearly drawn in Scotland and by the end of 1888 there existed a
38
rough consensus among the Scottish socialists for a more thorough and
better organised propoganda. This was partly fuelled by a dissatisfaction with
London and resulted in the formation of the Scottish Socialist Federation
(SSF). T.E. Barlas, the organising secretary of the Dundee SDF, circulated the
Scottish Branches with a plea for increased donations which would enable
paid lecturers to be employed and directed by a Scottish Committee, arguing
the case in terms of the success of the German Social Democratic Party.123
The following month the "Glasgow Committee" called a meeting of SDF
members to discuss, "proposals for organisation of propaganda."124 This
interest culminated in a Conference called by Edinburgh SDF of all Scottish
Socialist Societies, "to arrange and perfect a system of propoganda in
Scotland."125 The outshot of this Conference was the "formation of a Delegate
Committee to thoroughly organise the propoganda in Scotland", which
Committee was to sit in Edinburgh for the first year with John Leslie
1 2fi
appointed Secretary pro tern.
The Conference was, more or less, representative of the available socialist
forces in Scotland. Attending from the SDF were Crieff, Edinburgh, Dundee
(No. 1 and Central), and Glasgow (Central and South); from the SL were
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Kilmarnock and West Calder, plus the Glasgow Christian
Socialist Society. Branches unrepresented were SDF Parkhead and SL
Carnoustie and Arbroath but they, "indicated they would be bound by
decisions taken."127 Since London, "has shown itself unable to organise
Scotland", it was resolved, "That a Scottish organisation be formed for
propaganda purposes."128 According to David Lowe, "the Conference resulted
in a severance from London and the establishment of a separate organisation,
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the Scottish Socialist Federation." Whatever the actual ambitions behind the
SSF it did not emerge as a separate Party, and there was no sense of a
separate Scottish identity or strategy involved. In practical terms it remained
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largely an Edinburgh phenomenon with the SDF and SL branches there linking
up, but operating, ultimately, simply as the Edinburgh branch of the SDF.
Increasingly Socialists began to consider the question of party organisation
and the existing Labour movement, and began to think in terms of a "Social
Democratic Labour Party."130 Ultimately, this idea would lead to the formation
of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the Labour Party itself. However, the
idea emerged not out of theoretical disputes but from the practical activity
that socialists found themselves engaged in.
In Glasgow the socialists made their first contacts with the masses in the
Lanarkshire coalfields. The link was made by William Small, a miners' agent
who established a branch of the SL&LL in Hamilton in late 1884.131 Thanks to
Small the SL found an audience amongst the miners and speakers regularly
visited from Glasgow. The first major demonstration of popular sympathy with
socialism occurred in the Autumn of 1885 at Hamilton. There, at the Low
Quarries, Bruce Glasier addressed a meeting of between 2 to 3,000 miners
(most of whom were Irish). It is unlikely that, beyond meetings given by
national figures such as Morris or Hyndman, there had been a larger assembly
to listen to socialist propaganda. Moreover, this was no public lecture given
to an audience of individuals but a truly mass meeting of workers. The
backdrop to this and similar meetings was the severe slump of 1883-6 which
particularly affected the Western Scottish coalfields.132 The title of Glasier's
speech was The Robbery of Labour'. Described by a local paper as an "open
advocacy of revolution", it was warmly greeted by his audience.133 The SL
maintained a high level of activity within Lanarkshire: organising propoganda
outings, speaking at strike meetings and attempting to build branches. In the
next few years, with the renewed attempts at building trade unions
throughout the Scottish coalfields and a particularly bitter and violent strike in
Lanarkshire during 1887, these links were intensified.
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Moves being made by the miners to establish and strengthen their unions in
Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, Stirling and Fife brought about a Scottish Miners'
National Federation, founded in Glasgow in August 1886. Keir Hardie, from
Ayrshire, was elected Secretary (defeating William Small) and in pursuit of a
moderate policy which would restrict output he proposed that ail areas take a
week's 'holiday' and so push up the price of coal. The more militant
Lanarkshire workforce, led by Robert Smillie, stayed out on strike after the
'holiday', much to Hardie's annoyance. They were unable, however, to extend
the strike to other areas and were left on their own. The situation rapidly
deteriorated with families forced to go begging and police were drafted in
from Glasgow to defend blacklegs. After a riot in Blantyre in which food
shops were looted and prisoners freed from the gaol, further police
reinforcements and troops were also sent in by order of the Glasgow
magistrates and conducted a midnight raid on the miners' rows.134 The Liberal
establishment proved unmoved by the miners' plight and even the radical
North British Daily Mail castigated the Blantyre incident as, "lawless
proceedings of the lowest section and population of th central mining
districts of Lanarkshire."135 In this situation it was the Glasgow socialists who
emerged as the champions of the miners' cause and the SL opened their
rooms as a temporary strike headquarters. The support of the SL culminated
in a mass meeting of 20,000 held on Glasgow Green in February 1887.136 For
the socialists this was an event beyond their previous experience, an
indication of working class strength in alliance with socialism that heralded a
potential breakthrough. The sheer sense of excitement is captured in a letter
from Bruce Glasier, the Secretary of the Glasgow SL, to the League
headquarters in London:137
I write you in great haste to warn you that the League
here has made a bold effort to enlist the sympathy of the
Unions in our movement and ally them with our propaganda.
We are credited on all hands with having imparted to them
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notions of Plunder and entire disregard of the sacred rights of
property.
We intend to justify their assertions by holding a meeting
in sympathy with their claims.
We expect the meeting will be very large and that the
police will supply us with a guard of honour. We will of course
take care not to commit ourselves. This action of ours will we
expect establish the League in Scotland.
In great haste and wishing heaven's protection upon us.
Yours fraternally, J. Bruce Glasier.
P.S. Vive le Revolution!
This letter clearly expresses the 'barricades mentality' common among
socialists at the time.138 Given the violence at Blantyre, the deaths in
Trafalgar Square during the "Bloody Sunday" riot and the persecution
throughout the country of socialists involved in the unemployed agitation,
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there were good reasons for Glasier's fears and excitement. At the same
time, given their belief in an iron law of wages, and rejection of any and all
ameliorative measures then, logically, the actual outcome of the Strike was of
no great consequence. Nevertheless, and despite their theory, the socialists
did maintain their contact with the working classes.
The single biggest issue, prior to the New Unionism, in which the Socialists
made an impact was the campaign amongst the unemployed. In Glasgow the
SL appears to have led the unemployed agitation. In May 1886 it organised a
mass meeting of the unemployed on Glasgow Green to demand work from
the City Council and to protest at the stopping of outdoor relief.140 As a
result the magistrates decided to keep the soup kitchens open for another
week but refused to provide work. This partial success cut across the
'official' position held by the SL. At the meeting on the Green a letter from
Morris was read out, which "denounce[d] the system that permitted men to
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starve, and point[ed] out that little good could be done until workmen became
their own masters."141 These sentiments were well received but the
paramount, practical concern must surely have been to do something, no
matter how 'little'. The harsh realities of the class struggle began to pose
uncomfortable problems for the young movement and, for many, new
approaches began to be considered.
Little encouragement came from London, however. In November 1886 the
Executive Council of the League passed (at the time of the Lord Mayor's show
142in London) the following resolution:
... while believing that no organised help can be promised
to the unemployed before a complete economic revolution is
effected, expresses its indignation at the cowardly and sneakish
action of the authorities in suppressing a meeting of the
unemployed for the purpose of contrasting their miserable
condition with the clownish performance of the City robbers.
The sentiments expressed were ambivalent and no lead was provided to
members and branches involved in the agitation. The following year, with
unemployment still to the fore, the Executive sought to clarify its position
further:143
That the Socialist League do maintain officially the
continuance of that policy of non-intervention pursued by it up
to the present; and though it can prohibit no individual member
or members of that body from participating in unemployed
agitation, it cannot take to support either morally or pecuniarily,
any member whose participation in any such agitation leads
him into difficulties.
This explains why Glasier in his breathless report of the miners'
demonstration should have included the proviso, "we will of course take care
not to commit ourselves." The Glasgow Branch remained active in the
unemployed campaign and, not satisfied by the League's official statement,
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sought further clarification. The opinions of, and divisions among, the Branch
members are detailed in two letters written by Glasier on the same day 24
October 1887: the first being an official communication by Glasier in his role
of branch secretary expressing the collective view of the branch, the second a
personal note giving more detail on the opposing attitudes and the reasons
behind them.144
The Glasgow branch decided to ask the Council to append an explanatory
statement to their resolution, their complaint being, "not so much the
meaning as the manner of the resolution." It was, "of a far too brief and
format nature to appear in the Journal of [the] League which circulates
amongst not only many outsiders who know little or nothing of the policy of
the League, but also among socialists who may only recently have become
acquainted with our organisation." The resolution, "as it stands conveys the
impression the the Council have no regard for the unemployed and have no
sympathy with those who display any interest in the cause of these victims of
our capitalist system", and in Glasgow's opinion, "the resolution should have
been worded or amplified as to show that the Council were actuated not by a
conviction that it is not in [the] power of the League to do anything of real
advantage to the unemployed." The last sentence is confusing but it would
appear that the crux of the 'official' communication was, that while the branch
accepted the League's official position in principle they were worried about
the bad impression their apparently uncaring attitude might convey. This
position, however, disguised an actual division among the members which
Glasier's second letter went on to explain.
The "unemployed question" was of "serious concern" to the branch which was
"divided as to [which] policy we should pursue." At the same meeting which
expressed dissatisfaction with the Council's resolution on the matter it was
also decided that the branch, "meanwhile ... should not actively interfere in
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the agitation." Glasier himself was among those who, "stick to the position
that whatever temptations there may be to join in the unemployed struggle -
yet the real welfare of the unemployed and all other portions of the suffering
will be best maintained by pressing onward the complete revolution."
Nevertheless, those who shared this view were sympathetic to "those who
wished to do something." Glasier admitted there was a logic to the opposing
view and he commented:
I find it by no means an easy task to maintain the
principle that we cannot secure any adequate amelioration of
the condition of the unemployed under the existing system and
that any insufficient ameliorative would merely drive as it were
the sore underneath the surface.
The argument of, "those who wished to do something" was threefold. Firstly,
that it is quite impossible for us to be absolutely sure of
what may happen in the future - and that cases of absolute
starvation must have to the living generation a claim above all
abstract principles and concern as to future contingencies.
Secondly, at a very practical level, there was the "common good fund" of the
City Corporation which was intended for the relief of the unemployed and the
Corporation also possessed large areas of unreclaimed land which could be
utilised to provide permanent employment.
It is asked is it not in accordance with socialist principles
to ask the [Town] Council to employ workers - without the
interference of middlemen or contractors for the common weal
of the workers and whole body of citizens?
Glasier admitted that this, "makes our position difficult here." Lastly they
argued for the benefits of spreading socialism. Thus,
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seeing no other political or religious body have as yet
championed the cause of the unemployed, it would be of
immense advantage as a means of creating a sympathy and
interest in our propoganda here if we took the lead in [the]
matter as we did with conspicuous success in the case of the
Lanarkshire miners' strike.
Towards a 'Socialistic' Labour Party
Here then was an incipient division within the Socialist movement (and not
just affecting the SL) between those who were out for socialism without any
'distractions", and those who were thinking in terms of incorporating the
struggle for partial reforms and amelioratives within the ultimate struggle for
socialism. The two sides could be labelled 'revolutionaries' versus
'reformists', but his would be a shorthand that would obscure more than it
would explain. The 1880s were too much a period of flux, with new ideas
only being developed and people uncertain on how to make them practical,
for such a dichotomy to have any valid meaning. What is clear is that there
were tensions within the Socialist movement with thoughts increasingly
turning to the possibilities of 'political action' and the notion of a 'Labour
Party'.
At the 1887 Conference of the SL the 'parliamentary' resolution which
eventually forced the issue and led to the expulsion of the Bloomsbury group
was actually submitted from the Hamilton branch. It read in full:145
Whereas the primary duty of the Socialist party is to
educate the people in the principles of Socialism and to
organise them to overthrow the capitalist system, this
Conference lays down the following line of policy for the
guidance of the executive and branches of the Socialist
League;- That every effort be made to permeate the existing
political organisations with Socialism, that all possible help be
given to such movements as trade unionism, co-operation,
national and international labour federation, etc. by which the
working classes are trying to better their condition; that
Parliament, municipal, and other local government bodies and
the contests for the election of members to them should be
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taken advantage of for spreading the principles of Socialism and
organising the people into a Socialistic labour party; that while
we share the common aspirations of the wage earners to win
better terms from the capitalist, we steadily insist that their
complete economical emancipation can only be effected by
transforming the society of to-day into a co-operative
commonwealth.
The reference to permeation of the "existing political organisations" indicates
a Fabian influence but the key phrase was the call for a "Socialistic labour
party". This, and the intention of working with existing labour bodies like the
trade unions and the co-operatives, and standing candidates for election
pointed socialism in a wholly new direction - and one which it would
eventually take. The crucial figures behind this resolution were J.L. Mahon and
William Small.
During 1887 Mahon was extremely active, operating almost as a one man
propoganda unit, amongst the Northumberland miners and in Scotland. He
re-galvanised the Edinburgh Branch and brought back into play the title of
Scottish Land and Labour League (SL&LL). Mahon's association with
'parliamentarianism' as well as his perceived opportunism - he refused to use
the term socialist in his propaganda and substituted 'democrat' instead -
guaranteed him hostility among the Glasgow membership.146 Nontheless,
Mahon was, particularly in his intention to take socialism right into the trade
unions and lay down a policy against the current leadership, pointing the way
ahead. In his correspondence with Engels during the early summer, Mahon,
"sketched out a policy which some elements in the movement were in fact to
follow in the next five years, and which was to lead to the formation of the
ILP in 1893."147 Mahon was also active in Lanarkshire where his policy re. the
Unions is likely to have had more appeal to the likes of William Small. That
Mahon had a close relationship with the Hamilton Branch is indicated by the
fact that he acted as their delegate at the 1887 Conference and would,
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therefore have moved the above resolution on a Socialistic Labour Party.148
With the failure of this resolution a number of members (beyond those who
were immediately expelled) gradually began to move into other areas. Mahon
kept up his propoganda effort but was completely out of sympathy with the
majority view of the SL and left at the end of 1887, eventually rejoining the
SDF.149
Of more significance, however, was the trajectory of William Small who, in his
search for a more practical policy for socialism to put before the working
class , supported Keir Hardie's 'independent labour' candidature at the
Mid-Lanark by-election of April 1888. Following this failed attempt Small
became one of the founder members of the coalition of radicals, land
restorationists, socialists, and trade unionists which came together as the
Scottish (Parliamentary) Labour Party.150 As the SL slowly disintegrated -
Morris eventually left and the organisation ultimately dissolved in a sordid
police conspiracy151 - this was a route that other members increasingly took.
In May 1893, in a letter to Scheu, Bruce Glasier commented that, "The League
of course if defunct - and I am without a socialist habitation or a name."152
Glasier was replying to an overture by Scheu about the possibility of a
delegate from Glasgow attending the International Congress at Zurich. Glasier
informed Scheu that socialists in Glasgow would be keen to go, but were
unlikely to have the money since they were all in deficit after the winter's
propoganda; he personally was in dire straits, having lost his job on account
of his political activity.153 There were now only two socialist bodies in
Glasgow, the Fabians and the SDF, but there was another organisation which
Glasier thought likely to be sympathetic:154
I am sure your name would be favourably received by
several of the Labour Party bodies - many of the members of
which were at one time members of the League.
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At the beginning of that year (1893) the Scottish Labour Party (SLP) had
identified itself as socialist and at the founding conference of the HP at
Bradford called for the new party to adopt the title of, 'Socialist Labour
Party'.155 Glasier's old comrade from their land league days, Shaw Maxwell,
was elected to the post of National Secretary, and though Glasier remained
aloof for the time being he soon joined and, in 1897, he was elected to the
National Administrative Council (NAC) of the ILP and from then on was one of
the so-called 'big four' of the Party, alongside Keir Hardie, Philip Snowden and
Ramsay MacDonald.156 The threads that were to bind socialism to Labour had,
by then, nearly all been sewn together. It is the ILP and the policy of
'independent labour representation' which our attention will be focussed upon
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Chapter Two
The ILP and Labour Organisation in Glasgow,
1888-1914
The story of the emergence of a 'Labour' electoral presence in Glasgow is
also the story of the Independent Labour Party (ILP). It is not that Labour - in
a political sense - was simply reducible to the ILP but that the ILP was the
main organisation, or galvanising force, behind the alliance of forces that
constituted the 'Labour Party'. Other bodies and individuals represented the
trade unions, the co-operators, the Irish and, while all are significant, their
direct involvement was never as consistent or committed to the policy that
was the ILP's self-appointed aim, i.e. of securing the independent
representation of labour in national and local government. It is for this
reason that, despite its relatively small membership,1 the ILP merits attention
in its own right. Our focus will be upon the organisation of the ILP - the
question of what sort of Party, branches and electoral presence, membership
- and its relationship with other working class forces in constructing a
'Labour alliance'. First, however, we need to consider the Scottish Labour
Party (SLP), formed in 1888 and which was, in the words of Keir Hardie, 'The
Pioneer of the ILP". 2
The Scottish Labour Party
The independent challenge posed by Keir Hardie at the Parliamentary
by-election at Mid-Lanark in 1888 has been substantially chronicled.3 For our
purposes what is of interest is not the details of that electoral campaign but
the organisation which developed out of it - the SLP. In turn this leads to
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consideration of the whole question of the creation of a 'labour party', an
issue which pre-dated Mid-Lanark. David Howell, in his mammoth history of
the early years of the HP comments upon Scotland that:4
Scottish Labour could claim to be organisationally in
advance of its English counterpart ... [yet] individual prominence
and organisational precocity neither indicated nor produced
mass support.
In fact, the formation of the SLP (and Hardie's candidature at Mid-Lanark) can
be explained in terms of the very weakness of the Labour movement in
Scotland. Because of the lack of a strong trade union base, political
questions assumed a much larger importance in Scotland. The main thrust
behind the formation of the SLP came from within the coalfields of
Lanarkshire and Central Scotland. Unlike in Durham or Northumberland the
miners' unions in Scotland were not strong enough to force their choice of
representatives upon local Liberal associations. The absence of Lib-Lab M.Ps.,
and Lib-Labism generally, from Scotland, meant there was no avenue for
working class leaders into Parliament. Because of this the question of
organisation became paramount.
This is not to say that Hardie and the other miners' leaders involved with him
were merely ambitious but frustrated Liberal politicians, though they all were
or, at least, had been Liberals. The argument for independent representation
of miners and for a labour party, as articulated by Hardie, was based upon the
weakness of the mining unions in Scotland. This position was clarified in the
pages of Hardie's paper, The Miner, which argued for the State to play an
interventionist role in improving the position of miners, an argument which
was conducted against the 'independent' view of the Lib-Lab M.Ps. In the
very first issue of The Miner the Northumberland miners' M.P., Thomas Burt,
wrote, "it seems to me to appeal to Parliament to fix the hours of adults [i.e.
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adult men] is to weaken the motives for union and self-reliance."5 In
opposition to this view, Hardie and the other Scottish mining leaders did not
make a contrast between the Union and Parliament - they put an immense
effort into forming the Scottish Miners' National Federation - but, through a
recognition of their weakness, sought a potential ally in Parliament. Replying
to Burt, Hardie drew a comparison between the plight of the miner and the
Irish and Highland peasant:6
Parliament, when called upon, interfered to save the Irish
and Highland tenant farmers from landlord oppression; and it is
surely none too much to ask it to interfere in behalf of the
miner. The classes named had the opportunity, as the miner
has, of putting things right of themselves; but that which looks
well in theory is often found to be very difficult in practice. So
it is in this case. The miner finds it next to, if not quite,
impossible to continue an eight-hour day without some outside
help, and he therefore looks with confidence to Parliament to
respond to his cry by voting for the Bill.
The eight hours issue was complicated by the fact that some areas in
England and Wales already enjoyed an eight or even seven hour day and, for
them, eight hours appeared a retrograde step. Hardie gave this argument
short shrift and regarded the Lib-Lab M.Ps. who used it to explain their
opposition to an Eight Hours Bill as voting for sectional against national
interests; the eight hours was to be seen as a maximum not a minimum. In
Scotland only Fife enjoyed an eight hours day but the coal industry there was
just on the threshold of expansion and did not alter the basic position
regarding Scotland. The pressure exerted from Scotland won it a measure of
independent recognition and the Northumberland M.P.s., Burt and Fenwick,
who abstained on the Eight Hours Bill in 1887, were forced to concede that
they would vote for a separate Scottish Bill.7 Such differing perceptions
served to highlight the distinctiveness, not only of Scottish miners, but of
Scottish political life in general. The Miner of February 1888 listed the mining
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proposals likely to come before Parliament in the new session - another Eight
Hours Bill, a Mining Royalties Bill, a Mining Accidents Insurance (Scotland) Bill,
a Truck Bill, and an Arbitration Court Bill - and pointed out that:8
each and all of these measures ... proceed from Scotland,
and from the Scottish Miners' National Federation. This gives
proof of what could be done if we had a Scottish Parliament
sitting in Edinburgh.
This was a much more practical (and relevant) approach to the question of
Scottish political identity than the vague sentiments of the Scottish Land and
Labour League and the SLP, formed later in the same year, did include Home
Rule all round' in its founding Programme.9 Like socialists such as Mahon,
however, the Scottish miners' leaders were focussing upon a strategy of
achieving social reform and were looking towards Parliament and the
formation of a working class political party; a strategy that did not include
Home Rule as a major demand. The existing 'labour party', as the Lib-Lab
M.Ps. were sometimes referred to, was regarded as inadequate to the
demands, not only of the miners, but the working class as a whole.10
The Miner found the 'New Liberal Programme' of 1886 and the 'Address'
issued by the TUC Electoral Committee as totally deficient as regards the
needs of the miners. Even the contributions made by the labour M.Ps. to the
former document were seen as lacking any social content and subsuming
miners' interests purely to the dictates of the Liberal Party. The Miner refused
to regard the Liberals as beyond reproach and went so far as to question the
value of all Parties to working men: "Party be hanged we are miners first and
partisans last."11 The identification of working class interests with the fortunes
of the Liberal Party - the policy of the labour M.Ps. - was no longer tenable:
"It is the half-heartedness of the present leaders which keeps our cause from
progressing."12 Objection was made to the "apologetic tone" of the TUC
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Address, which actually referred to a "Labour Party", though there was very
little sign of its actual existence. If the only purpose of this "Labour Party"
was to return working men M.Ps. then it was worse than useless. What was
needed was a policy and this was presented by Hardie and Chisholm
Robertson, Secretary of the Stirlingshire Miners and President of the Scottish
Miners' National Federation, in the Programme of the "Sons of Labour".
Here, 'political' demands such as adult suffrage and payment of M.Ps. were
presented together with 'social' reforms like the eight hours day and the
ubiquitous local veto over the licensing laws. Both Hardie and Robertson
argued an 'evolutionary' line that the era of the Liberal Party and hence any
positive role it might have once played in politics, was now at an end.
Having done good work in the past in securing civil and religious freedoms,
the Liberal Party now had to give way to a new force.13 This view of the
Liberal Party as historically obsolete complemented the argument that the
capitalist was no longer necessary: "His day is now nearly past."14 At a
political level their emphasis varied at times between the (theoretical) end of
Liberalism and its ultimate replacement, with the practicality of simply
establishing some sort of independent labour presence.
The Trade Unions already provided a presence of sorts, but the aim was for
something more. In an editorial on the Unions, Hardie argued that a Trade
Union was firstly, "An insurance society", organised by the workers
themselves but, "to justify its existence [it] must be something more than an
insurance society.15
It possesses the means of spreading education and of
interesting the members in all questions affecting their well
being, social and political. Working men should be taught to be
members of a Labour party first, and Whigs and Tories after.
The classes do not fail to make the most of the great party
names to keep the masses divided, and while working men are
quarrelling as to whether a Whig or Tory shall rule them both
are fleecing him and sharing the plunder equally between
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themselves. We want a new party - a Labour party pure and
simple, and Trade Unions have the power to create this..."
Hardie was the Secretary of the Scottish Miners' National Federation and in
his report to the annual meeting in 1887 he returned to the theme of a
Labour Party, only now he appeared to be retreating from his statement above
on the role of the Unions:16
The formation of a Labour Party in the country has
hitherto been looked upon as a dream of the enthusiast. It
would appear as if the miners of Scotland were to have the
credit for transforming it into a reality. Resolutions have been
passed at various large centres in favour of this being done,
while in some constituencies candidates have been selected.
The Labour Party will be a distinct organisation from the Trade
Unions. It will be Conservative enough to preserve everything
that is good: liberal enough to reform what is capable of being
reformed; and radical enough to uproot and destroy whatever is
altogether wrong.
The following month he added:17
Trade unions must of necessity become more and more
political organisations, but their politics must be those of
labour. ... in Scotland ... the labour question is only beginning to
come to the front. Whatever is done in this matter should be
done apart and distinct from the Trade Unions, so that men
may not have to pay for the support of a man in Parliament
with whose general political opinions they have no sympathy.
It is obvious that Hardie wanted the unions to play a role in the Labour Party',
in fact that he saw their involvement as crucial, but he was unclear and
uncertain as to what that role should be and how far the members would
permit political activity. A clearer statement of intended organisation was
given by Chisholm Robertson in an article on the 'Programme of the Sons of
Labour':18
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It is necessary that working men's political associations
should at once be formed in every town and district in the
country, at which proposals for raising the standard of living of
the people should be debated and agreed upon. An
International Conference of representatives of these
associations should be held, and the proposals arranged into a
practical workable programme. Seats in which the power is in
the hands of the labourers should be selected, for which
well-known and tried representatives should be put forward for
places in which their influence is greatest. Political organisers
should be appointed to spread the programme and establish
branch associations, and in order to meet this expense, and to
meet contingencies likely to occur soon, an "election and
payment of members" fund should at once be revised. The
mere knowledge that such associations were in action, watchful,
and ready to call members to account for ommissions would
have an effect greater than can now even be dreamt of.
This statement of intent was both wildly ambitious - an international
dimension was envisaged - and ultra-cautious - the actual term "Party" was
not used. The Sons of Labour was an attempted off-shoot of the American
organisation, the Knights of Labour; branches were formed, mostly in the
English Midlands, though by 1892 it was almost totally defunct.19 There was
some activity in Glasgow among the dock labourers and in early 1890 the
'District Master Workman' of the Knights in the City was J. Shaw Maxwell,
editor of the old Voice of the People In Scotland, however, the idea of the
Sons' was mostly associated with the Lothian Miners' leader, William Bulloch,
another contributor to The Miner, who attempted to push the organisation in
20
the coalfields. The history of the Knights and Sons need not concern us
here beyond noting that, for Hardie and Robertson it was the political aspect
which appealed, rather than the trade union side, which was rendered
redundant, more or less, by the existence of the Scottish Miners' National
Federation. Bulloch addressed the Federation's Executive on the subject in
May 1888, and at the following meeting John Weir, Secretary of the Fife
Miners' Union, argued against the 'Sons' organising in any area other than
those which remained unorganised by the Federation.21 In 1890 a conference
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was held by the Knights in London where it was decided, "to form a
programme of action in national and local politics".22 What this meant,
however, was simply support for the TUC established Labour Electoral
Association (LEA) and, through it, for the Liberal Party. In Scotland by this
time developments had taken a completely different turn.
In Scotland, without any strong tradition of Lib-Labism, working through the
LEA was not a viable strategy; Scottish local Liberal Associations were quite
determined not to select working men candidates. The ultimate decision of
actually forming a Labour Party was only taken after exhausting attempted
routes via the Liberal Party. Towards the end of 1887, when Hardie was still a
prospective candidate for North Ayrshire, he made a speech commenting
upon how the Liberals and Tories had selected their candidates, which had
been done:23
without the mass of the people being consulted. Your
leaders have chosen the men, and now they send them down
to you to have them returned.
Hardie's solution was to, "endeavour to have a Labour Electoral Association
formed in every town and village in the constituency."24 He would then insist
on a plebiscite between himself and the Liberal Association's candidate with
whoever getting most support having a clear run against the Tory. Whether
this was a principled commitment to a more democratic procedure or just a
tactical manoeuvre to gain more credibility for his candidature, the real
purpose behind such a suggestion was to try and weaken the middle class
grip on the selection of candidates. Hardie repeated his plebiscite demand a
few months later at Mid-Lanark. It was refused and he went to the poll in a
three-cornered contest.25 Immediately after the poll - and arising out of
Hardie's campaign - branches of a new organisation, the Scottish
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Parliamentary Labour Party, were formed and the history of labour
representation entered a new, 'independent' phase.26
The 'independent' stance adopted by Hardie and the SLP was not, necessarily,
how they would have chosen matters to proceed. The formation of some
sort of labour party was not predicated on a break with the Liberal Party.
Prior to Mid-Lanark Hardie was still talking in terms of the LEA. In the article
by Chisholm Robertson, referred to above, it would appear that what was
intended by these, "working men's political associations" amounted to no less
than an 'independent Labour Party': a network of local branches, some form
on (inter) national cohesion, an electoral challenge for parliamentary seats,
paid organisers and a fund for 'party' finances. And yet the term 'Party' is not
used. Much of the talk and rhetoric about a 'labour party' must be seen as a
means of 'sueing' for a limited amount of representation from the Liberals.
The refusal of the Scottish Liberal Party to countenance working class
candidates effectively forced the issue. The term Labour Party, whether in
upper or lower case, cannot be accepted as an unproblematic definition.
However, as we are dealing here with the Labour Party in the process of
becoming a reality we should not expect a pre-defined strategy that could
simply be followed, but should expect trial and error, new initiatives meeting
varied responses and with varied success. The ad-hoc nature of labour
politics at this time must be kept in mind. A good description of this
experience is given in William Stewart's 1921 biography of Hardie:27
New organisations were born and lived a little while and
then died, but always left behind them some foundations and
corner stones for future builders. Labour Electoral Associations,
National Labour Parties, Sons of Labour - modelled on the
American Knights of Labour - Hardie was willing to try them all
and also ready to associate with the pioneers and
propogandists whom these organisations called into activity.
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The first 'official' meeting of the SLP took place in Glasgow on 19 May 1888.
Hardie explained the purpose as being, "the formation of a bona-fide Labour
28
Party in Scotland." It was decided to form a committee which would arrange
for an inaugural conference and public demonstration to be held in August,
also in Glasgow. At that Conference an Executive was elected and a
Constitution and Programme decided upon. The purpose of the new party
29
was claimed to be:
to educate the people politically, and to secure the return
to Parliament and all local bodies of members pledged to its
programme.
The Programme contained a series of political' and 'social' demands. Among
the former were adult suffrage and the abolition of plural voting, triennial
parliaments, the payment of election expenses and salaries for M.Ps. The
latter included the eight hour day, nationalisation of the land and minerals,
state acquisition of railways, waterways and tramways, and the issue of State
•3n
money only. The SLP did not declare itself socialist but, clearly there was
much in such a programme that would have appealed to socialists. The
dominant tone of the conference was, perhaps, best expressed by
Cunningham-Graham, himself a declared socialist and also a sitting Liberal
M.P., when he said that the working classes:31
were not getting a fair share of the benefits of civilisation;
and the means he proposed to help them were - shorter hours
of labour, relief works for the unemployed, nationalisation of the
means of the land, and the means of production. Now much as
they revered the party led by the G.O.M., they did not expect
them to take up a programme like that.
At the same time as socialists like Cunningham-Graham and William Small
were helping to form the SLP, there was also a significant input of radical
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opinion into the new organisation, as indicated by the election of John
Ferguson, the Irish Nationalist leader in Scotland, and Dr. G.B. Clark, the
Crofters' M.P., as the two Honorary Vice-Presidents. While the question of a
Labour party' was increasingly exercising the minds of socialists, it was also
the case that the question of labour representation was a common theme
amongst radical opinion.
The radical 'wing' of the Liberal Party tended to view the cause of labour
representation as their own or, at least, to view labour as sharing with them a
common interest against the Whigs. One example of this type of thinking is
provided by John Stuart Mill in 1870 when he supported the candidature of
George Odger, Secretary of London Trades Council, at a by-election at
Southwark, where he stood against the Liberal. The result was to let in the
Tory, although it was Odger who came second. Mill wrote to Odger:32
It is plain that the Whigs intend to monopolise political
power as long as they can without coalescing with the Radicals.
The working men are quite right in allowing Tories to get into
the House to defeat this exclusive feeling of the Whigs, and
may do it without sacrificing any principles. The working men's
policy is to insist on their own representatives and, in default of
success, to permit the Tories to be sent into the House until
the Whig majority is seriously reduced when, of course, the
Whigs will be happy to compromise and allow a few working
men representatives in the House.
Hardie's strategy in the run-up to Mid-Lanark can be seen as an echo of the
views of Mill. In March 1888 he wrote:33
Better to split the party now, if there is to be a split, than
at a general election, and if the labour party only make their
power felt now, then terms will not be wanting when the
general election comes
Hardie's stance over Mid-Lanark did receive significant support from radicals.
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The London based Henry Georgite, land-restorationist journal, The Democrat
viewed Hardie as, "the Radical candidate", who was being dished by an
unrepresentative clique, i.e. the Mid-Lanark Liberal Association.34 The
identification of labour representation with the radicals' own interest also
meant, ultimately, labour's identification with the Liberals.35
If the labour classes are to form a reliable wing of the
Liberal Party their just and equitable claims must no longer be
either tampered with or evaded.
However, taking an 'independent' line at a by-election was one thing, the
pressure for 'unity' against the Tories at a general election was a completely
different matter. In 1892 the editor of The Democrat had moved firmly back
into the Liberal camp. The SLP was running candidates against Liberals and
was forced to expel John Ferguson and Dr. Clark for speaking in support of
Liberal candidates in seats the SLP was contesting.36 The basic problem
confronting the radicals was what to do when the Liberal Party refused to
countenance Labour representation. For some, like Shaw Maxwell the solution
was to move completely towards an 'independent' line and socialism.37 For
most, however, the only course of action was to remain within the Liberal
Party where, in Hardie's words he (i.e. the Radical) "has to grin and bear the
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situation as best he may." There was also a fundamental difference between
the ambitions of the radicals who saw Labour as being a "reliable wing of the
Liberal Party" and the socialist inclined views of men like Hardie who could, at
least theoretically, consider a future beyond the Liberal Party. During the
3Q
Mid-Lanark campaign Hardie wrote:
But don't let us be mistaken: sending a "working man"
representative to Parliament is only a beginning, but it is a
beginning: ... We must get rid of this talk of working men
having a right to a 'share' in the representation. Why working
men and women (using that term to embrace all workers) must
have all the representation.
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The socialist input to the SLP involved both the SL and the SDF. As we saw
from Bruce Glasier's letter to Andreas Scheu (see Chapter One) "many"
ex-members of the League had joined the SLP. This process was encouraged
as the SL began to fracture over the question of anarchism, with the result
that, "One section of its members drifted more and more towards political
action, and identified themselves with the Labour Party programme"40 One
such was John W. Warrington, President of Glasgow Trades Council.41 At the
same time members of the SDF also joined the SLP, though without
abandoning their own organisation. Its work and involvement was recognised
by George Carson, who wrote of the SDF:42
[its] splendid work in and out of doors cannot be too
highly spoken of, and many of whose best members are also
active and zealous members of the Labour Party.
This involvement operated harmoniously - in Edinburgh it was the
membership of the Scottish Socialist Federation which actually established the
SLP branch43 - an arrangement made all the easier by the actual structure of
the SLP. The SLP operated a branch structure like any other political party but,
at the same time, its "Annual Conference" was a much broader affair at which
were represented trade union branches, trades council, co-operative societies,
land nationalisation societies, Fabians, SDF, and branches of the SLP itself. The
intention was to make the SLP the instrument for achieving labour
representation but to associate with that policy a much wider and more
representative body of opinion. After the Annual Conference there was the
Annual Business Meeting of the SLP proper. Even here, however, there was
little attempt at centralised control. As Hardie made clear, the emphasis was
44
on local autonomy:
Each branch was a separate practical organisation, and the
work of the executive appointed yearly from the conference
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ended with the carrying out of the resolutions, and taking such
action as might be necessary for extending the sphere of
operations. ... If they began to make hard and fast rules binding
on every branch then the party would in his opinion go to
pieces ... So long as members and branches and affiliated
organisations set to work on the principle of an independent
labour party, they would be left free to apply these principles in
the way best suited to the local requirements.
From SLP to ILP
The formation of the ILP in 1893 did not mark any break with the established
practices of the SLP - the pursuit of independent representation remained the
purpose of both organisations. However, the eventual assimilation of the
Scottish body into the 'National' ILP did mark a subtle change in the nature of
the SLP as an organisation. The separate identity of the SLP was lost, to a
great extent, since it became simply a Division of the ILP where before it had
been a Scottish Party in its own right. The eventual decision to join up with
the ILP was only taken almost two years after Bradford, at the final annual
conference of the SLP on 26 December 1894. The motion was moved by
Hardie and the 53 delegates from 32 Branches voted unanimously in favour.
At the same time a motion to form a Scottish "Council" of the ILP was
defeated by 28 votes to 22.45
The SLP also had to forfeit its 'twin-track' approach of annual business
meeting and annual conference. The identification of the broader labour
movement and other, sympathetic organisations with the 'Labour Party' was
lost as the single annual conference of the National ILP became the focal
point of organisation and debate. Linked to this the autonomy of the
individual branches of the SLP was lost. The ILP, as originally established,
took a very similar line to the SLP on branch autonomy but the centre of the
Party - the National Administrative Council (NAC) - soon began to exert an
increasing authority over both organisation and policy.46 This is not to say
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that the ILP became a dictatorial organisation but to point out that it did
become more of an organised Party. This represented a break with the
practice of the SLP and gradually led to a new relationship between it and
other socialists. We have seen that members of the SDF were also active
members of the SLP, but with the formation of the ILP and its identification of
itself (despite the choice of name) as a socialist Party, in Scotland this meant
that the SDF would eventually have to regard the 'Labour Party' as a rival.
This should not be regarded as an absolute division since in certain areas
both parties could work harmoniously together and, as Joan Smith has
pointed out, someone's choice of Party could depend simply on who had a
nearby branch.47 Nevertheless, the nature of the previous relationship
between the SDF and SLP was altered.
The SDF accepted the need for electoral politics though they were never so
successful in constructing labour 'alliances' as the ILP. In any joint
proceedings to construct electoral coalitions the SDF would attempt to inject
the demand for 'socialisation of the means of production, distribution and
exchange', while the ILP was happier to go along with much vaguer
commitments to reform and collectivism, in order to encourage non-
socialists to get involved. These two contrary strategies were expressed at
the SLP annual conference of January 1894. John Warrington of Glasgow
Trades Council, and ex-member of the SL, moved a resolution, the salient
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point of which was:
... we hereby recommend the workers of Scotland to
support energetically the Scottish Labour party, and every
similar organisation which has for its object the return to
Parliament and to every representative body representatives
who will act irrespective of the convenience of any political
party in securing justice to labour and the establishment of a
just social order.
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This was seconded by a delegate from Govan Trades Council who
emphasised that, "the real fundamental principle of the resolution" was labour
4q
representation in Parliament. From the SDF, however, an amendment was
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moved that would delete everything after "securing" and replace it with:
The socialisation of the means of production, distribution,
and exchange, to be owned and controlled by a Democratic
State in the interests of the entire community, and the
complete emancipation of labour from the domination of
landlordism and capitalism.
The mover of the amendment argued that while nationalisation of the land
would secure the workers a "fairer" share of the wealth produced only full
socialisation could provide them with "the full reward of their labour". Hardie,
acting as Chairman, said on behalf of the executive that they were "aware that
there were different parties among the Socialists" and that the resolution had
been framed so as to, "express the idea of socialism without committing the
idea of socialism to any one school."51 The SDF amendment was lost by 57
votes for to 104 against. Hardie s statement however, still suggested that the
SLP was committed to socialism and this led to an objection from David
McLardy, delegate from the Scottish Land Restoration Union, who stated that
"he was not in favour of what was known as Socialism", (which provoked a
cry of "Oh, Dear") and that, "Unless it was understood that he was not
committed to that movement, he must move an amendment."52 The radical
influence on the SLP, however, was on the wane, no further amendment was
moved and the original resolution was then carried unanimously.
This debate was repeated throughout the pre-war period. In January 1900
the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) promoted a "Workers Conference
on Parliamentary and Local Representation", which was to give birth to the
Scottish Workers' Representation Committee (SWRC), effectively the Labour
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Party in Scotland until its dissolution in 1909.53 Represented at the
Conference were Trades Councils, Trade Unions, the Co-operative movement,
the ILP and the SDF. The main discussion was around the first resolution,
which was on working class representation':54
Recognising that no real progress had been made with
those important measures of social and industrial reform which
are absolutely necessary for the comfort and wellbeing of the
working classes, and further recognising that neither of the two
political parties can or will give effect to those reforms, this
Conference is of opinion that the only means by which such
reforms can be obtained is by having direct independent
working class representation in the House of Commons and on
local administrative bodies, and hereby pledges itself to secure
that end as a logical sequence to the possession of political
power by the working classes.
Two amendments were offered to the resolution. One was to drop
"independent", and this was defeated by 141 votes to 13. The SDF then
moved to include, "to secure the socialisation of the means of production,
distribution and exchange", which received 23 votes. This vote did not mean,
according to the ILP view of politics, that any commitment to socialism had
been negated. The Chairman of the Conference was Bob Smillie of the
Lanarkshire Miners, and prominent member of the ILP, who described himself
as "a trade unionist, co-operator and socialist", and argued that the
conference which was made up of the "different sections of the democratic
movement" had "established the new Trinity of Labour."55 As with the SLP in
1894 the temper of the Conference appeared to be socialist. Smillie managed
to re-introduce a commitment to socialism by arguing - after the defeat of
the SDF resolution - that the majority were actually in favour of its inclusion,
only "there was no special reason for adding it to the resolution."56
There has been a tendency to regard the SDF as a dogmatic and humourless
type of organisation. Smillie criticised them for losing much of the value in
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their arguments by, "a too persistently aggressive spirit."57 Joseph Duncan,
full-time organiser for the ILP in Scotland complained, after a run-in with
John Maclean that, "They are a queer breed of impossible people the SDF."58
Like all myths' this view of the SDF does have a basis in reality, though it is
important to note that the most assiduous propogators of the myth' tended
to be prominent members of the ILP. As David Howell has commented:59
The image of the Social Democratic Federation as a
narrow dogmatic sect unsuited to the pragmatic rigours of
British politics is a tendentious, partial and misleading one, in
which the polemical judgements of some ILP contemporaries
have been canonised into firm historical verdicts.
For many in the ILP the more attractive strategy was 'socialist unity' with the
SDF, rather than the softly-softly approach of the 'Labour alliance'. Harry
McShane has recalled how he left the ILP in 1911 to join the newly formed
British Socialist Party, which was basically the old SDF with Victor Grayson,
Robert Blatchford and "the best elements of the ILP."60 However, it was only a
minority of the ILP which defected and, according to McShane, in Glasgow
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some joined the BSP while retaining their ILP membership. The SDF was
capable of giving a public lead over campaigning - like opposition to the Boer
War and unemployment - but it is clear that it was the ILP which made the
running in promoting labour representation. Their approach did attract other
forces, which would not accept a purely socialist platform, into electoral
alliances. Though at times the ILP did have to stand on its own, the
commitment to forming a party of labour was always there and, certainly
insofar as Glasgow is concerned, the link between socialism and labour as an
electoral force was made solely through the ILP.
Elections - 1) Parliamentary
As far as parliamentary representation is concerned, Scotland was one of the
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weak spots for Labour. In a direct comparison with England, I.G.C. Hutchinson
clearly shows how much less successful was the Labour challenge, both in
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terms of the number of seats contested and those actually won. And yet, an
'independent' challenge to Liberalism emerged in Scotland first. Prior to
Mid-Lanark, the Scottish land Restoration League (SLRL) stood five candidates
at the general election of 1885 in and around Glasgow. Their polls averaged
472 votes and a 6 per cent share. These results, however, divide into two
groups: In Tradeston, Partick and Greenock the averages were 75 votes and a
1.1 per cent share, while in Hutchesontown and Bridgeton the SLRL candidates
received 1,156 and 14.4 per cent, and 978 and 12.1% respectively.63 Only the
latter two were bona-fide candidates, the other three being "reprisal"
candidates against the Liberals for their having refused the first two straight
fights against the Conservatives.64 The SLRL had little, if any, direct Labour
support, though it could well have expected some. Glasgow Trades Council
refused its endorsement even though the franchise reforms of 1884/5 had
encouraged it to re-consider the question of independent labour
representation. It commented that the Reform Act, "has added ... to the roll of
voters two million of the working classes who had previously no voice in
matters political." Claiming that it had always been in "the most complete
unanimity" as regards the desirability of having labour men in Parliament it
concluded that, "the time for action ... had arrived."65
The SLRL may have been more concerned with the Highland agitation and
land reform, but these issues were not seen as irrelevant to the needs of the
industrial working class. During 1885 the Glasgow Trades Council circulated
trades councils throughout Britain for their opinion of the causes of the poor
state of trade, and found:66
in nearly all cases the opinion held was that the present
unsatisfactory state of the Land Laws was the great cause of
the current depression."
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Despite such an analysis Glasgow Trades Council was not yet prepared to
support electoral challenges against the Liberal Party. This would only occur
when the personnel of the Council changed and also its political stance -
from Liberal to Labour. A footnote to the SLRL campaign is that the candidate
at Hutchesontown was none other than Shaw Maxwell, who was to re-contest
the same seat ten years later for the ILP.67
Glasgow Trades Council did support Hardie's candidature at Mid-Lanark and,
although it did not join the SLP at its foundation it did affiliate eventually and
it was one of the constituent members of the short-lived Scottish United
Trades Council Labour Party (SUTCLP). The history of the SUTCLP need not
detain us for very long; formed in 1891 it had disappeared by 1893. Partly
influenced by H.H. Champion the SUTCLP did not at first appear as a rival to
the SLP but personal conflicts involving Champion and Chishoim Robertson
versus Hardie certainly imparted that edge to relations between the two
organisations. However, the SUTCLP was a short-lived phenomenon, though
its longer-term significance can be seen as being part of the ad-hoc
development of independent labour'. As David Howell has commented:68
Yet the success of the SUTCLP in cultivating links with
trades councils indicated some shift in Scottish trade union
opinion which could produce subsequent benefits for the SLP.
At the beginning of 1893 an SLP delegate at the annual conference could
claim of Glasgow Trades Council that, 'The Council was theirs and they would
CQ
keep it. In the General Election of 1892 three Glasgow seats were
contested; two by the SLP and one by the SUTCLP. The SLP candidates stood
in Camlachie and Tradeston where they secured 906 votes and 12 per cent
and 783 votes and 11 per cent respectively, while the single SUTCLP
candidate, for the College constituency, managed only 225 votes and 2 per
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cent. Disappointing as these results were, some consolation could still be
taken from them. Speaking at the SLP conference the following January
Hardie pointed out that, "At the recent General Election the Labour Party was
for the first time in evidence as an organised movement."70 The seven labour
candidates in Scotland (4 SLP and 3 SUTCLP) had accounted for 14 per cent
of the poll. Hardie went on to claim that, "the same proportion would hold
good all over the country, a fact which proves the strength of the labour vote
and its power for good if properly directed."71 The basis of Hardie's optimism
(apart from his own triumph in West Ham) could only have been realistically
based upon forcing concessions from the Liberals, since in both Tradeston
and Camlachie the SLP intervention was sufficient to deprive the Liberals of
victory.
No deals were made with the Liberals in Scotland, however, which was crucial
in restricting Labour representation north of the border prior to 1918. At the
General Election of 1895 the ILP stood eight candidates in Scotland, five of
whom contested Glasgow constituencies. The Glasgow average poll was 502
votes and 7.5 per cent. Only Bob Smillie, standing for Camlachie, managed to
get more than 10 per cent of the votes, and in Hutchesontown, Shaw Maxwell
managed to secure only half the number and proportion of votes he received
ten years previously. Even the Labour Leader had to admit that the Glasgow
polls were "disgracefully small"72 and after this debacle Labour's parliamentary
ambitions became much more circumspect: only one Labour candidate stood
in Glasgow at the General Election of 1900 and only two in the Elections of
1906 and 1910.
In 1900 the Glasgow Labour candidate was the only one to stand in the whole
of Scotland - this was A.E. Fletcher who stood in Camlachie under the
auspices of the SWRC 73 It was the ILP which was principally behind Fletcher's
candidature - he had stood down in Aberdeen at a by-election in 1896 once
78
Tom Mann entered the field74 - and they were able to get a significant
coalition of forces to support him, the SWRC, the SDF, the Clarion Scouts, the
United Irish League, the Trades Council and, most significantly, the local
Liberal Association.75 The key to this coalition was the Boer War which
possibly explains the Liberals' failure to promote a candidate of their own, and
Fletcher's anti-war stand made him acceptable to the socialists. The 1900 or
"Khaki" election was unique in Glasgow' political history as the first and only
time that the City returned a wholly Unionist (four Conservatives and three
Liberal Unionists) representation to Parliament. Fletcher's performance was
certainly creditable, getting over 3,000 votes and 42 per cent of the poll, but
the unique circumstance of this election reduces its significance.
Labour eventually made its breakthrough in 1906 when George Barnes, of the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE), won Hutchesontown, defeating both
Conservative and Liberal in a three-cornered contest. Both Barnes and
Joseph Burgess, the candidate in Camlachie, were members of the ILP, and
even if Barnes, "had no time for Glasgow socialists"76 the preference for
moderate trade unionists as parliamentary candidates was part and parcel of
the I LP's strategy. Barnes success and the relatively high poll in Camlachie
were partly due to Irish support for Labour in preference to the Liberals.77
Alongside Barnes, Labour also returned Alex Wilkie in the two-member
Dundee seat, again in the face of Liberal opposition. Labour's success overall
in Britain in returning 30 M.Ps. in 1906, enthused the ILP which, even in
Scotland, despite only securing two victories, could share in the general
euphoria and even claim a distinctive contribution. Joseph Duncan wrote to
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his fiancee, "And so the Revolution is started at last."
We have done much better in Scotland than I expected. ...
This is not a big proportion but then it must be remembered
that in Scotland we have not a clear fight anywhere. In every
constituency we have to fight both Liberal & Tory. Although this
makes harder fighting it is much more satisfactory. When we
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get our men in it means that they go in on our own votes. It
declares the open war. ... It is the clear trumpet call of the
revolution.
However, the cause of labour representation in Scotland stubbornly refused to
move. In the general election of December 1910 William Adamson won a
further seat in West Fife, giving a grand total of three Scottish Labour M.Ps.
Even this may exaggerate the strength of Labour's "own votes". While Barnes
and Wilkie originally won their seats against Liberals they did not
subsequently have to face Liberal opposition. Adamson's victory was also
achieved against a Liberal but he appears to have benefitted from the
decision of the Conservatives not to contest after their third-place in the
January 1910 election. The crucial factor, as regards Labour's performance in
Scotland compared with England, was that indicated by Duncan above, the
failure of the Lib-Lab pact to operate north of the border. The Liberal
acceptance of both Barnes and Wilkie after 1906 was simply the acceptance
of a fait accompli, made easier by the 'loyalty' of the Labour Party in
Parliament to the Liberal Government. Elsewhere Labour was not strong
enough to force the issue and the Liberals in Camlachie were prepared to
lose the seat to the Unionists (as happened in all three elections in 1906 and
1910) rather than cede their claim to it to Labour. Even if the non-existence
of the Lib-Lab pact in Scotland was partly due to timing - the Scottish
Liberals only considered it after Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign had
been launched, allowing the Liberal Party to place itself firmly at the head of
the Progressive forces79 - Labour s failure to force concessions reflects both
its own weakness and the continuing strength of the Liberal Party in
Scotland.80
Elections - 2) Municipal: From The 'Forces of the Democracy' to the Labour
Party.
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Local elections offer more scope for the psephologist, in that they were
conducted annually rather than the irregular occurrences of general elections,
and that municipal wards covered much smaller areas than parliamentary
constituencies, thus allowing a more detailed picture of local social indicators.
We shall cover the actual detail of Labour's municipal programme in the
following chapter, and the question of the electorate in Chapter Six. At the
moment our concern lies with the organisation of Labour's electoral presence
at the municipal level.
The ILP's first electoral success in Glasgow occurred at the Municipal election
o 1
of 1895 when it ran three candidates and managed to return two of them.
This breakthrough, however, was facilitated by the general lack of interest
shown in the polls that year due to a complete re-organisation of ward
boundaries (necessary after the extension of the City boundaries in 1891) to
take place the following year, which meant that victorious candidates would
only have one year on the Corporation before having to stand for re-election
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rather than the normal three-year term. While most other organisations and
individuals were concentrating their energies for the full local general'
municipal election in 1896 when all seats on the Council would have to be
contested, the ILP took the opportunity of securing at least some sitting
Councillors. The Trades Council, which had previously 'endorsed' candidates
for the municipal elections, took no took no part in the 1895 contests, but this
was because it was planning a much more substantial intervention for 1896.
It was clear that this 'general' election would provide a unique opportunity for
the proponents of Labour representation and the Trades Council put itself at
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the front of this movement.
It had been agreed [in 1895] to appoint a Standing
Committee of the Council to keep in touch with the Ward
Committees and other bodies of workers, so as to be able to
increase the numbers and thus strengthen the position of the
Labour members of the Town Council. It was felt that no such
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opportunity was likely to again occur as, owing to the
re-arrangement of the Wards, the whole of the 75 members fell
to be elected...
This view marked a complete departure from the timorous attitude towards
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local labour representation held by the Trades Council a decade previously.
The change in attitude had been brought about by the gradually increasing
socialist element in the Trades Council which, particularly after 1892, was
effectively dominant. The Council did not, however, intend to act alone but to
create an effective 'labour party' which would comprise delegates from the
Trades Council, individual union branches, the ILP, the Glasgow Federation of
Co-operative Societies and the Irish National League (INL). An inaugural
meeting was held with three delegates from each 'central' body at which a
Programme was drafted. Following on from this a "large and
well-represented" meeting of delegates from branches was held on 12 June
at which it was decided to form and run candidates under a Workers
Municipal Committee. This Committee (which soon became known as the
Workers Election Committee (WEC)) numbered approximately 160:85
and when it is borne in mind that only two delegates were
allowed for each body or Trade Society, it will at once be seen
that it was what it claimed to be - representative in a very high
degree of the workers of the city.
Glasgow's 'general' election of 1896 provided a great stimulus to political
organisation, propoganda and debate, much needed after the depressing
performance of the ILP campaign at the Parliamentary polls the previous year.
This new enthusiasm was reflected in the publication of a new socialist
journal, The Glasgow Commonweal A monthly publication, the The Glasgow
Commonweal was not presented as a party organ but was an open affair
giving space to the activities of the ILP, SDF and Clarion Scouts. Although it
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only survived for eight issues, it did cover the preparations for the
forthcoming municipal elections and it was the doings of the WEC which
came to dominate its pages. The full implications of the alliance being
constructed by the ILP and Trades Council were not welcomed by all
socialists or all members of the ILP and the debate over the WEC was carried
on within The Glasgow Commonweal The very choice of title refers back
directly to the old Socialist League/William Morris Commonweal and the
debate over electoral strategy in 1896 echoes the debate which the Socialist
League underwent in 1887. The difference being that the SL was divided over
the question of electoral politics per se, while the Socialists in Glasgow in
1896 were divided over whether or not electoral politics should be pursued
with non-socialists.
The 'purist' line against any electoral compromises was expressed in a long
article by George Neil entitled, "Socialism or Dishonour".86 It was, he wrote,
"the desire of some socialists to run conjointly with the Trade Unionists, Irish
Nationalists, and Co-operators under the name of the Workers Party'" (as the
WEC was often called). This name, 'Workers' Party', was in Neil's view
acceptable to all only because it "does not suggest anything at all of
Socialism". However, the dilemna was that since they believed that only
socialism could solve the "Labour problem" it was the duty of socialists to
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push it forward at every opportunity:
But are we at all likely to accomplish our object by
burying our identity, and following the lead of a few
idiosyncratic individuals who have made up their minds to be
returned "by hook or by crook" for one constituency or another,
to the 'Marble Halls of Glasgow'. ... To run under any other
name than that which we are best known by merely because a
few of the supporters of the other parties are willing to go a
short part of the way with us and then cry halt is not the way
to further Socialism.
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Moreover, among the Trade Unionists, Co-operators and Irish Nationalists
there were "some [who] hate both Socialism and Socialists as strongly as the
devil is supposed to hate holy water." Their alliance with socialism was
simply a marriage of convenience prompted by their understanding that
"Socialism is now a power in Glasgow" and that they needed the "assistance
of the Socialists in the various wards" to get their candidates returned.
In Neil's estimation both the Trade Unions and the Co-ops were moving in he
direction of socialism and there was an implicit, logical connection between
them and socialists but, as regards the Irish, he was particularly hostile, as his
reference to "holy water" might suggest. Neil admitted that many Irishmen
had supported socialists in the past, "but it must be remembered that those
Irishmen were, and some of them still are, Socialists." He questioned the very
basis of the Irish claim to representation in the City - as residents and
ratepayers yes, but not as "Nationalists whose sole object is Home Rule for
Ireland." Locally, the Nationalists had, at the last Parish Council Election, run
in a leet with Liberals and Tories against Socialist candidates, and generally
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Neil's opinion of them was unequivocal:
they are so shifty that no party can depend for any length
of time upon their support. ... the nationalist party, as a party, in
and out of the House of Commons, are among the bitterest
opponents of Socialism.
In contrast, the co-operators, wrote Neil, "have a claim to our support",
because, "Many of our comrades are Co-operators, and there is
unquestionably a manifest desire among Co-operators to know more about
Socialism." This being so he felt able to claim that the Co-ops would support
Socialist candidates. As for the Unions:89
They are undoubtedly gradually coming round to
Socialism, and many of our best men among them are not
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afraid to openly espouse our cause."
While workers' organisation was necessary under capitalism, trade unionism
did not provide the solution to "the industrial anarchy which dominates the
world today" and would prove less able to withstand capitalism in the future .
It was necessary, therefore, that all socialist candidates should stand on a
socialist platform. Neil was not advocating abstention but it was clear that the
return of "two or three Socialists to the Council" was not seen as being of
any particular value, and his emphasis on the educative role of speaking and
acting Socialism could have come straight out of the Commonweal of 1886.
Neil's was not a lone voice, however, and he can be regarded as
representative of one strand of thinking, basically that of the SDF which still
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retained an active presence within the ILP. He received support from
another contributor who saw more cons than pros in the workers' coalitions,
especially, "the risk of being obliged to not only vote for, but to run
non-Socialist candidates."91 Someone else argued for getting as many
Socialists as possible onto the Ward Committees through which, "Socialist
representation will be made easier, and a good opportunity afforded for
pushing non-Socialist representatives in our direction."92 However, the very
real opportunity which existed for returning a significant number of 'Labour'
Councillors proved the stronger influence. All ILP branches save one were
affiliated to the WEC and a letter on, 'The Policy of Socialists a Municipal
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Elections", stated what would appear to have been the majority view:
As a Socialist and a Trade Unionist I think the policy now
being carried out is the best under the circumstances.
Candidates are scarce, money is ditto, and we depend for our
votes largely on the non-socialist but fairly sympathetic, yet
easily alienated trade union voters. We wish to challenge the
personnel of the Council, to do which we must win new seats
and keep those we have, and when limited action for a given
end is possible, we are justified in seizing the opportunity.
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This was a very straightforward exposition of the 'labour alliance' strategy.
However, the WEC, or 'workers' party' included more than just the socialists
and trade unionists. It also had within its ranks the Irish Nationalists and the
Co-operators, and these four distinct groups in total accounted for what we
might term the "forces of the democracy". The term "the democracy" was
used to denote the working class or, rather, the enfranchised working class in
its organised expression. Through its own self-organisation the working class
was seen as gradually establishing its own agenda in political affairs.
Commenting on the Glasgow municipal election of 1894 the Glasgow Herald
pointed out how "incongruous" the old, familiar mottoes of "retrenchment and
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reform" and "economy and efficiency" had become:
especially at this time, when the new democracy is asking
that the Corporation shall become a sort of universal employer
of labour, which is to be remunerated at trade union rates and
is to go on only for eight hours a day. However this may be, it
is the fact that in several of the wards in which there were
contests many votes were given on the understanding that the
candidates for whom they were recorded were "sound" on the
labour and eight hours question.
It was within this organised sense of "the democracy" and with the
knowledge that there were certain demands that this "democracy" would
support, that the ILP sought to locate its electoral strategy. The Chairman of
the WEC, John Cronin, argued that this represented a "very agreeable change"
in the ILP in Glasgow:95
Quite a number of honest Trade Unionists socialistically
inclined have complained of the narrow, bitter spirit in which
the party in times past approached public questions. It was a
common saying that the ILP would not could not work
harmoniously unless they had everything their own way. This
may or may not be true of the past, it is not true today. The
Glasgow ILPers seem to have profited by experience, and I think
it simple justice to say that in all recent movements they have
struck a keen desire to work heartily with the Trade Unionists.
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There was a certain amount of dissimilation going on here since it was the
ILPers within the Trades Council who had pushed for the creation of the WEC,
though it was the case that the two organisations were by no means
synonymous. Cronin was a significant figure since, as well as being Chairman
of the WEC, he was also President of the Trades Council, Secretary of the Iron
and Steel Workers Union, and the municipal candidate for Dalmarnock Ward.
He was also a Roman Catholic and a Socialist. Not surprisingly his view of
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the forthcoming election was quite different to that of George Neil:
It is sincerely to be hoped that the different sections will
not seek to overload the programme with their own particular
theories I don't believe in a big document full of empty
platitudes. What we want is something that will appeal to the
common sense of the workers, and likely to be realised in a few
years.
Of the four 'democratic forces' that constituted the WMC, the ILP and the
Trades Council involvement need little explanation. The ILP's basic strategy -
despite manifestations of "narrow, bitter spirit" - was based upon forming a
labour electoral alliance. The Trades Council had always taken a political role
in attempting to secure reforms in the trade union interest and had, since the
mid-1880s, accepted the logic of actual labour representation; the increasing
dominance of socialists within the Council had developed that acceptance into
a commitment to 'independent labour'. The Co-operative movement in
Scotland generally played a more prominent role in Labour politics than its
counterpart in England. Partly this was due to the relative weakness of
Scottish trade unionism which gave the Co-ops a much greater weight within
the Labour movement in Scotland. Certainly, Socialists put a great deal of
effort into propoganda and educative work with the co-operative societies
(and we shall discuss this in a later chapter), but 1896 saw the Co-ops in
Glasgow throw their hats into the WEC ring largely due to a direct assault
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upon their own organisation.
This was an attempted Boycott by private butchers to prevent Co-op
Societies buying directly in the meat and cattle market. Essentially the
Boycott represented an attack by small traders on what they perceived as the
unfair competition from the Co-ops which were attracting increasing custom.
In 1888 a Scottish Traders' Defence Association had been established in
Glasgow which not only attempted boycotts against societies but also sought
to victimise individual co-operators at their place of work.97 When the
butchers re-activated this campaign in 1896 they did so in a situation which
was very likely to lead the Co-ops into direct political involvement. Not only
were the labour forces offering to defend the Societies' right to buy in the
meat markets, but the whole question of access to the markets could only be
decided by the City Corporation since they were publicly owned. According
to the historian of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (SCWS), the
1896 Boycott led to, "the start of a sustained effort on the part of the Scottish
QQ
Co-operators to obtain Parliamentary representation."
This did not lead, however, to a consistent commitment to work with the
'workers party'. The Co-operative movement was represented at the founding
of the Scottish Workers' Representation Committee (SWRC) in 1899/1900. but
the Glasgow Societies had by that time already withdrawn from the WEC. The
Labour Leader explained the non-involvement of the Co-ops in 1899 as due
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to the WEC changing its Secretary who had been a Co-op nominee.
However, the most likely explanation would appear to be that, having secured
their position against the private traders, the Co-ops lost interest and
reverted back to their 'no-politics' stand. Even as early as 1897 the WEC was
comprised only of delegates from the Trades Council, the ILP, and the INL.100
The involvement of the Irish in the WEC caused a certain difficulty with the
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Co-ops who refused to endorse one of the nominated WEC candidates (P.
O'Hare of the INL who was standing in Springburn) because, "he was engaged
in the wine and spirit business."101 At the same time municipalisation of the
liquor traffic' was one of the items in the WEC programme which all
candidates were pledged to. This was a difficult item for the INL since many
Irish were employed in the 'trade'. Nevertheless they did accept it and even
when an INL proposal to drop this item was defeated in 1898, they did not, on
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that account, leave the Committee. The politics of the Irish community and
its relationship to Labour and Socialism will be examined in detail in a
subsequent chapter. However, its identification as part of 'the forces of the
democracy' is worthy of comment on two counts. One is that the very active
role taken by the INL in the pursuit of labour representation through the WEC
qualifies the standard view of the Irish as being an electoral barrier to Labour.
Obviously the link at a municipal level was easier to make since the question
of Home Rule was not a dominant concern, but this local involvement with
Labour does indicate a (strong) tendency within the Irish community to
identify with the interests of the working class. This leads to the second
point. The Irish or Catholic-Irish were predominantly working class, in fact
mainly of the poorer working class. They were cultivated by proponents of
labour representation because of their perceived voting strength and that they
were primariily working class. But despite their 'national' identification the
branches of the INL provided a voice for members of the largely unskilled,
poorer workers who were not, by any means, adequately represented by the
'purely' Labour organisations. This provided an answer to George Neil's
questioning of the right of the Irish to local representation. As Bruce Glasier
admitted of the United Irish League (UIL) - as the INL became - despite all its
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shortcomings it was, nontheless, "a democratic party acting for the poor."
The success of the WEC in getting a significant number of Councillors elected
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- the 'labour group' on the Town Council became known as the "Stalwarts" -
put Glasgow in the forefront of Labour organisation and appeared to set an
example which could be followed nationally. In 1901 the Labour Leader
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opened up a debate on electoral strategy under the heading:
Wanted. A Stalwart Party in Parliament. Can the Forces of
Democracy be United.
The subject for discussion is not the need for a Labour
Party or even for its being independent, but whether it is
possible for Labour to unite with other advanced sections of
politicians so as to secure joint action in and out of Parliament,
and if so, upon what terms and conditions is such joint action
to be secured , and what are its likely effects upon the Labour
movement.
By using the term "Stalwart Party" the leadership of the ILP were setting the
parameters of the debate, indicating the outcome they preferred. Ironically, at
just this time the 'democratic alliance' which had created the WEC in Glasgow
was in the process of decay. At the municipal polls of 1902 the Glasgow
Herald commented upon:105
the almost entire disappearance of the word "Stalwart"
from the vocabulary of the candidates and their supporters. It
has for some time been a term of reproach, and has been
regarded by various extreme partisans as synonomous with
broken pledges and empty professions.
The exact structure of this 'labour party' in Glasgow had been unclear even in
1896 and, although the Stalwarts became an identifiable grouping on the
Town Council over the next few years, the unity of the alliance gradually
dissipated, making it increasingly difficult to identify just who exactly
represented labour in the City Chambers. The WEC was not a political party
and did not have a Party discipline. The candidates it adopted had to accept
the programme formulated by the WEC but, apart from having to declare the
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sources of funds beyond WEC contributions, there were no restraints on
those standing for office. In 1896-99 this very looseness appeared a positive
virtue, especially as the Stalwarts, while retaining, "fads and influences of old
associations ... never disagree on essentials."106
Indeed the constitution of the Committee is more in the
nature of an honourable understanding than a set of hard and
fast rules which people are punished for breaking. Hitherto the
work has been carried on without much friction is hoped and
believed there will be less and less as succeeding years bring
the wisdom that is born of experience.
The loss of the Co-operators seriously depleted the funds of the WEC.107 The
next group to depart was the INL, mainly due to differences with the ILP over
the division of seats. The final straw for the Irish came with the death of John
Ferguson in 1905 and the ILP claiming his Calton seat as 'LabouT, rather than
108
recognising it as 'Irish'. Far from being an example to Labour nationally,
Glasgow now appeared to be seriously out of step. After the Municipal polls
in 1905 and the loss of two 'labouT seats the Labour Leader commented
acidly, "Perhaps there are reasons for this which the party in Glasgow will
have to take into serious consideration."109 With even the Trades Council
losing interest in the WEC it had become, more or less, a shell containing
only the ILP. Unity of the democratic forces had proven more difficult to
maintain than has been thought back in 1896, and the ILP's own ambitions
had become a source of antagonism. One later explanation for the break-up
stated:110
As the Socialist element grew in strength on the WEC its
programme and policy became more exclusively "Socialist".
This was not to the liking of the UIL, nor the Co-operators, and
as a consequence they seceded.
As Labour representation on Glasgow Town Council continued to decline
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throughout the early 1900s, the explanation by activists became more
focussed upon the need for a more structured organisation. Labour's failure
in these years was thrown into sharper relief by the success enjoyed by an
individual named Andrew Scott Gibson who, originally identifying himself as a
Socialist, fought a number of highly personalised, populist campaigns against
the Corporation establishment' and municipal 'extravagance'. His role shall be
discussed in the following chapter but it was significant that he appeared able
to win in almost any Ward he chose to stand and that he always attracted a
massive turnout of electors. The Glasgow correspondent of the Labour
Leader regarded the success of Scott Gibson as indicative of the, "emergence
of a type of free-lance candidate which, by claiming affinity with Labour, does
nothing but harm to the Labour cause." What permitted this phenomenon
was, "The absence of a well-organised municipal Labour party outside the
Town Council, with a well-defined municipal policy."111 The very loose
structure of the WEC, previously regarded as a virtue, was now seen as a
hindrance in that it discouraged the development of an organisation with a
definite policy and a sense of party discipline.
An opportunity to construct a Labour Party on the ground had been offered
by the SWRC, the Scottish equivalent of the Labour Representation Committee
(LRC). The SWRC has recently been described as a weak and ineffectual
organisation, basically "a failure".112 While undoubtedly lacking in energy and
dynamism, the SWRC had to labour under the burden of critical
under-funding. This was because, although established under the aegis of
the STUC, trade unions in Scotland tended on the whole to send their total
affiliation fees to the London-based LRC. The SWRC constantly tried to have it
established that, like the STUC, they should have a right to the proportion of
monies produced from the Scottish members.113 Behind this dispute and the
eventual disbandment of the SWRC, was the determination of the LRC, and its
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Secretary Ramsay MacDonald, to maintain all union contributions and displace
the SWRC. As one executive member of the SWRC stated:114
the aim of the Labour Party was to extinguish the Scottish
Committee, and proposal to that effect had been made to the
Committee during his term of office.
With the collapse of the SWRC the Labour Party gave little attention to
Scottish affairs with the result that, up to the outbreak of War in 1914,
"organisation lagged substantially behind the levels attained at this time in
England."115 Glasgow, however, was partly responsible for failing to create a
local 'Labour Party'. The opportunity had been presented by the SWRC which,
at its first annual conference, passed a resolution in favour of the
establishment of local committees which would undertake all electoral work -
both parliamentary and municipal. This was opposed by the ILP in Glasgow
which moved an amendment, "that local committees only deal with
Parliamentary work and leave municipal elections to others."116 Whether the
ILP opposed this resolution in order to maintain their own local dominance or
to retain their alliance with the Irish (who were not part of the SWRC) is
unclear. But what is clear is that Labour organisation in Glasgow was in
serious decline. In the run-up to the polls in 1908 a correspondent in
Forward complained of the WEC and the "same old wrangle over trifles, the
same old higgle-de-piggledy, unorganised way of doing things."117
If we had selected six seats and fought them in November
with six good men and had them early enough in the field, we
could win something. But here we are, nothing done, nor will
anything be done until the last moment, and then we shall
waste our energies over some dozen divisions and win nothing.
The Trades Council has withdrawn their delegates [from the
WEC] Isn't it about time the ILP was doing the same, and
uniting with the Trades Council to form an LRC?
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In fact some progress was being made along these lines. In Springburn - "a
great Trade Union stronghold" - there was a local LRC which had chosen the
Labour candidate.118 The following year the Trades Council began to take a
more active role again and appointed a new Election Committee, at which
time Labour started to win seats on the Corporation again.119 The eventual
formation of the Glasgow Labour Party still took a few years. Despite
protracted discussions between the ILP, Trades Council and the Fabian Society
the general trend towards a more cohesive organisation was apparent.
Labour's re-emergence was not based upon an attempt to re-activate the
alliance of the democracy' but was, rather, a development of Labour's own
organisational strength and discipline, within which the forces of the
1 20
democracy could be incorporated. The contrast with the WEC is clear:
The Glasgow Labour Party was instituted in 1912, and is
composed of delegates from the Trades Council, Glasgow ILP
Federation, seven divisional LRCs, the Fabian Society and the
Women's Labour League. It takes the place of the Workers'
Municipal Elections Committee (now defunct) and is the
controlling body in all matters appertaining to Parliamentary,
Municipal, Parish Council and School Board candidatures, and
has a deciding voice on questions of policy and discipline, such
questions being submitted to a conference of members and
public representatives. The Party devotes attention to
Registration and Political Organisation generally.
Just as the WEC, in its heyday, had not been simply a centralist shell, but had
gathered within it a multiplicity of local organisations, so too did the Glasgow
Labour Party. The significant difference is that it did so not as "a composite
body", which the WEC had been, but as a "controlling body."121 The seven
LRCs corresponded to the seven Glasgow Parliamentary Divisions and had
responsibility for selecting candidates for local and national elections. The
LRCs were themselves delegate bodies, having no individual membership
structure, but it was the affiliated organisations that were the evidence of
Labour's strength. The "basis of representation" of Blackfriars and
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Hutchesontown LRC included delegates from Trade Union branches, ILP
branches, British Socialist Party, Women's Labour League, Housing Association,
Co-operative Women's Guild, Food Protest Association, Kinning park
Co-operative Society, United Baking Co-operative Society.122
Although undated this document refers to the First World War, as the
affiliation of the BSP and Food Protest Association indicate. The inclusion of
single issue campaigning bodies like the Food Protest and Housing
Associations are indicative of Labour's strength beyond formal party'
structures, a development that was greatly accelerated during wartime. Two
other changes from the WEC are noticeable. One is the organised presence
of women, whose increasing public role had been in evidence prior to 1914,
but which also developed rapidly during the War. The great absence from the
Labour Party was the Irish who were not permitted affiliation. This created a
resentment amongst Irish political opinion in the City, yet the lack of an
organised presence did not mean a total absence of on the part of the Irish,
many of whom were taking active roles in Labour politics. The ILP delegates
to the Blackfriars and Hutchesontown LRC numbered eight, meaning that there
were four branches affiliated, which indicated its continuing significance.
Whether acting 'independently' or in an electoral 'alliance' it remained the
case that, "the ILP was the Labour Party' on the ground and in constituency
wards around Clydeside."123
Membership of The ILP
Although the role of the ILP in Glasgow is now well-attested to, there has
been little attempt to provide detail on its actual organisational and social
structure.124 Despite the paucity of records, particularly those relating to
individual branches, what there is in the ILP Archive is still of substantial
value.125 The SLP had seven branches covering the seven Parliamentary
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Divisions of Glasgow, plus a branch in Govan and a Women's Labour Party
(later the Women's branch of the ILP). Apart from the Women's branch, which
collapsed in 1898, these branches were the mainstay of the ILP in Glasgow. In
times of expansion they grew and formed 'extra' branches in their respective
Divisions, while in periods of retrenchment they, at least, retained some sort
of existence; in 1896 there were 17 branches, in 1910 18 branches, while
between 1899 and 1902 there were only the eight 'core' branches plus
Partick.126
There are no figures for membership of the SLP available, which is hardly
surprising given the 'autonomy' enjoyed by its branches would hardly have
encouraged much collection of information at the 'centre'. The first
membership figures we have for Glasgow are for the ILP in 1896 when eight
of the 17 branches provided numbers. Central Branch had 60 members,
Tradeston 50, Townhead 54, Springburn 25, Dennistoun 32 (these last three
giving the St Rollox Division a total of 111), Blackfriars 26, Hutchesontown 60
(giving a combined figure of 86), and the Women's Branch had 50
members.127
For 1897 there are figures for nine of the thirteen branches still active.
Tradeston had 50 members, Camlachie 60, Central 30, College 97, Govan 20,
Townhead 40, Bridgeton 80, Hutchesontown 72 and the Women's Branch
12ft
28. For 1898 there is more consistency, in that there are figures for all nine
remaining branches. Govan had 24 members, Tradeston 50, Bridgeton 108,
College 104, St Rollox 40, Central 25, Camlachie 60, Hutchesontown 80, and
12Q
the Women's Branch 30. There are no membership figures available for
1899 but for 1900 there are numbers for all the branches except Govan.
Tradeston had 30 members, College 39, St Rollox 49, Central 25, Camlachie
i on
61, Bridgeton 92, and Hutchesontown 80. For 1901 there are figures for five
branches. College had 30 members, St Rollox 48, Central 25, Camlachie 55,
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and Hutchesontown 59.131 For 1902 there are figures for three branches only.
St Rollox had 50 members, Central 38 and Hutchesontown 60.132
After 1902 membership figures are no longer provided at all, though from
1908 to 1910 its is possible to make extrapolations from branch affiliation
fees paid to the NAC. Those figures we do have are not reliable as being
definite records of the actual branch membership, though we can use them,
even if only as indicators. As regards the ILP we are on somewhat safer
ground than with other organisations since membership figures were based
on actual dues paid. Therefore we are not dealing with exaggerated figures
provided by enthusiastic secretaries but a record, more or less, of the paying
membership.
David Howell has indicated, none the less, that there could be a danger of
branches over-subscribing members, but the Glasgow information would tend
to suggest a problem of under-subscribing. An example of this is provided
by the Glasgow "City" (i.e. Central Division) branch which, in 1902 according
to its fees paid to the NAC, had a membership of 38, an increase from the
previous year's 25. These figures were produced from London for the Annual
Reports, brought out after the Annual Conference which was held at Easter
each year. However, according to a surviving document of the branch, its
own Annual Report for the year ending 31 March 1903, the branch
membership was stated as 98, the previous year's having been 83. Thus in
1902 the City branch membership, on the basis of fees paid to the NAC, was
put at 38 while, in fact, it had been 83.
This discrepancy could be explained by a simple misprint, the number 83
having been entered into the annual report as 38, but the figure of 25
members in 1901 would suggest not. The Report of the City branch indicates
a well-organised body which kept a close record of its changing membership.
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how many had left and for what reasons and how many had joined over the
previous twelve months. The Report also shows that the largest single source
of revenue for the branch came directly from "members' contributions". This
would suggest that City were withholding money from the NAC. This could
be because they deliberately did not want to diminish their own resources or
that, after working out their own financial needs, they simply had no money
left to forward to party headquarters. Whatever the actual reason, the actual
membership of the City branch would seem to have been significantly higher
than the official' figures show.133
How general a phenomenon it was for branches to under-subscribe it is
impossible to say, but the above instance does qualify examples of
particularly low membership figures. It has been pointed out that ILP
membership in Glasgow, while accounting for half the total Scottish figure,
hardly bares comparison with that of the two major parties.134 For instance, in
Bridgeton - an ILP stronghold after the War - is claimed to have only a
membership of 20 in 1909.135 However, as the figures above indicate
Bridgeton had been one of, if not the, largest ILP branch in Glasgow up to
1902. Moreover, according to 'official' figures, Bridgeton had 200 members in
1910 and won a place on the "roll of honour" of branches affiliating on 200 or
more members.136
It is difficult enough to trace simply numbers of ILP members, turning these
numbers into people is almost, if not quite, impossible. The increasing
attention that the ILP on Clydeside has received has given us some idea of
the social basis of its membership. The role of the likes of Harry Hopkins of
the ASE on Govan Trades Council and the Clyde Workers' Committee,
suggests a leading position taken by skilled workers.137 However, apart from
the most prominent of the activists and elected representatives there is no
systematic data on ILP membership.
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Howell has pointed out some of the pitfalls in trying to establish the class
complexion of the ILP through its choice of candidates - the pressure to look
for someone who could "afford" to get elected operated at both the national
and local level. Howell sees the ILP, and this is mainly through descriptive
material and revealing comments upon such matters as fear of victimisation
by ordinary members, as being largely a party of the respectable working
class, but not of the poorer and unorganised sections of the working class.
His understanding of the work of Clark on the Colne Valley ILP (which had the
benefit of extant local records) sees a significant middle class leadership
group but a rank and file which reflected the industrial structure of the
area.138
As far as Glasgow is concerned we can glean a certain amount of systematic
data through record linkage, though only for branch secretaries. Between
1895 and 1911 in the published Directories of Branches the names and
addresses of the branch secretaries were provided. By checking these names
and addresses with the Glasgow Electoral Register we can locate at least
some of these individuals. Where the address was of branch rooms or where
an address was outwith the City boundary, then that person cannot be traced.
Likewise, this process assumes that people qualified for the vote in the first
place. Where they did not their names would not appear. In total, we were
able to trace the occupations of 69 ILP Secretaries, which are listed in the
Table below.
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TABLE 1: OCCUPATIONS OF GLASGOW ILP BRANCH SECRETARIES 1895-1911

























































Sources: ilp. Directories of Branches, City of Glasgow, Electoral Registers. Glasgow
Post Office Annua! Directories
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The most obvious comment about the above Table is the fact that there is
only one woman. This is not simply a reflection of the extremely limited
enfranchisement of women but that, apart from, the Women's Branch, this was
the only female branch secretary of the Glasgow ILP. The number of men
employed in metals and engineering supports the qualitative evidence on the
significance of the skilled engineer. Harry McShane, unusual in that he was a
Catholic who gained an engineering apprenticeship, recalled that his branch of
the ILP, which he joined in 1909, "was composed mostly of workers, mainly
1 39
engineers." Ironfounders were the third largest occupational group in
Glasgow in 1911, and blacksmiths, turners, platers were also numerous. The
single largest male occupation, however, was commercial clerks, of whom
there were 12,684 in 1911. Their prominence in the table above is, therefore, a
true reflection of the occupational structure of the City of Glasgow. Amongst
the other trades, printers, joiners, tailors were all prominent occupations. The
shop-keeping or petit-bourgeois element is not especially large but is, at
least, in evidence. On the other hand, the unskilled workers are poorly
represented. In the non-specific category it is clear that many could be
entered under white-collar' or even 'supervisory', e.g. the gas and meter
inspectors. Similarly, tester, cargo measurer, packing box maker, stair railer
all suggest suggest a level of skill or control. Even a storeman could be seen
as demanding clerical duties, as would a postman. The unskilled, strictly
defined, are represented only by the two labourers.140
Our data on the occupations of the Glasgow branch secretaries support the
picture of the Colne Valley ILP, i.e. "its rank and file reflected the district's
141
dominant industry". At the same time branch secretaries still represent a
leadership group to a certain extent, even if it is one that is as close to a
representative sample of the rank-and- file as we are likely to get, certainly
for this period. Vet there was a broader involvement in the life of the ILP
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than Table 1, on its own, would suggest. Edwin Muir, at the time a young
clerk in a Glasgow beer-bottling plant, joined the ILP in 1908. Already a
member of the Clarion Scout Rambling Club, he "attended Socialist
demonstrations and street-corner meetings, and went to Socialist dances."
He had become friends with another young man who had been brought up in
a "free-thinking. Socialist family." As his friend was a member of the ILP,
Muir joined as well. His picture of the membership offers a qualification on a
too narrow identification of the ILP with our list of branch secretaries:142
Every Sunday evening we attended a speakers' class run
by an old and experienced Socialist. Working-class mothers,
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Chapter Three
Labour and Municipal Politics, 1896-1914.
Our previous chapter on political organisation emphasised the importance of
the local or municipal level. The electoral system of Wards with three
members, and one Councillor retiring consecutively, ensured that Labour had
the opportunity to stand candidates each year, if it could find the means to
do so. As well as the Town Council elections, there were also annual
elections to the School Board and the Parish Councils. Labour and Socialist
candidates also stood for these bodies throughout this period, but this does
not detract from the fact that most effort was deployed at the November
Town Council Polls. Labour's lack of effort, and generally of success, at School
Board and Parish Council elections was partly due to the sectarian
involvement of the Churches.1 However, at a more positive level, Labour's
concentration on the Town Council was because this was the real source of
local power. Municipal elections can tell us more about Labour than
parliamentary campaigns. Their regularity encouraged a more consistent
presence and also a more distinctive voice, since Labour's local policies were
likely to differ, in degree if not substance, from national priorities. In 1896 the
Workers' Election Committee (WEC) stood at the Glasgow municipal 'general'
election under the following 9-point Programme.
1) Land values to be the basis of taxation; all to be appropriated. 2) Judicial
maximum rents to be fixed for buildings and improvements, based upon cost
and condition. 3) Right of Issue and Legal Tender for Corporation Notes, to
abolish interest. 4) Aquisition of land by the Corporation for the erection of
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dwellings, shops, &c. 5) Municipilisation of the liquor traffic. 6) Free libraries.
7) Free ferries. 8) Absorbtion of unemployed labour, or adequate support for
the unemployed by the state or community, as is the case with judges,
ministers, police, assessors, army, navy, &c. 9) Minimum wage of public
servants to be not less than 30/- per week of 44 hours.2
The Role of John Ferguson and the 'Single Tax.'
In a 'purist' sense this was not a socialist programme since it did not involve
the demand for 'socialisation of the means of production, distribution and
exchange'. Nevertheless, its precise demands on rents, the unemployed and a
minimum wage were local expressions of the type of reform that most
socialists supported. The most significant item, however, was the first point,
the taxation of land values. It and the general tenor of the Programme as a
whole were largely due to the influence of John Ferguson, Irish Nationalist
leader and Glasgow City Councillor. Ferguson had been involved, albeit
pessimistically, on Hardie's side at Mid-Lanark, and had held an honorary
office in the Scottish Labour Party until forced out over his support for Liberal
candidates at the General Election of 1892. Ferguson, who was in fact a
Protestant from Ulster, owned a successful printing business in Glasgow.3 As
his departure from the SLP shows there was the constraint of Home Rule on
his relationship with Labour and Socialist forces. At the local level, however,
there was more opportunity for joint co-operation with the Trades Council
and the ILP without antagonising the national priorities of the Irish Party,
especially in the supposedly non-political character of Scottish municipal
politics. Ferguson stood for a political alliance between the working and
middle classes, as he explained to Keir Hardie just after the Mid-Lanark
contest:4
"I'm delighted to know the Labour Party is for action. My
opinion is still it shd enter the Liberal Association and work
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through it. There is certainly an element of danger in two
political organisations holding the same principles coming into
collision. In one organisation the labour and trading classes wd.
learn to have a common interest but divided all the bitterness
that Louis Blanc points out as existing between the "bourgeois"
and the "proletarians" in France will arise here. If you cannot
induce the Labourers to join the Liberal Association and push
their claims through it by all means organise Labour by itself.
Better that than nothing. I'll try all I can in the Liberal
Association to support Labour claims and if need be I'll stand
by the demands of Labour as put ford by you and other Labour
leaders, against all parties. You only ask what must be granted
if the foundation of our social edifice is not to be destroyed."
Ferguson's estrangement from the proponents of independent labour
representation remained a qualified and temporary breach only, at least at the
local level. Fie was elected to the Glasgow Town Council in 1893 and became
the focus of leadership for the small group of "Labour" members who, after
1896, became known as the "Stalwarts". Even before 1896 however, Ferguson
had emerged as the de facto leader of the "social reform" or "working class"
candidates in Glasgow; his seal of approval seems to have been necessary to
give any hope of success. In 1895 the ILP ran three candidates and got two
returned. The Labour Leader commented that:5
"Our men fought on a pure Socialist programme, and won
on the merits of that programme."
According to the Glasgow Herald, however, P G Stewart, the successful ILP
candidate for the Fifth Ward:6
"came forward as a disciple of Councillor John Ferguson,
whose lead on labour questions, and indeed generally, he is
prepared to follow."
The return of the WEC candidates in 1896 was seen as a means of
strengthening Ferguson's position and policy within the Council, not least by
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Ferguson himself. Speaking on the night of the poll:7
"He had now at his back, he said, Mr Brown, Mr Shaw
Maxwell, Councillor Mitchell, and Mr Cronin, gentlemen who
would support him in his programme which he had fought so
vigorously during his past tenure of office."
Speaking at the same meeting Boyd Brown "said he would follow in the
footsteps of Councillor Ferguson".8 Since this meeting was being held in the
INL hall and Brown had come third in the same ward as Ferguson had topped
the poll in, he may just have been politically tactful, yet there is no indication
that the candidates mentioned above, all members of the ILP, had any
disagreements with any of Ferguson's policies, or with being identified as his
supporters. Ferguson's views on society and reform were similar to many
socialists who found the justification for socialism in the new testament and
regarded Jesus as the "first socialist".9 His view of preserving the social fabric
through reform, rather than seeking to destroy it was also shared by many
socialists, and on certain issues he could even appear in advance of some of
his ILP colleagues (see below).
Ferguson seems to have had an involvement in nearly every organisation and
been acceptable to all the disparate forces behind the WEC. He had the
strength of the INL behind him, of course, and even his tendency to go
against the advice of the centre on occasion only reflects upon his own
standing in Glasgow. To the Trades Council he was an accepted friend of
labour who could be relied upon to support demands for trade union rates
and conditions in Council contracts, etc. He was a member of the Liberal
Party and could present himself as the choice of the Liberal Association.10
Though an Irishman, Ferguson's own business had no links with the liquor
trade and his temperance views made him acceptable even to the
co-operators. Ferguson was also a Protestant and this protected him from
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anti-Catholic prejudices.
Due to Ferguson, the taxation of land values became a sort of test question at
local elections and it was only after his death, in 1905, that the ILP in
Glasgow could even begin to question its validity and seek to remove it from
the municipal programme.11 Ferguson spent the rest of his life pursuing the
land tax shibboleth and even managed to get a majority of the Town Council
to support a Parliamentary Bill, which was still going through the House of
Commons in 1906, after his death. It would not appear, therefore, that the
programme as a whole conformed to John Cronin's desire for, "something
that will appeal to the commonsense of the workers', and likely to be realised
in a few years."12 And yet, it is clear that the taxation of land values did
appeal directly to the 'commonsense' of the Glasgow working class.13
Ferguson argued that £2million per annum was paid to the ground landlords
for the use of the land on which Glasgow was built. Despite Ferguson not
really being qualified to make such a judgement it was, as a later
commentator wrote, through it:14
"that he managed to draw so much support to his side.
The figure of £2,000,000 became as popular as John Ferguson
himself."
The programme in fact divided into two parts, an Administrative side which
could be introduced by the Corporation more or less immediately, and a
Legislative part which first required the granting of parliamentary powers; a
division which became explicit in later programmes. Like the proposal to tax
land values, the issue of corporation notes offered a route to self-sufficiency
for the municipality and the means of financing social reforms. The basic
premise behind issuing notes and providing banking services was to cut out
the private money lenders and thus reduce (or even seek to completely wipe
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out) the interest charges paid by the local authority. It became a mainstay of
"municipal socialism" and Thomas Johnston, future Secretary of State for
Scotland became one of the most prominent advocates of municipal banking
and was a central figure in establishing Scotland's first municipal bank in
Kirkintilloch where he stood as a Councillor from 1913.15
Item 5, the municipilisation of the drink traffic was a hardy perennial. To a
very great extent municipal politics had revolved around the temperance
question. The Socialist and Labour forces, while seeking to implant a new,
reforming agenda could not afford to antagonise a powerful lobby which they
mostly sympathised with anyhow. Municipal control became the distinctive
Labour solution to the drink problem. On occasion a Labour or Socialist
candidate would receive the support of the temperance "party" but, by and
large, and despite nearly every Labour and Socialist candidate declaring
themselves to be total abstainers, the temperance vote went to the "middle
class, "apolitical" candidate.
Housing was covered by items 2 and 4 with the emphasis on controlling
rents. While rent levels were crucially important to all working class
households, it was only later, with the virtual collapse of working class house
building from c. 1904 leading to increasing pressure on the existing housing
stock, combined with the heavy unemployment of 1907/8, that housing came
to dominate local politics in Glasgow. The other items in the programme
were consistent, practical labour issues. Along with the demands for free
libraries and free ferries, the issues of wages and unemployment were of
immediate concern to the labour interest and could be fought for immediate
implementation.
There was little that was controversial about the administrative side to the
WEC programme, so far as campaigning in working class wards was
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concerned, so much so that other candidates found no difficulty in presenting
similar reform "manifestoes". What was distinctive about 1896 and the
intervention of the WEC was its organised nature, the electors being asked to
support a definite programme rather than only the promises of individual
candidates. The Stalwarts did not form a Party and as we shall see below the
parts eventually re-asserted themselves over the sum total, but it did,
nevertheless, represent an advance on what had gone before. The existing
"labour" element or "party" in the Town Council consisted of John Battersby
and A J Hunter,16 both of whom were closely connected with the Trades
Council; Battersby had been a previous President in and a member of the
Parliamentary Committee, while Hunter was the Council's Secretary, a position
he held until 1902.17 Although they stood as working men and based their
appeal on the labour vote they did not seek to disturb the no-party-politics
consensus, and were increasingly out of step with the younger socialists on
the Council. Even the election of Ferguson and Finlay in 1893 did not mark a
crucial turning point, though it and the increased interest of the Trades
Council in 1984, and the ILP successes in 1895 gave clear indications of the
growing tendency towards organisation of the labour forces.
As detailed in the previous chapter, 1896 provided a particularly fortuitous set
of circumstances for Labour's electoral challenge. Of particular significance,
and especially given the de facto leadership of John Ferguson, was the Irish
involvement - five INL branches were affiliated to the WEC.18 At the
November poll of 1896 there were twelve wards "where the Irish electors had
a special interest".19 This "special interest" might simply mean supporting a
candidate who expressed sympathy with Irish interests as seems to have
been the case in Maryhill, or it could refer to the situation in Anderston where
the name of the Irish candidate was announced from the pulpit of the local
20
Chapel. By and large, however, the "way to Catholic success" (in the phrase
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of the Observe/) lay via the WEC, even though local Catholic opinion,such as
the Observer, did not draw attention to this fact.21 What is clear from the
1896 poll is that Irish-Catholic candidates were not strong enough to stand
on their own; to have any chance of success they had to be allied to some
other group, to seek a wider legitimation by identifying with other interests.
For the major organ of Irish-Catholic opinion the state of municipal alliances
represented, "A mixed state of matters ...22
In some cases the candidates who are of our creed and
race receive in one ward the support and co-operation of a
political party, while in another ward the same political party
objects to run with Irishmen or with Catholics on a host of
varying, and in some cases conflicting grounds."
Thus the Trades Council was willing to support Sheehan in Mile End (though
he retired before the contest) but not M.J. Connell in Townhead, and while
Connell was on the Liberal or "popular" leet the Liberal Associations in
Springburn and Hutchesontown preferred to support Tory rather than Irish
candidates.23 The situation in Hutchesontown was even more complicated
since Stewart of the ILP was selected by the Ward Committee, but neither he
nor it supported the Irish nominee Quin. At the same time Stewart was not a
recognised WEC candidate, Hutchesontown being the only ILP branch not to
affiliate24, and even though he became one of the leading Stalwarts and was
regarded as a Labour candidate, certain Irish-labour support, for instance P
Reilly of the Labourers Union, went to Quin.25
The situation was a very fluid one with WEC recognition being granted to
certain Irish candidates very late in the day. Out of this confusion it can be
safely said, that no matter how large or organised the Irish vote may have
been, Irish candidates were only returned where they were in alliance with
Labour or where they were actual Labour candidates. Perhaps only John
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Ferguson was strong enough to stand on his own and his situation was
somewhat unique (apart from anything else he was not a Catholic). Of the
twelve wards listed, the only Irish successes were in the East End wards of
Dalmarnock, Calton and Mile-End where those candidates were actually WEC
nominees, and only one of whom, John Cronin, was an Irish-Catholic, and
even he was a member of the ILP. The fourth East End ward, Whitevale, saw
Hugh Murphy nominee of the WEC and the INL fail by only 131 votes, while
Joseph McGroary, a similar labour-Nationalist candidate failed by over 1,000
26
votes in Cowcaddens. Elsewhere the Irish candidates were easily beaten.
The East End wards were historically the most fiercely contested, where
labour representation was strongest, and where we would expect most Irish,
i.e the poorer working class, to live. Hutchesontown which bordered Calton
and Dalmarnock on the south bank of the Clyde was very similar and is seen
as having had a very large Irish vote, yet even here the ILP candidate was
able to triumph over the Irish nominee.
The Labour Presence in Glasgow Town Council.
1896 was seen as a great victory by the Labour forces: Of the eleven WEC
candidates standing in eight wards, five were returned.27 This number
represents only definite WEC candidates and does not include those given
belated recognition on the eve of the poll. It does not even include
P.G. Stewart, whose return increased the number of Stalwarts to six.
Moreover there were already the two existing "labour" members, Baillies
Battersby and Hunter, whose position re the WEC was an ambivalent one;
they were not on the WEC list in 1896 though they were regarded as part of
the "Labour party on the Town Council", and in the following years they
became regarded as Stalwarts and stood as WEC candidates. This gave a total
Labour representation of eight, five of whom were members of the ILP,
Stewart, Shaw Maxwell, Cronin, Boyd Brown, and Mitchell, the last three of
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whom were office bearers on the Trades Council. In the following year the
WEC ran eight candidates in seven wards and won four, a net gain of three
seats. At the same time Battersby and Hunter were returned unopposed, so
the Stalwarts had increased their representation to eleven, including six
ILPers.
As has been indicated above, the policy which the Stalwarts stood on and
would pursue in the Council Chambers had already been given shape by John
Ferguson. In 1894 he had introduced two (crucial) motions: One;
'That the land values of the city, not being the creation of
any individual, but the whole community, should be
appropriated to the service of the city."
And secondly;
That 21s. be the lowest wage for an able-bodied man in
the municipal employment for a week of six days."
Out of a total possible vote of 77 Ferguson received eight votes for the first
and twelve for the second. After the 1896 election, both these motions were
passed, as well as a proposal to permit a limited Corporation fire insurance,
28
and a vote in favour of Corporation banking.
In their first two years of activity these were the major successes of the
Stalwarts. To take the taxation of land values any further an Act of
Parliament was necessary, and while Ferguson won Corporation assent to
pursue such a Bill, he died before it was finally dealt with by the House of
Commons. While this was Ferguson's major pre-occupation and the means by
which to finance other reforms, he did not stand still. Having "secured" the
21s. with, as he put it, "the help of my sterling friend and colleague, P G
Stewart ... The real living wage will be my next consideration". "By this I
mean a wage which will afford a proper, moral, intellectual, and physical
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life.' There was, however, some disagreement among the Stalwarts over
this. George Mitchell opposed any further increase "at present", even though
the 21s. represented a retreat from the 30s in the WEC programme, which
made no mention of gender, and instead he favoured an eight hour day,
"which, as every intelligent man knows, must ultimately result in an increase
of wages." This attitude had more than a little the 'superior' labour aristocrat
about it. Mitchell was put out that the tramwaymen still wanted to work
Sundays even after having their hours reduced and spread over six days, and
having had their wages increased by 1/6. In his opinion, of the 12,000
municipal employees, "there are not more than 3,000 worth fighting for. An
on
even smaller number than that belong to trade unions." This ignored the
difficulties unskilled and semi-skilled workers faced in trying to organise, as
well as the financial pressures on what were still relatively low wages.
Nevertheless, having achieved the 21s., the issue of a municipal minimum
wage was one Labour would return to.
Other concerns given prominence were free libraries, proposals to establish
council workshops, and municipal control of the drink traffic.31 Housing was
covered through attempts, most closely associated with P G Stewart, to
utilise and extend the terms of the Glasgow City Improvement Acts of 1866
and 1897 to clear the worst slums and provide an amount of Council-built
housing.32 However, the advocates of "social reform" in Glasgow faced a
major problem, what was left to municipalise? As P G Stewart put it in 1898:33
"And with regard to the future. Glasgow is in the happy
position of having already municipalised everything that even
the most advanced among other towns contemplates
municipalising. We must therefore look for fresh fields to
conquer."
We shall examine the search for "fresh fields" below (and the difficulties in
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finding them) but it is worth considering at the moment just how far the
Stalwarts were the direct cause of reform.
As we have seen above, the strength of the Stalwarts on the Council was
eleven in 1897, and though one contemporary account puts the number at ten
in 1898, a later account refers to a maximum of fourteen, presumably by
18 99-190 0.34 While this undoubtedly represented a distinct bloc of votes
(assuming some sort of "party" discipline) it still accounted for only a very
small minority of a total representation of 75 Councillors. Furthermore,
Labour's electoral strength was directly related to the extent of its challenge;
at no time did labour ever stand sufficient candidates to win a majority on the
Council.
At the 1896 municipal 'general' election there were 14 labour candidates
(eleven WEC nominees plus Stewart, Battersby and Hunter) out of a total field
of 114. Over the next three years the WEC ran 22 candidates in all out of 28
contested seats, with a net gain of four. Of these 22, however, seven were
sitting Councillors which meant that, at best, Labour could have hoped to gain
an extra 15 members between 1897-99. As things stood, the Stalwarts had,
at most, twelve members by 1899, representing 16% of the full Council.
Moreover, while in the elections of 1897,98, and 99 the WEC had run in nearly
all the seats contested, even had it won every seat it challenged for the most
it could have hoped for by 1899 was 23 Councillors, or 31% of the total
elected membership. These figures point to both the limited extent of
Labour's electoral challenge and the limited extent of electoral contests in
municipal politics. However, within those seats which were contested the
issues largely revolved around pro and anti-Labour causes. This becomes
clearer when we realise that it was the same wards that tended to be
contested regularly.
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The East end of the City was divided into four wards, Dalmamock, Calton, Mile
End, and Whitevale; the first two comprised Bridgeton Parliamentary Division
and the latter two Camlachie. Bordering Calton to the South of the Clyde was
ward 18, Hutchesontown, half of the Blackfriars and Hutchesontown Division,
and it was in these five wards that Labour's main challenge was posed in
these years. Between 1896-99 there were only three uncontested seats, Mile
End and Hutchesontown in 1897(when Battersby was returned unopposed) and
Whitevale in 1898; on all other occasions the seats were contested and
always by Labour. Success varied: Whitevale, contested on three occasions
was never won; Dalmarnock yielded a seat in 1896 but was followed by three
successive defeats; two seats were secured in Calton in 1896 which were
held in '97 and '99 with an unsuccessful effort in'98; Mile End and
Hutchesontown likewise produced two seats apiece in 1896 which were
successfully held over the next three years. Labour's other area of strength
was in the artisan north of the city, the St Rollox division which comprised
the municipal wards of Dennistoun, Springburn, Cowlairs, and Townhead.
Dennistoun was a largely middle class residential area which was only
contested for the first time in 1907 by the "socialist millionaire" and member
of the ILP, James Allan.35 The other three wards were extensively working
class in character, with a great deal of employment in engineering and
railways, and reputed to have a high level of trade union and co-op society
membership. Cowlairs returned Hunter of the old' labour party who was
unopposed in 1897 and re-elected in 1900; apart from him, however, there
were no other Labour candidates in this ward. Springburn and Townhead were
contested much more fiercely. Despite defeat in 1896, both seats were won
by Labour the following year; in Springburn's case, two seats which were held
in 1898 (uncontested) and 1899; William Forsyth of the ILP won Townhead in
1897 and successfully held the seat three years later, but Labour's efforts in
the intervening years were fruitless.
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Other candidatures in these years were single challenges in Anderston
(successful!), and Cowcaddens, Maryhill, and Gorbals, (all unsuccessful,). The
WEC/Co-op candidate, Peter Glasse, challenged twice in Woodside but was
beaten on both occasions. If we discount 1896, which was an unique year,
there were nine wards which were never contested at all in 1897,8,9 and only
six contests in which there was no Labour candidate. Labour's electoral
challenge was, therefore, more or less limited to the north and east of the
city with the centre, west and south, i.e. the business and middle class
residential wards being almost beyond consideration.
The 'Ratepayers" Reaction
Even in the wards where Labour did return candidates, however, it was never
able to dominate totally; at not time did Labour ever hold all three seats in a
single ward. Furthermore, the successful years of the Stalwarts were quite
short-lived. Labour representation did not embark on a constantly increasing
trajectory but, in fact, soon went in to a serious decline. The democratic'
alliance behind the WEC was, more or less, defunct by the mid-1900s.
Between 1905 and 1909 Labour only won two elections for the Town Council,
and in 1908 its representation had fallen to a single seat in Mile End.36 The
break-up of the Stalwarts meant that the WEC took on a more socialist
identity - all candidates were members of the ILP and were reliant upon ILP
branches for their campaigns. The Labour Programme had, in fact, changed
little since the original WEC document in 1896 but the loss of the
Co-operators, the Irish and the decreasing interest shown by the Trades
Council, left 'Labour' more exposed to the middle-class reaction against the
increasing demands being placed upon the rates. The ILP might claim that
the Labour vote represented the solid "bedrock" of out and out socialist
support, but this was little comfort for the actual loss of seats it was
suffering.37
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In effect, while Labour's policies had not changed the political climate had.
The extension of municipal services and control had been a relatively
unproblematic issue in the early 1890s. Municipilisation may have been
claimed as an effective local contribution to socialism by the ILP, but it had
already been adopted by a majority of the Liberal-dominated Town Council.
Glasgow had achieved a world-wide reputation as the most municipalised
oo
City and attracted visitors on that score. From a Liberal viewpoint, which
regarded municipal control as a manifestation of "civic spirit" the Labour
councillors could be regarded as simply the most enthusiastic proponents of
39
what was an accepted policy. The last great municipal venture had been the
take-over of the tramway network from its American operators. The
campaign behind this move had involved socialists and the Trades Council
and its success had allowed Labour to 'swim with the tide' of extending
municipal control and win the partial reforms introduced by Ferguson and the
Stalwarts.
There had always been an opposition to the growth of public services which,
in Glasgow, found its most faithful expression in the leader columns of the
Glasgow Herald. At the election of John Ferguson in 1893, the Herald warned
against, "his overwhelming schemes of municipilisation and confiscation",
thereby drawing the connection between public ownership and the threat to
private property.40 Further proposals to take over the City's telephone system
and establish municipal workshops were being discussed at this point, to
which the Herald objected as being outwith the remit of the Council's
duties:41
Such schemes must be regarded with disfavour. They do
not commend themselves to the ratepayers at large, and they
are not consistent with the financial position and responsibility
of the Corporation."
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Increasingly groups of concerned ratepayers' began to organise objections to
the policies of the Corporation. One such was the Citizens' Union which was
established in 1898 and which did not run candidates so much as offer its
recommendation in support of candidates who opposed further municipal
undertakings. One of its principal figures was a butcher called Roderick Scott
who, in 1900, defeated Boyd S. Brown - one of the original Stalwarts of 1896
- in Calton.42 Scott had also been a prominent force in the Co-operative
boycott, though he had been defeated at the 1896 poll. Even though Boyd
had estranged himself from the WEC by 1900 and was not a recognised
candidate, it was still significant that Scott could win a seat (and by a
thousand plus majority) in the same Ward as John Ferguson.
At the same time as the 'ratepayers" pressure groups began to take the
initiative, so Labour began to run out of steam. Part of the problem was that
Glasgow did not have much left to municipalise. Further schemes were
suggested, such as coal supplies, milk, banking, housing, but none managed
to arouse much enthusiasm. Suggestions for services such as coal and milk
also managed to estrange allies in the co-operative societies which already
provided such services. From around 1900, moreover, the rates issue became
much more pronounced and significant. This was due to particularly large
increases in Glasgow's rates due to municipal reforms and amenities, and to
national reforms and improvements, e.g. in education, which placed more
demands upon local authorities. Between 1900 and 1906 the Glasgow Poor
Rate more than doubled, from 10.25d. in the £, to over 20d.43
Labour's poor performances were thrown into sharper relief by the success of
Scott Gibson, a 'maverick' candidate who, from his first appearance in 1901
and over the next few years fought a series of elections in various wards,
winning every one. Everywhere he stood there was a huge poll and an
extremely virulent campaign. At no time connected with the WEC or ILP
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Gibson was, at first, identified as a socialist by the Labour Leader, though he
was soon regarded as a "reactionary" adventurer.44 The secret of Scott
Gibson's success was the populist' type of campaign he was able to run,
exploiting public resentment of municipal extravagance' and rising rates.
Harry McShane recalls of him:45
He attacked the Town Council fearlessly and criticised all
kinds of corrupt practices; he protested and exploded against
the people at the top and got himself thrown out of the
Corporation on a number of occasions. He was nowhere near
the Labour point of view, but he was one of the best speakers I
ever heard.
In 1902 (despite already being a sitting Councillor for Springburn), Scott
Gibson challenged and defeated the incumbent Lord Provost, Samuel
Chisholm, in Woodside on a "massive" turnout of 82.9%.46 Chisholm was
undoubtedly a prime representative of "the people at the top" but he was also
a firm defender of municipal provision of services and of housing reform in
particular. He had been supported by the WEC in 1896 due to his defence of
the City Improvement Bill47 and it was he who was most identified with the
Municipal Housing Commission which sat during 1902-03. His defeat by Scott
Gibson was seen by the Glasgow Herald as a check to the Council's housing
proposals and "a declaration in favour of some immediate action toward the
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restriction of municipal expenditure. We shall discuss Scott Gibson's
politics further, particularly in relation to the Irish Nationalists in the following
chapter, and we shall return to the housing question below. At this point,
however, he was a thorn in Labour's side - indirectly in that he encouraged
hostility to municipal provision, and directly when he, once again, changed
wards and moved to the East End and won Dalmarnock in 1906, a seat the ILP
40
had been trying hard to regain.
As we have already discussed (Chapter Two), Scott Gibson's success did.
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eventually, encourage Labour to seriously consider the questions of
organisation and party discipline. The formation of the Glasgow Labour Party,
however, took some time and other explanations were offered for Labour's
poor showing. Foremost among these were the perceived hostility of the
Temperance and Women voters. The role of the female electorate is perhaps
analogous to the Irish vote in this instance. Women could qualify for the
local vote, but only under very restricted circumstances and only accounted
for a fraction of the total electorate. We shall return to the question of
women and the vote in a further chapter, but for the moment it is sufficient
to comment that explanations of defeat that claimed, "In reality, we did win
on the men's vote.", are not very convincing.50 The hostility of the
Temperance lobbies to Labour candidates was a, more or less, constant
opposition. Labour challenged the Temperance view with their own solution
of 'municipal control of the drink trade', and also by refuting the claim that
drink was the cause of poverty.51 At the same time, however, Labour was
itself imbued with temperance sympathies and there were very few
candidates who did not declare themselves as abstainers, e.g. in 1906 of the
nine "Forward" candidates eight were claimed to be life-long abstainers.52 At
the same time, while temperance remained a significant issue and the 'lobby'
a significant force, it was not the dominant issue it had previously been.
Moreover, the hostility to Labour candidates was not a new phenomenon and
had not prevented the Labour successes of the later 1890s.
The nadir of Labour's municipal fortunes appeared to be the election of 1908,
when eight candidates were run and all were defeated. There had been no
victories in either 1905 or 1906 but 1907 had produced one retained seat and
a significant increase in votes: in 1906 eight Labour candidates had gained
8,000 votes or 24% of the total poll in the seats contested by them, in 1907
these figures were 12,566 and 40%.53 After the apparent recovery of 1907, the
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results in 1908 were particularly hard to bear, yet there were certain
indicators that suggested a potential shift in Labour's favour. The decline in
votes was not as low as Labour had registered in 1906 - 9,548 votes were
polled, giving a share of 36%. Furthermore, 1908 saw the return of mass
unemployment to Glasgow and the ILP and SDF worked together in organising
meetings and demonstrations to demand relief.54 The Glasgow Workers'
Unemployed Committee was formed which included the Trades Council,
according to which "Unemployment is really the question of the day".55 The
plight of the unemployed allowed Labour to focus demands upon both the
national and local state and make public provision a more popular issue once
again. It is hardly surprising that the municipal elections in 1909 saw the
Trades Council take a more active role again in establishing an Election
Committee.56 At the same time a decision taken by the Town Council to
exploit the tramway surplus as a subsidy for the rates also galvanised the
Trades Council to take political action to defend the principal that, as the
working class were the main users of the trams, they should get the major
benefit by way of low fares. The Trades Council campaign was successful
and the proposal was shelved.57
It was only in retrospect, however, that 1909 appeared as a turning point.
Partly the improved performance was due to a concentration of resources,
only four seats being contested. While the local polls were an improvement
on previous years, there was no rejoicing at having won a single seat; the
disappointments of the previous years had cut to deep to allow that. As one
commentator in Forward put it:58
For the present. Municipal Socialism is in the lean and dry
stage. It stands in need of new ideas and a new inspiration.
Labour's Re-Emergence 1910-1914; Importance of the Housing Question.
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If the tramways had been the big issue in municipal politics in the early
1890s, the single most important concern from 1910 on (and indeed right up
to the present day) was housing. It had always been an issue; the original
WEC programme of 1896 had included the demand for legally fixed maximum
rents, and direct building of houses by the Corporation, and two years later it
made this last point a much more specific call for the "erection of artisan
dwellings", via the development of the City Improvement Trust, "to be let at
rents sufficient to cover the cost of construction and maintenance."59 This
demand had already been made by an ILP candidate in 1894, alongside a
proposal for direct labour.60 In the working class areas, even non-socialist
candidates could make housing and anti-landlordism a plank of their
programme, as, for instance, a "temperance and working-man's candidate" in
the Gorbals in 1891 who appealed to the electors, "to vote down the landlord
and house factor clique."61 The proposal to tax land values was explicitly
directed against the 'unproductive' class of landowners ("compelling
landowners to tax land values", as one candidate put it62) which, in Glasgow
terms was easily transposed onto landlords.
Labour's priorities were set out by John Ferguson in his brief two point
programme of 1893. First was the appropriation of the "Ground values" for
the benefit of the community, and secondly to create a labour opinion in the
Council which would use the existing powers of the Corporation, while
seeking yet greater powers, in order to improve the condition of the working
class:63
"by means of a living wage, natural hours of labour,
comfortable healthy homes, and proper places of recreation."
Out of this fourfold concern with the quality of life the Stalwarts were most
successful with the first two, which were really part and parcel of the one
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issue. Although not without a certain amount of ambivalence from within its
own ranks. Labour was able to make this a test question for candidates in
working class wards. Housing, however, did not become such a test question
and this was partly because the Corporation did not have direct responsibility
and control of the provision of houses, as it did have over the wages and
conditions of its own employees. Although demands could be formulated for
the Council to actually do something about housing, it had, first of all, to
acquire the necessary powers from Parliament, a protracted process that did
not encourage hopes of immediate progress, as was possible over wages and
conditions.
Nevertheless, some developments did occur after 1896. A second Glasgow
City Improvement Act was passed by Parliament in 1897 which permitted the
Corporation to purchase slum or insanitary property at the value of the
ground on which it was situated, not, as under the 1866 Act at full market
value plus ten per cent. Furthermore, P G Stewart introduced a clause which
gave the Corporation powers to purchase land, in and out of the City
boundary, upon which to build houses. This was included despite expert legal
opinion against, and that it passed both the Lords and Commons was "a great
surprise" to Stewart himself.64 However, there were very definite limitations
placed on the possible development of Council housing; the area of land
purchased was to be, in total, no more than 25 acres, and the Corporation
was not permitted to spend, on the purchase of land and the erection of
buildings, more than £100,000.65 By 1901 one block of land in Carntyne had
been built on and let, but the cost of 69 one-apartment and 84
two-apartment tenement flats was over £17,000; in 1902 the Corporation was
authorised by provisional order to spend an extra £150,000.66
The potential of the housing question as a popular campaigning issue for
Labour was always significant. The election of 1902 was fought, basically, on
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this issue. John Ferguson, who was actually only narrowly returned, stated
the basic viewpoint:67
"Upon this question no compromise is possible. Decency,
morality, and virtue are bound to deteriorate amidst a horrible
den of dirt - moral and physical - in which hundreds and
thousands of our wage-earners have to live."
The Citizens' Union based its intervention at the polls solely on the housing
question, but saw only one of its chosen candidates returned. Labour, on the
other hand, was conspicuously successful. Apart from Ferguson, three other
candidates retained their positions and a new seat was won. Even the
Glasgow Herald had to admit that the results represented, "a victory of no
mean character for the extreme party."68 This success was, however,
overshadowed by Chisholm's defeat at the hands of Scott Gibson, and the
growing reaction against rates increases, along with the break-up of the WEC,
meant that Labour was unable to capitalise on the issue.
Apart from this, there was the nature in which the housing issue was
presented. The housing built by the Corporation was always referred to, as
was the housing 'problem' generally, as affecting mainly the "poorest classes".
Joseph Melling has commented on how in the pre-1914 debate on housing,
"objective conditions were described in highly moralistic terms." The Glasgow
en
Municipal Commission, for instance:
"combined statistical analysis with sweeping generalisation
on the minority of vicious loafers and criminals amongst those
inhabiting ticketed dwellings."
Such constant pejorative references to the "poorest classes" very likely had
an adverse effect on the more respectable elements of the working class. By
1914 Glasgow Corporation had only built 2,199 houses, the vast majority of
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which were one or two apartments.70 Council housing, therefore, only affected
a very small number of people directly and did not represent any
improvement on the more substantial existing tenement properties. Gradually,
however, from around 1902, the terms of the debate over housing began to
change. Emphasis began to be put on the building of 'cottage' type housing.
This had been argued by the ILP Councillor Joseph Burgess at the Municipal
Commission and the attraction of garden cities of low-rise housing, against
tenements, provided a positive example which Glasgow Town Council
eventually decided it should attempt to follow in 1912.71 Alongside of this
development, there was a changed perception about who such houses should
be provided for, and Labour was in the forefront of arguing that they should
be for the 'respectable' working class. In his evidence to the Municipal
Commission in 1903 George Carson , Secretary of the Trades Council and
member of the ILP, stated that, "The Council is in favour of the housing
proposals of the Corporation ... being satisfied that if carried out they would
be of the utmost advantage to the people." He then went on to say:72
The Council is opposed to the suggestion that the
Corporation should be restricted to the providing of housing
accomodation for the criminal and vicious classes only. If the
Corporation are to build houses at all, it must be for the thrifty,
industrious and sober working classes for whom such housing
accomodation should be provided, as the larger portion of
these, by reason of their small wages, are compelled to live in
houses which are inimical to health, and generally amongst a
most undesirable class of people.
As we have seen, Labour's municipal fortunes began to improve in 1909 and
this was maintained with by-election victories and into the election of 1910.73
The duties of organisation would seem to have been taken more seriously,
but at the same time it was felt that Labour lacked a big issue which it could
champion, a new "inspiration" . These two factors became combined with the
further extension of Glasgow's boundaries which, as in 1896, provided a
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stimulus to Labour representation. The extension of 1891 was never regarded
as a final measure, in 1906 Kinning park was at last included within Glasgow,
though the big development was the inclusion of Partick, Govan, Tollcross,
etc. in 1912. The case for extension was really unanswerable; as the Glasgow
Herald pointed out the whole area was effectively one City and had been so
for some time.74 The existing boundaries had been rendered obsolete and
confusing by rapid urban development, and, in the case of fire, actually
dangerous. Glasgow also provided services to the outlying areas and,
reasonably enough, expected payment in return. The price demanded by the
outlying burghs, however, was exemption from Glasgow rates for a
considerable period.75 As in 1891, and in the case of Kinning Park, the most
vociferous advocates of inclusion were the local labour forces. Labour
candidates in the soon- to-be-incorporated areas were well to the fore in the
election of 1911, fought on the boundary question, and enjoyed some
success.76 At the same time the Glasgow Labour Party was in the process of
being formed.
Among the new generation of political leaders on Clydeside was John
Wheatley. Possibly the single most influential figure in Labour circles
Wheatley's role encompassed the ILP, the Labour Party, the Irish, housing, and
the extension of Glasgow. In many ways he can be regarded as inheriting the
mantle of John Ferguson, only with the distinction that Wheatley's primary
loyalty - despite the fact that he was a Catholic - lay within the ILP and
Labour.
Prior the the First World War Wheatley was best known for his success at
debating on whether or not Catholics could be socialists. A member of the
ILP, and former member of the UIL, Wheatley established the Catholic Socialist
Society (CSS) to achieve that end, i.e. to draw the Irish - Catholic working
class population into the labour and socialist movement.77 Forward played a
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supportive role by giving the CSS a regular column, "Catholic Notes", to
report and debate its activities. Wheatley has been credited with almost
single-handedly swinging the Irish vote behind Labour in the West of
Scotland.78 More recently it has been suggested that the impact of Wheatley
and the CSS was minimal and obscures the real reasons behind the Irish shift
to Labour post-1918.79
Although Wheatley had to face much hostility from within Catholic circles as,
for instance, having his effigy burnt by a crowd from the local Catholic
on
Church, it would appear that in his debate with the Belgian Jesuit, Father
Puissant, Wheatley enjoyed the tacit support of the heirarchy. The Archbishop
of Glasgow refused to condemn Wheatley or the CSS, in contrast to the
situation in Leeds where the opposition of the Bishop there led to the rapid
collapse of the CSS. The debate with Puissant was conducted in the pages of
the Glasgow Observer between 1906 and 1909, which took a fairly tolerant
view of the activities and purpose of the CSS.(Wheatley had previously been
employed by the Observe/) Both the Observer and Archbishop Maguire took
an open attitude towards the Labour Party, could talk of it eventually replacing
the Liberal Party, and of how Irish voters, freed from Irish and Catholic
concerns, should vote Labour, at least at the local level. From August 1909
Father Puissant no longer contributed to the debate and it seems likely that
he had become something of an embarrassment to the heirarchy.81
This did not mean the end of hostilities between Labour and the Irish. The
year 1911 saw a particularly acrimonious furore over relations between both
in terms of seats and candidates however, despite the demise of the
Stalwarts and the UIL being barred from affiliation to the Glasgow Labour
Party, it still remained the case that Irish candidates had been supported by
and run under the auspices of Labour. The relationship between the Irish and
Labour was a complex and fluctuating one (as we shall discuss in the
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following chapter), but it needs to be approached with the understanding that
- whatever official' Irish opinion might be at any one time - significant
numbers of the Irish working class were, and had been for some time, voting
Labour.
In the municipal election of 1912 John Wheatley, already a sitting councillor
for Shettleston in Lanark County Council, came top of the poll for the new
Glasgow ward of Shettleston and Tollcross, in so doing becoming the only
Catholic on Glasgow Corporation. That this "triumph" was achieved over the
opposition of the "official Irish party" and the Observer indicates Irish support
for Labour and further questions the myth of a homogeneous Irish vote. Tom
Johnston, writing in Forward, saw Wheatley's success as particularly gratifying
and of no little significance. The "official" Irish opposition, he claimed, was
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partly because they:
"knew that if [Wheatley] was elected they could no longer
tell the Irish working man that the Labour Party was anti-Irish."
Wheatley's success, and his status as the only Catholic Councillor, must have
produced a powerful argument in support of his case that the Irish working
class should join up with the Labour and Socialist movement.
The other issue Wheatley's name is most closely associated with is housing,
in particular his role at the Ministry of Health in the first Labour Government
in formulating the 1924 Housing Act. Wheatley's concern over housing
pre-dates the First World War and is linked to the development of a popular
housing campaign by Labour on Clydeside. Though it took the War to shove
the housing question in Glasgow to the forefront of national politics, the
origins of the crisis were firmly rooted in the pre-war years. For the decade
preceding 1914 Glasgow experienced almost zero additions to its stock of
working class housing; the state of the housing market was so disorganised
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that there were large numbers of houses standing empty, thus exacerbating
the shortage of appropriate housing at affordable rents. Basically the problem
was one of poverty; people could not afford the houses that were available,
while the returns on low rent properties were so low as to make building
unprofitable. In 1913 the Labour Party Housing Committee (LPHC) was formed,
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in a situation described by its chief organiser, Andrew McBride:
'They recognised that as private speculators had
practically ceased building, and that as many houses were
admitted to be unfit for human habitation, we felt we were in
easy reach of a famine in housing."
The LPHC enjoyed the support of every part of the labour movement,and also
involved elements of the working class who had been apolitical, or even
hostile to socialism.84 In mid 1914 a further development took place with the
formation of the Glasgow Women's Housing Association (GWHA), mainly
through the efforts of the LPHC and the Women's Labour League (WLL). The
intention was to broaden the housing campaign and to involve women more
directly, in which it was remarkably successful - the GWHA became the
organising focus of the Rent Strike of 1915. Increasingly Labour presented
itself as the "only housing party", and at the same time began to develop a
more positive approach to the female electorate.85 The housing situation had
certainly become more serious in Glasgow in the years since 1902, but its
new-found significance in municipal affairs was not due solely to the
objective circumstances of the housing market, but to that, combined with
Labour's ability, unlike in the Stalwart period, to provide organisational support
for the issue and thus maintain and develop an effective campaign. Even
without the advent of war it is unlikely that the housing question would have
faded away.
The LPHC was originally founded to support a policy of local authority
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housing outlined by John Wheatley as the "artisan, or, eight pound cottages
scheme". The intention was for the Corporation to build cottage-style houses
for working class families which could be let at a rent of only £8 per annum;
the funds to allow this were to be taken from the surplus of the Corporation
owned tramway system. In its simplicity, and its popularity, this scheme of
Wheatley's was similar, in its political effect, to John Ferguson's proposal to
tax land values, with its magical figure of £2m. Labour had found its "new
inspiration." According to one recent writer, Wheatley's proposal:86
"was perhaps the single most crucial element to the
growth in support for Glasgow Labour and its housing
proposals."
Had it been adopted, however, Wheatley's policy would have, at best, had only
a limited impact on Glasgow's housing shortage, at most only 1,000 houses a
year could have been built, and any broader impact would have been due to
the "filtering up" process of poorer tenants moving into the accomodation
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released by the families lucky enough to secure a cottage. Looking to the
future Wheatley's scheme may well have contained within it the drawbacks
that good-quality council housing was to demonstrate in the inter-war period;
the actual tenants of the early council houses were the very people who
could most afford renting from the private sector; poorer tenants were to be
unable to afford the new houses, and the "slum-clearance" housing provided
for them carried the stigma of obvious cheapness and lower quality; and
optimistic notions of "filtering up" were to founder on the economic reality of
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poverty. Wheatley himself was less than forthcoming on what to do about
the "slum dweller". In his Reply to the Critics of £8 cottages, Wheatley
89
penned the following in regard to the selecting of tenants:
- "Would preference be given to the slum-dweller?
- It is not the intention of the Labour Party to do so. This is
a scheme to prevent people from falling into slum life.
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- Why not deal with the slum-dweller first?
- The Labour Party believe that the most immediate and
greatest assistance that can be rendered to the weakest as
well as the strongest section of the working class is to
shake the profit and interest mongers off their backs.
- But after houses have been provided at cost price there
would be probably a small section who could not afford the
rent?
- The Labour Party will always be found foremost in helping
these."
It was the propaganda impact of the & scheme that was most important.
This is not to say that it was 'merely' propoganda, but that Wheatley's
proposal, due to its simplicity, practicalness, and attractiveness, was able to
influence and galvanise public opinion. He himself was aware that the
programme was not sufficient for the City's needs but argued that should this
experiment prove itself then the City would find other ways of extending the
qn
scale of this type of house-building. By anyone's standards Wheatley was
talking about a definite improvement in the quality of life. Compared to the
one and two apartments most of Glasgow's working class was housed in, the
proposed cottages were obviously superior. Wheatley's plan was for
4-apartment houses comprising:91
- Living room - 13ft. by 11ft. 6in.
- Parlour or bedroom - 13ft. 6in. by 11ft. 6in.
- Bedroom - 10ft. 3in. by 9ft.
- Bedroom - 10ft. 3in. by 8ft„
- Kitchen scullery - 10ft. by 6ft. 6in.
- Bathroom - 6ft 6in. by 5ft. 6in.
- With an average garden area for each house of 130 square
yards.
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It was a proposal which sought to raise people's expectations (though not
without a certain ambivalence for women as we shall see), and it was a
theme Wheatley remained constant to. Ten years later, speaking in the House
of Commons against the Tory Government's housing proposals, Wheatley
expressed graphically the sense of moral outrage and class consciousness
which made housing such an important political issue. Having been brought
up himself, in a family of eleven who shared a single apartment, Wheatley
qo
spoke from direct experience:
"... I would like to say in conclusion that the houses are
too small - they are miserably small. ... These houses will never
be homes. They will very soon be slums. They proceed on the
assumption that the working classes have no friends, and do
not require any place in which to entertain their friends. ... Why
should you object to the preaching of class war in this side?
What are doing in all your legislation? Why do you propose
these boxes for our people? Are they inferior to you? Are you
laying it down that this Britain of ours is not, within 50 or 60
years from now, to rise in its housing superior to the boxes
which you are providing in this Bill to-day?..."
While the political significance of the housing question has been
well-attested, it is possible to make make a more precise correlation between
housing conditions and electoral support for Labour. Table 1 below shows
those Wards with the highest proportion of one and two-roomed houses in
1911 for the then Municipal Burgh of Glasgow. (It does not include those
areas absorbed into Glasgow in 1912 unfortunately.) The two columns to the
right indicate whether or not a Ward had at least one Labour councillor in
either 1896/97 or in 1914.
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TABLE 1: LABOUR MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION AND SIZE OF HOUSES IN
GLASGOW WARDS
% of 1 & 2 Labour Labour
WARD roomed houses 1986/7 1914
Hutchesontown 92.0 * ★
Dalmarnock 91.6 * *
Mile End 91.4 * *
90% +
Springburn 86.2 *
Kinning Park 85.2 *











Source: Third Statistical Account of Glasgow, p 455, for housing figures. Electoral
results from the Glasgow Herald - and refer to the municipal polls of 1896 and 1897, and
Labour's position after the municipal election of 1914.
In 1911 fourteen of the City's 26 Wards has a proportion of 1 and 2-roomed
houses in excess of 70%, the average for the City being 66.4%. Of these,
eight had at least one Labour Councillor in 1914. Apart from the newly
incorporated areas these were the only Labour Councillors in the City. If we
go back to 1896/7, which years witnessed the emergence of the Stalwarts, we
find that Labour representation was, again, concentrated solely within these
same Wards. If we disregard Kinning Park for a moment, since it did not
become part of Glasgow until 1906, we see that of the nine Wards which
were responsible for all the Labour Councillors at these two dates, five had
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Labour representatives on both occasions. This link' gets closer the higher up
the 'scale' we go, i.e. the greater the proportion of 1 and 2-roomed houses in
a Ward (or the more pressure on housing there would be in an area) the more
likely that Ward was to have had a Labour Councillor. Thus, of the five Wards
with more than 80% of 1 and 2-roomed houses, all were at least partially
represented by Labour in either of the two dates, and four were so on both
occasions. The three Wards 'scoring' over 90% - Hutchesontown, Dalmarnock
and Mile End - all returned Labour representatives in both years.
We shall discuss the social indicators of Glasgow's Wards in more detail in
Chapter Six, and attempt to distinguish between middle class, 'respectable'
working class and 'pooreT working class. There was, however, no fixed
criteria for determining the status of working class areas solely by the size of
houses, the quality of 1 and 2-roomed houses varied considerably. Thus the
'artisan' areas of Springburn and Kinning Park appear to have had suffered
worse conditions than the slum' areas of Anderston and Cowcaddens, when
we might have expected their positions on the Table to have been reversed.
Nevertheless, there does appear a clear link between housing conditions and
Labour electoral success, which also indicates that Labour enjoyed support
both in 'artisan' and 'poorer' areas. This raises fundamental questions about
the basis of Labour's constituency and Labour's own perception of that
support, questions that can only be fully answered from the vantage point of
post-1918 and a fully democratic franchise.
Conclusion; Labour's "Permanent' Minority Position.
Having reached the end of the period under consideration it is necessary to
briefly examine just how strong an electoral force Labour had become in
Glasgow. Although housing provided the big municipal issue Labour had been
seeking, the improvement in its electoral performance had begun before the
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housing campaign took off. As we have seen above, the number of
candidates was reduced to four in 1909 and Labour's average poll increased
dramatically. The single gain at the November poll was followed by two
by-election victories, and Labour representation now steadily increased. Prior
to the city extension in 1912 the number of Labour councillors had reached
QO
12, and with the elections of the newly extended area there was an infusion
of new blood from the outlying burghs with victories in (Govan) Fairfield, and
Shettleston & Tollcross. By mid 1914 there were 17 Labour councillors in 11
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wards; 12 in 8 'inner city' wards and 5 in 3 'outer' wards. The importance of
the housing question can be gauged from the results of the 1913 poll at
which Labour won six seats and lost two, the two losses being due to the
failure of those Councillors to vote for the £8 cottages scheme in the Council
(which was only defeated by one vote), which had led to "apathy" among their
supporters as regards canvassing.95
Labour's successes in the years after 1909 still have to be seen in relation to
the full representation of Glasgow Corporation. If this is not done there is a
danger of drawing a false and misleading picture of the extent of Labour's
popularity or, to quote Melling, "the growth in support for Glasgow Labour".96
If we look at the results of the 1913 election, the last municipal e'ection
before the outbreak of War, we see that Labour contested 13 of the 17 wards
in which there were elections, and won in six of them, gaining just under 50%
of the votes cast in those 13 wards; Labour thus seems to have been getting
the representation its vote deserved. This representation, however, remained
extremely limited. Labour's 17 Councillors only accounted for 15.3% of the
total 111 elected members, a figure which did not match the proportionate
representation enjoyed by the Stalwarts at their height.97 While there was
undoubted scope for further improvement in Labour's position, 11 wards
represented just under 30% of all the wards, it is clear that, even had Labour
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been able to win outright control of all these wards where it had at least one
member, it would still have been nowhere near to winning a majority on the
Corporation. There remained huge areas of the City where Labour did not
contest; in the last three years of full municipal elections (1911,12,13) there
were 14 of the 26 'inner city' wards where Labour did not stand at all. Just as
in national politics, so at the municipal level, Labour could only aspire to be a
minority party. It took the upheavals of the First World War, and the creation
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Chapter Four
The Irish
If, in the political system operating after the First World War the support of
the Irish-Catholic population in Scotland for the Labour Party has been seen
as crucial to Labour's success, it is also the case that prior to the First World
War the Irish in Scotland have been identified as a major stumbling-block to
the advance of the Labour movement. Studies of the Irish, or Catholic, vote in
the modern period have identified it as being more pro-Labour than the
Scottish working class vote as a whole.1 Generally speaking, it has been seen
that only with the settling of Irish independence in 1922, i.e. with the removal
of Home Rule from the political agenda, that the Irish in Scotland (and the UK
for that matter) broke their long alliance with the Liberal Party and moved to
Labour.2 We shall return to the immediate post-war period, and the role of
the Irish vote, in the conclusion to this study, but for the moment it is
important to emphasise the change in Irish voting patterns post-WWI insisted
upon by much of the historiography, and the view taken of the negative role
played by the Irish as regards the Labour movement pre-1914, since it will be
seen, through a detailed examination of Irish relations with Labour in Glasgow,
that the break' in Irish political behaviour has been exaggerated. The
'traditional' view of the Irish and Labour is expressed by J G Kellas:3
One important factor which weakened the Labour
movement in Scotland was the hostility of the Roman Catholics.
As long Home Rule depended on the Liberals, the Catholics
voted for them and the Labour Party was deprived of much of
its potential working class vote. ... The Protestant-Catholic split
also entered the industrial wing of the movement, for the trade
unions could not be effective when cheap labour in the form of
Irish Catholic immigrants was readily available.
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Elsewhere Kellas has stated this view even more forcibly:4
It was the attitude of the Irish working class which
prevented the emergence of a strong Labour movement in
Scotland, until Irish Home Rule was solved.
The work of William Walker adds to the weight of the above view by
emphasising the Church-oriented basis of Irish nationalist politics hostile to
both secular ideologies, especially if they smacked of socialism, and any
weakening of the Home Rule vote.5 Other historians, notably I S Wood and
John McAffrey, have sought to qualify this view of the Irish in Scotland, and
they comment upon the positive, active role played by individual Irishmen and
Irish organisations alongside of, and within the Labour movement. Wood in
particular seeks to question the views of Walker on:6
Whether Irish nationalism in Scotland was always inimical
to any immigrant rapport on class issues with Scottish trade
unionists and radical movements
The work of McAffrey, involving as it does some attempt at quantifying the
Irish electorate, is the more directly relevant to our concerns here. McAffrey
sees the Irish vote in Scotland as:7
a conditional vote, organised and given to whatever power
in the State would accede to Catholic wishes as expressed in
this conjunction of religion and nationality.
Furthermore, by attempting to focus attention on the number of Irish voters,
McAffrey calls into question the supposed significance of the 'Irish vote', as
well as indicating cracks in its supposed monolithism. Thus, on occasion, in
specific localities the Irish vote, or parts of it, went to Labour, while a general
level of enfranchisement of 50% of Irish male householders must have
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seriously limited the impact of that vote, even if it was united.8
Overview of Irish Nationalist Politics in Glasgow
Organised Irish-Catholic nationalist politics in Glasgow can be traced back to
1823 and the establishment of a Catholic Association to support Daniel
O'Connell's agitation for Catholic emancipation.9 The "Liberator" was extremely
popular in Scotland and his regular visits and tours encouraged a Catholic
political presence and helped make links with indigenous radical forces.
Contact between revolutionary radicals had been established earlier in the
1790s through Thomas Muir and the Society of United Scotsmen. This
'underground' activity was to continue throughout much of the nineteenth
century, co-existing with the Reform Act agitation and Chartism.10 In the
1850s and 1860s the Irish Republican Brotherhood - the Fenians - enjoyed
considerable support in Glasgow, mainly through the aegis of the "violently
national" Free Press.11 This paper, established in 1851, and its editor Keane,
had politically to oppose the Catholic heirarchy which, both in Ireland and
Scotland condemned the IRB. It was not until the collapse of the Fenian
movement by the end of the 1860s that the directly 'constitutional' movement
for Home Rule came to dominate the activities of the Irish in Britain, until it
was, in turn, surpassed by the armed struggle of Sinn Fein.
In 1870 Isaac Butt, an ex-Tory who had acted as defence lawyer for fenian
prisoners, established the Home Government Association in Dublin. Almost
immediately it spread to Britain with the first 'mainland' branch of the
Association, or League as it was soon to be called, being founded in Glasgow
in 1871. The moving force here was John Ferguson, like Butt also a
Protestant, born in Belfast in 1836 and who had moved to Glasgow in 1860.
Ferguson arranged for Butt to speak in Glasgow, and from that meeting began
the Home Rule agitation in Britain. The branch established in Glasgow was
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named the Home Government Branch (HGB) which, throughout all the
developments of the Home Rule party - Irish land League, Irish National
League, United Irish League - remained "the most influential sector in Great
Britain of the movement".12
Ferguson had been involved in the activities of the Reform League prior to
the passing of the 1867 Act which helped to stimulate Catholic efforts at the
local political level. With the emergence of Parnell and a new, more
aggressive policy from the Irish MPs, the Irish National League (1882) sought
to make the Irish electorate in Britain a more disciplined and cohesive force.
Though Parliamentary elections were all important a great deal of effort was
spent at the local level in getting representation on to Ward Committees and
securing Catholic representatives on the School Board.13 The School Board
elections, by way of the cumulative voting system, allowed for direct
sectarian representation and indicates the level of co-operation between the
Church and the INL. Archbishop Eyre, soon after his arrival in Glasgow, had
formed a Catholic Union with the aim of mobilising the Irish vote by making
sure that Catholic electors appeared on the register.14
It is normal to find at the elections in this period that the
parochial organisation of the local Catholic Union and the local
branch of the Irish National League co-operated in compiling
registers of voters, in urging registration, deciding on
candidates and canvassing. The parish and the local political
organisation were often indistinguishable in their activity.
The extent of Protestant leadership of the Irish Party, eg Butt, Parnell, and in
Glasgow John Ferguson, meant that sectarianism was never likely to flourish
within Irish nationalism. A move directed from within the HGB that "Irishmen
should not place their confidence in Protestant leaders", was repudiated by a
city-wide meeting.15 However, as Ian Wood indicates, things might be quite
different in certain localities. Wood gives instances from Lanarkshire and
Ayrshire which suggest that branches there were exclusively Catholic in a
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deliberate sense.16 The role of the clergy should not be underestimated. While
tensions continued to exist, most notable over hierarchy condemnation of the
1886 "plan of campaign" as illegal, and on the Pope's authority against God's
law,17, and more recurrently over the Church's major pre-occupation with
religious education, there is little doubt that constitutional nationalism enjoyed
the Church's support, as fenianism had encountered its wrath. Whether or
not this led to clerical control is another matter.
Undoubtedly the pattern of Irish migration encouraged the identification of
Irish and Catholic. While census figures do not distinguish between religions
there is no doubt that Ulster Protestants were regarded as distinct from
Catholics, as less of a threat (though Orangemen came in for criticism), and,
indeed, as more or less Scottish. A phenomenon of the nineteenth century
migration into mining areas (the industry with the largest number of
Irish-born males employed in Scotland) was the formation of small
communities that were totally Irish and Catholic, as was the case of the small
village where John Wheatley's family lived, and which remains even today in a
village like Croy to the N E of Glasgow. The historian of the Irish in Scotland
regards their unity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
exemplary and due to several overlapping causes. Firstly, "assimilation with
the native stock had not then begun", and this was partly due to their being
able to maintain their own religion. The community was largely single class;
"in those days the vast majority belonged to the working class and the
opportunities for success on business or profession were few". Their
"isolation" meant they were "thrown back on one another for social
intercourse in their moments of leisure". And in their social life the role of the
local church was central:18
The church had been built with their hard-earned money,
their pastors were usually Irish like themselves, the school
alongside depended on their contributions for its upkeep, and
153
even the humble parish hall was hallowed in their sight by the
fact that it had been their temporary chapel until they were able
to undertake the erection of a stone edifice. The hail provided
recreation for them in the evenings of the week and was the
meeting place on Sundays after Mass for the formulation of
plans for financing the school and clearing of debts, and
determining policy in the schoolboard and municipal elections.
In addition it housed such confraternities as the Young Men's
Society or the local branch of the benevolent institution known
as the Irish National Order of Foresters. ... The men of the
parish had their branch of the INL, which met usually on Sunday
afternoons, but the concert run on Saturday evenings under the
management of the branch was open to all the parish. Once a
year, too, in the west of Scotland at least, there was a reunion
of those who claimed the same county in Ireland as their
birthplace.
Given this "centripetal force" it is hardly surprising that Irish and Catholic
were, more or less, synonymous terms. Thus the parish priest at Baillieston,
speaking at the inauguration of a new INL branch in 1886:19
he could not separate the Irish cause from Catholicity, and
he always considered, speaking in a general sense, that when
he met an Irishman he met a Catholic.
The Catholic-Irish newspaper, the Glasgow Observer and Catholic Herald
(better known simply as the Observe/), which divided its space between
Church matters and Nationalist politics, made similar, if less forthright
identification. At the 1896 municipal elections for instance it referred to
"candidates of our race and creed", and commented upon , 'The way to
20
Catholic success". Such comments do not prove sectarian attitudes or
clerical control but they do indicate just how difficult it is separate Irish from
Catholic at this time. The same identification was made by the host
community, which could result in an anti-Catholic reaction; John Cronin of
the WEC and ILP lost his seat at Dalmarnock in 1898 in the face of a
campaign of, "keep out Cronin the Papist."21 Unfortunately there has been no
work done on the 'Orange' vote (or 'community')similar to that on the
Irish-Catholics, but the extent of comment about it in the press of the period
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leaves no doubt as to its existence. However, anti-Irish prejudice extended
beyond the membership of the lodges. Helen Crawfurd, a future leader of the
1915 rent strike, suffragette, prominent member of the HP, and later the
Communist Party, was brought up in the Gorbals in a strongly religious
household - her father was a Presbyterian (and Tory) and her mother a
Methodist - and recalled the attitudes prevalent towards the Irish in the
Glasgow of the 1880s:22
Irish was, in the eyes of the public, synonomous with
Catholic and both stood for the overthrow of the Church and
for violence. ... I looked upon the Fenian and Catholic Irish as
sub-human.
The year 1885 saw the Catholic political forces in Glasgow develop a greater
cohesiveness. This was the first General Election since Parnell had assumed
the leadership of the Irish party and it was to be fought under his new,
aggressive tactics which, in this instance, meant the unusual step of voting
Tory. It was also the year in which the Glasgow Observer was established,
giving the Irish community in the city their first regular journal since the
demise of the Free Press in 1868.23
Moreover, unlike its predecessor, the Observer did not clash with the
heirarchy but was in broad agreement over politics with the Church; the
closeness of the relationship indicated by sales of the Observer at the back of
the Chapel.24 The one point of friction was the differing emphasis put on
Home Rule and Catholic education with the Observer, and its (eventual)
proprietor Charles Diamond insisting on the primacy of the former over all
other considerations. The results of the school board elections of that year
were analysed by the Observer, "to demonstrate the self-confidence which
Catholics could feel through effective electoral organisation."25 Though the
cumulative vote of the school board elections allowed Catholic representation,
this success could not be repeated at either the Parliamentary or even
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municipal level. Nevertheless it could encourage an awareness of electoral
strength and further efforts at organisation, as well as raising (unrealistic)
hopes of securing Catholic/Irish MPs and Town Councillors. The rapid
development of the INL meant that "[it] could claim from 1885 to be the
26
fastest growing political organisation in Scotland. At its strongest it had
over a hundred branches, mostly situated in the West, and though Glasgow
accounted for only a few more than a dozen of these, "judged from the press
coverage [Glasgow branches] tended to have larger membership and to
provide a base for the movement's best-known activists in Scotland like John
Ferguson".27
The Tory success in 1885 could be explained as due to the INL's switch of
allegiance, just as Gladstone's victory the following year can be seen in terms
of the 'return' of the Irish vote. This was undoubtedly how Nationalists chose
to depict events, thus reflecting favourably on their political muscle, but there
is a case for regarding the election results and the Irish vote as being no
more than coincidental. Thus the Conservatives could have expected a swing
in their favour over issues that had nothing to do with the Irish. The seats
lost by Liberals were relatively few in Scotland with, according to McAffrey,
Kilmarnock Burghs, "the only important industrial one they lost directly to Irish
28
abstention." The General Election of 1886, again in broad terms, seems to
indicate the significance of the Irish vote to the Liberals, but in Scotland, "the
Liberals suffered serious reverses ... and nowhere more so than where the
29
Irish vote was strong". This leads McAffrey to the conclusion that:
Catholic political participation in Scotland then in the
1880s and 1890s could be seen as important in maintaining
support for the Liberals and ensuring their return when there
was a general tide of support for Liberalism as in, for instance
1892. But when a mood of Unionism swept in, as it did in the
period up to the early 1900s,it was nowhere strong enough to
guarantee the retention of Liberal seats under threat.
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Generally speaking the Irish vote was solidly pro-Liberal up to the elections of
1910, as instructed by the executive of the Irish parliamentary party.
However, on specific occasions, in specific areas, the Irish vote did go to
Labour, or was split over whether or not to support a Labour candidate. This
could occur from either the decision of the Executive, or could emerge from
the initiative of local activists struggling against the authority of the centre.
Though the Irish vote was "conditional" on who would best respond to Irish
issues it was not an "opportunist" vote, 1885 notwithstanding, an exercise
never to be repeated except in individual cases. Given the working class
nature of the Irish community in Britain, the continuing peasant struggle
against landlordism in Ireland, and the fact that Home Rule became an integral
part of the radical programme, there can be little question that the Irish vote
was intrinsically anti-Tory. It could be argued that had the Conservatives
been able to 'solve the Irish problem' then the Irish would have voted for
them, but the important point is that the Tories, as the Unionist Party, were
incapable of offering the Irish Home Rule or anything approximating to it. The
pressure on Irish support for the Liberal Party was, therefore, always going to
come from the left, which meant, by and large, that Labour would be the only
serious alternative choice for Irish voters.
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TABLE 1: PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS OF IRISH-BORN MALES IN GLASGOW 1911.
Total Irish-born male workforce aged over 10 = 26,062.
Total male workforce aged over 10 = 253,210.
Irish-born males as percentage of total male workforce = 10.29%.
OCCUPATIONS (A) (B) (C) (D)
General Labourers 1959 7.52 2.88 26.86
Dock/Quay Labourers 1561 5.99 1.57 39.29
Ironfounders 1497 5.74 3.62 16.35
Iron, Steel, Tube
Manufacture 1040 3.99 2.07 19.82
Builders', Masons'
Bricklayers' Labourers 995 3.82 0.83 47.11
Vanmen, Lorrymen,
Carriers, Carters 866 3.32 4.35 7.86
Gas Works Service 832 3.19 1.01 32.54
Undefined Workers in
Engine & Machine Making 646 2.48 3.37 7.58
Omnibus & Tram Sevice 583 2.24 1.14 20.22
Boot, &c. - Makers,
Dealers 550 2.11 1.18 18.34
Labourers in
Engineering Works 525 2.01 1.10 18.92
TOTAL 11054 42.41 32.12 18.88
TABLE 2: OTHER (SELECTED) OCCUPATIONS OF IRISH-BORN MALES IN
GLASGOW 1911
OCCUPATIONS (A) (B) (C) (D)
Barmen 215 0.82 0.46 18.34
Inn, Hotel Keepers;
Publicans, Beersellers;
Wine & Spirit Merchants,
Agents 296 1.14 0.77 15.12
Builders, Bricklayers,
& Masons 231 0.89 1.12 8.17
Advocates, Solicitors 3 0.01 0.19 0.63
Physicians, Surgeons,
Registered Practitioners 9 0.03 0.20 1.73
Schoolmasters, Teachers,
Professors, Lecturers 35 0.13 0.41 3.38
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SOURCE: Census of Scotland 1911 Vol 1 Part 2, City of Glasgow. Table XXII; Vol 3. A
Tablel" Notes:
COLUMN A = Number of Irish-born in each occupation.
COLUMN B = Number of Irish-born as a percentage of total Irish-born male workforce.
COLUMN C = Total number of all workers employed in each occupation as a percentage of total
male workforce.
COLUMN D = Number of Irish-born in each occupation as a percentage of total Irish-born
workforce.
The working class complexion of the Irish community has been attested to by
writers from Handley on, yet, surprisingly little attempt has been made to
quantify this perception. The essentially unskilled or semi-skilled, manual
labourer nature of the Irish-born male workforce can be gauged clearly from
the table above. Principal Occupations' are identified as those in which there
were more than 500 Irish-born males employed, according to the Census of
1911.
Of the eleven principal occupations no fewer than four are explicitly described
as labouring jobs, and these four groups alone account for just under 20% of
the total Irish-born male workforce.
In all of the eleven principal occupations, bar two, the Irish have a higher
employment location quotient, ie Irish workers were more likely to be
employed in these areas than the rest of the workforce.
Table 2 - Other (Selected) Occupations - throws added light on the social
structure of the Irish community. As we might expect the Irish are very much
under-represented in the Professions - Law, Medicine, Education. The
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numbers employed as Builders, Masons and Bricklayers contrasts sharply with
the figure in Table 1 for the labourers in these trades; in the former the Irish
are under-represented while in the latter they are massively over-represented.
Barmen and Publicans, etc. are included due to the significance of the drink
trade' within the politics of the Irish. Conforming to the myth about the Irish
and publicans the Irish are over-represented in these two groups which, if
taken as one, would qualify as a principal occupation. The importance of the
drink trade amongst the Irish, however, is likely due to it being one of the few
commercial opportunities open to them.
Irish Nationalism and Socialism
Prior to the formation of the Labour Party (or.rather, those forces pushing for
independent labour representation) there existed organisations on the left
which could act as a pole of attraction to Irish workers. As we saw in
chapter 1 the early Socialist movement was intimately involved, and to a
great extent grew out of, the land agitation in Scotland and Ireland; before
joining the fledgling SDF Bruce Glasier had been secretary of a branch of the
30
Land League and Shaw Maxwell had been similarly active. For certain
Irishmen the pull towards socialism would be strong due to it addressing their
position as industrial workers in Britain and, in its radicalism and revolutionary
fervour, socialism could be regarded, in contrast to Home Rule
constitutionalism, as closer to the revolutionary nationalism of the fenian
movement, of which some Scots-Irish socialists claimed involvement.
Even association with pronounced atheists and free-lovers, etc, could arouse
the condemnation of the clergy, as occurred in Parkhead in 1887 when
numbers of Irish unemployed began to visit a newly-established SDF hall.31
The influence of such company, so it was argued, would lead to Irishmen
losing their heritage, i.e. their religion and their Irishness. The life histories of
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John Wheatley and James Connolly both show, in their different ways, that
Catholics could be socialists without losing their religion or, at least in the
case of Connolly, their Irish identity. Nevertheless, the move towards
socialism, in the early part of the period, seems only to have attracted
individual Irishmen and to have involved a break, to some degree, with the
Irish-Catholic community. Amongst the early members of th Glasgow SDF
was Pete Curran who later joined the ILP and became a Labour MP for Jarrow.
He received the attention of the Glasgow Observer over the subject of his
schooling and subsequent (sic) loss of Irishness. Under the heading, "Pete
(Pat's) Schooling", it commented:32
Mr Pete (who used to be Pat) Curran was the subject of an
appreciative sketch in the Tory 'Daily Graphic', from which it
may be learned that Mr Curran, who belongs to Glasgow, was
educated there at a Board School. If this is so, Mr Curran is true
to his training. Catholic parents who want to make ILP Pete's
out of Catholic Pats should adopt that has turned out Mr Pete
(Pat) Curran.
Those Irish who joined the socialist movement, at least in its early stages,
could not be expected to retain much influence within the immigrant
community. They were not harbingers of mass conversion, the decision to
become a socialist being largely an individual choice. Yet they were no more
"oddities" than the rest of their new comrades whose collective conversion
was symptomatic of the "upheavals of the economic and political life of Great
Britain" at this time.33 Significant as the Irish element of the early socialist
societies may have been, within the Irish community they were only of
marginal importance, In terms of mainstream politics it is the role of the
branches of the INL and of prominent individuals within the nationalist
movement that has to be examined. Once, however, a significant Labour
presence emerges the political role of the Irish has to be related to it.
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The General Elections. 1885 - 1895
Pamell's instruction to vote Tory in 1885 cut across established Irish voting
behaviour and the interests of the Irish working class in Britain. The discipline
of the response in Irish ranks emphasises the dominance of the national
question in the Irish community. Nevertheless there were some problems in
realising total support to the leadership's call.
The Third Reform Act made an enormous impact on the Scottish Highlands
where a land reform movement, inspired by the example of the Irish Land
League, had been active since 1881-2. (see Chapter One re land war.) Under
the new franchise a Crofters' Party was formed, outside of official Liberalism,
with Irish and Radical support and which won four out six seats contested in
1885.34 The total absence of Irish electors in the Highland constituencies
meant there was no confusion over the 'vote Tory' policy, but in the industrial
south-west there were a number of candidates run by the more left-wing,
pro-land nationalisation, Scottish Land Restoration League [SLRL], which did
have sympathisers amongst the Irish community.
The most prominent figure in this respect was John Ferguson who had openly
questioned Parnell's policy. Ferguson supported the candidature, in Blackfriars
and Hutchesontown, of James Shaw Maxwell, who also received the
endorsement of Michael Davitt.35 As we have already noted, of the five SLRL
candidates, only two - Shaw Maxwell in Blackfriar and Hutchesontowm and
Forsyth in Bridgeton - were 'serious' challenges, (see Chapter Three.) This
being so the relatively high polls of Shaw Maxwell and Forsyth may well have
been due to Irish support. Shaw Maxwell's support for the Irish Land League
had made him "particularly popular with many of the Glasgow Irish".36 While
Ferguson was censured by the Executive for his role at the election, a
majority of his own branch, the Home Government, gave him a vote of
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confidence, and his stature within the movement seems to have encouraged
the Executive to leave matters alone.37 There is no suggestion of a split away
from the executive but it does seem likely that a number of Irish were
prepared to follow Ferguson's example, and in Blackfriars the local INL was
38
divided on the matter with many supporting Shaw Maxwell.
There were no radical or 'labour' candidates (the term 'labour' was sometimes
applied to the SLRL candidates) at the 1886 election but Ferguson again
stepped out of line over his support for Keir Hardie at the Mid Lanark
bye-election in April 1888. While so much has been written about Mid Lanark
as a milestone in the eventual formation of the Labour Party, we have seen
above (Chapter Two) that it only appears so in retrospect; at the time it was
simply one of a series of 'one-off initiatives, which cum ulatively led to the
beginnings of independent labour representation. A great deal has also been
made of the role of the Irish vote which, it has been argued, by being
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withheld from Hardie was the prime cause of his defeat. Yet, given
estimates of the total Irish vote in the constituency of only 900 (10% of the
electorate) even had Hardie secured all of these votes he would still have
40
come last. As it was, it would seem likely that Hardie did receive an amount
of Irish support. Handley, who tends to downplay the Labour and Socialist
influence on the Irish community, says that Hardie's stand, "caused a split in
the Irish vote", and that, "A third of the delegates at a conference of Hardie's
supporters were Irishmen "41 Hardie had spoken at the St Patrick's day
meeting that year in the Glasgow City Halls along with Cunninghame Graham,
then the sitting Liberal MP in Lanarkshire NW and one of Hardie's closest
political associates. It seems reasonable to assume that, as with Shaw
Maxwell three years earlier, a number of Irishmen were prepared to break
ranks and vote for Hardie
In fact Hardie's performance was not as good as Shaw Maxwell's had been;
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8% of the poll compared to 14%. Hardie's low poll, after much optimism, may
have been due to an increasing awareness that he was not going to poll
sufficient to win and that a vote for him would be 'wasted'. Even John
Ferguson was secretly urging withdrawal while still helping to organise
Hardie's campaign. In a letter to Cunninghame Graham only days before the
poll Ferguson reckoned that Hardie would not get even 300 votes, and argued
for a deal by which, "I think we have a chance to get out with some credit".
The intended deal involved 'labour' declaring support for the Liberal in return
for Liberal support for Hardie next time round.42 As we have already seen
from Ferguson's communication with Hardie after the poll his own preference
was for Labour to work through the Liberal associations, though he approved
of continued agitation and became one of the Honorary Presidents of the
newly-formed Scottish Labour Party later that year.
The very ad-hoc and ill-defined nature of what the Labour party (with a
small'p') was, and its relationship with the Liberal Party, indicates one of the
difficulties Irish electors would have had in supporting it. While they might be
in agreement with the manifestoes and programmes issued by Hardie, the
SLP, Knights of Labour or whoever, the question had to be faced, what were
they being asked to vote for? In concrete terms the Labour party could hardly
be said to exist, whereas the Liberal Party was one of the two parties of
government. And, moreover, this Labour party, though increasingly spoken of
and referred to as a power in the country, was divided into a plethora of
organisations, and was unclear, to say the least, as to whether it was
independent or a 'wing', of Liberalism. Even as the cohesiveness and identity
of the Labour Party developed it can hardly be said to have ever, prior to
1914, been independent of the Liberals, insofar as parliamentary politics were
concerned. Labour figures may have railed at the Irish worker for failing to
vote in his own class interest (a disposition shared with the indigenous labour
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force), but given the limited extent of Labour's challenge, and the over-riding
importance of the national question of the Irish community, it was expecting a
great deal from the Irish community to jettison their alliance with the Liberals
who held the constitutional power to make Home Rule a reality. This simple
fact meant that even Irish radicals like Michael Davitt and John Ferguson
would never break completely with the Liberals.
The 1892 General Election saw, for the first time, a definite 'Labour' challenge
at the polls. In Scotland seven Labour' candidates stood: three from the SLP
(two in Glasgow seats); and four from the SUTCLP (one in Glasgow). All
stood against Liberals and all lost heavily, though in Camlachie and Tradeston,
the Labour intervention may have been responsible for losing the seats to
Liberal Unionists, (see Chapter Two.)
For the Irish this was an election where maximum unity had to be thrown
behind the Gladstonian Liberals who had, apparently, committed themselves to
Home Rule. The Glasgow Observer was in no mood to encourage any
sympathies for Labour candidates. It could claim that, "We are not going to
find fault with the Labour Party for asserting their independence and battling
for their rights", but it questioned the credentials of Cunninghame Graham, "a
Scottish landlord", Bennet Burleigh, "Unionist journalist", and even Keir Hardie,
whom it accused of "carpet bagging', as "bona fide Labour representativefs]".
This "so-called Labour Party", it went on, warming to the subject, was being
led by43
A wretched set of wire-pullers [who] put one another
forward as Labour candidates, blow each other's trumpets, and
apparently believe that those watching them are such fools as
to be taken in by the palpable deception.
Irish workers will note that the game of these men is
obviously to put Home Rule to one side, and also to put the
land question out of sight."
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The immediate 'provocation' for this splenetic attack was Cunninghame
Graham's assertion that he was quite pleased about Michael Davitt's defeat at
the Waterford bye-election by John Redmond, leader of the Parnellites, which
group the Observer was violently opposed to. However, the fundamental
point of contention was attitudes to the Liberal Party, upon which all hopes of
Home Rule seemed to lie.
Labour can only be regarded as having a specious independence from the
Liberals at this stage. When the rhetoric is cut through the strategy, at least
of the SLP, can be seen as trying to force a number of seats from the
Liberals, i.e. by the threat of standing labour candidates to get agreement
from the Liberals to allow Labour a free run in a number of constituencies
against the Tories. The SLP Conference in January 1892 was talking in terms
of 12 candidates in Scotland (plus one in Carlisle) 44 The 'independent' status
of these candidates was not at all clear since it was claimed, by Hardie, that
Cunninghame Graham was the officially adopted Liberal candidate in
Camlachie, and Bennet Burleigh was "likely" to be adopted by the Liberal
Association in Tradeston.45 As we have discussed elsewhere (in Chapter Two)
Labour's organisation and strategy were fluid and ad-hoc; as in 1888 at
Mid-Lanark the ultimate step of standing against Liberal candidates was one
that Labour saw itself as forced to take due to Liberal intransigence in failing
to give Labour its fair share of parliamentary representation. The suggested
tactics of the SLP can be compared to the history of the Irish Party. This is
implicit in Hardie:46
In addition the Labour party hold the balance of power in
many other constituencies and the Executive would see that
power was relentlessly used."
This comparison, very common at the time, was made explicit by John
Ferguson who referred to Labour's raising its "own standard" in 1892, in the
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same way the Irish Party did in 1871.47
The attitude of Ferguson to the General Election was not dominated totally by
Home Rule or, rather, he saw Home Rule and the cause of labour as
inextricably intertwined. As relations between the Labour and Irish parties
began to worsen Ferguson attempted to act as peace-broker, to appeal for
harmony by taking a long view of affairs. In early January 1892 he sent a
long letter to the press entitled, "The Revolt of Labour and the Triumph of
Home Rule", in which he stated his own position and tried to accomodate the
4ft
Labour and Irish interests.
Ferguson argued that the Home Rule movement, as led by Isaac Butt in the
1870s, had looked to the Irish aristocracy to gain Home Rule, to win through
"generous sentiment". As a result the movement was dead or dying by 1878.
The leadership of a 'new' party under the leadership of Parnell was also the
formation of a new "democratic" movement with the policy of "the Land for
the people". "Home Rule at once took a new life when it called up economic
and democratic forces like those to aid its noble sentiments". Not only did
"the new doctrine [sweep] the masses" in Ireland but, 'The British workingmen
were attracted to the Home Rule doctrine". The labour candidates of 1885
stood on Home Rule and "appropriation of ground rents", and this "revolt of
labour" was what induced Gladstone and Morley to start looking seriously at
"Irish history and Irish social problems." The Highland land war and crofter
agitation was organised on the lines of Davitt and the Land League.
Gladstone's proposal to buy out the Irish landlords was responsible for defeat
in 1886, but "the Labour Party" would not support any government which
proposed that policy, and, further, "is for Home Rule as a first measure, to
clear the way for the labour and land reform it demands. I know of no labour
leader who is not upon the Irish side."
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According to Ferguson "the Labour Party will control the coming election".
What had to be done was to convince Gladstone and Morley that the "official
party must not act as hitherto against the two or three dozen of Labour
candidates who will be put up to win." Here we again come up against the
point that this Labour party' is not, or is not yet, a truly independent political
force, but is still part of Liberalism. Ferguson was delighted at the success of
the Radicals (with whom he identified) at the Liberal Convention in Scotland
the previous November where they successfully carried a Home Rule
amendment calling for the "appropriation of ground rents and mining royalties
by taxation", and also proposals for "one man one vote", and the Eight hours
day. Ferguson may well have believed that, "the Labour Party knows the near
future belongs to it", but for the moment his position was of continued
adherence to the Liberals.
The Radical party to which I belong is doing its best to
prevent any parting of the ways between the Liberal and Labour
parties till we turn the next election and carry Home Rule."
But this could only be avoided if Labour was permitted its "two or three
dozen candidates". Ferguson wanted to avoid "another Irish blunder" like
Mid-Lanark in 1888 when Parnell opposed Hardie to please Gladstone. In his
desire to link Labour and the Irish Ferguson seems to have grossly overstated
the strength of Labour; far from controlling the election its performance was
negligible. The insurmountable dilemma facing Ferguson and other Irish
politicians who thought like him was that the Liberals were not going to
accept Labour candidatures, and this being so, unless Labour abandon ed its
ambitions, there would have to be a direct clash.
The SLP conference on 2 January was largely dominated by the question of
relations with the Liberal party, and decided on a policy of voting, where there
was no Labour candidate, for any party depending on the attitude of individual
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candidates to the labour programme. There was a strong suspicion that
Liberal headquarters in London were planning to stand working men Lib-Lab
candidates, "in order to outmanoef/re the Labour Party", and Hardie stated that
these would be fought even more vigorously than ordinary Liberal
49
candidates. In such a strained atmosphere Hardie added to the pressure by
stating that the Liberal Conference decisions on land nationalisation and the
eight hours were nothing but, "a device to catch the Labour vote".50 Ferguson,
himself partly responsible for achieving these breakthroughs, was compelled
to publicly contradict Hardie. It was something he was actually loath to do
since he had no desire to muddy the waters any further, but, since he had
been unable to attend the SLP Conference, he felt he had no other option.
Pointing out that Hardie had been in the strangers gallery at the Liberal
meeting and did not indicate then that, "he thought the whole thing a fraud",
Ferguson described Hardie s new view as "unjust [and] impolitic".51 Despite
Ferguson's efforts to be as diplomatic as possible, this public disagreement
helped further sharpen the differences in policy between Labour and the Irish.
In the same letter Ferguson went on to say52
I look to the Liberal party as the real instrument to obtain
reform, and to Mr Gladstone as the noblest British statesman in
our annals.
Given this view there could be little doubt where Ferguson would stand when
the crunch came over Labour candidates standing against Liberals. After the
elections he was expelled for his position of Honorary Vice-President of the
SLP for having appeared on Liberal platforms in seats contested by Labour.
As we have seen all seven Labour candidates in Scotland were defeated, the
best result being in Aberdeen South where H H Champion (SUTCLP) managed
15.8% of the poll. Even here, however, the Liberals still won, though
Champion's 'military' style of socialism may have been more attractive to
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disaffected Tories than Liberals. In Glasgow the SUTCLP candidate fared
abysmally with only 2.1% of the poll, but the SLP in Camlachie and Tradeston
did reasonably well in polling 11.9% and 10.7% respectively, and made the
greatest impact by drawing off enough Liberal votes to let the Unionists
in.(see Ch 3) How much of the Irish vote the SLP candidates got is an open
question and Cunninghame Graham certainly didn't seem to expect much in
early 1892 when he wrote to Hardie:53
About the Irish I am not sorry. Let them do their meanest.
They'll want me some day. In the meantime I look to Scotch
democrats as yourself, Haddow, Brodie, etc. to protect me from
the attacks of reactionary priestcraft. That is what it means.
The dispute with Ferguson, however, cannot be reduced to "the attacks of
reactionary priestcraft", and shows the political complexity and variety
amongst the Glasgow Irish community. McAffrey points out that in the 1890s,
"there is evidence of a growing interest within the Catholic community in
social questions", with translations of Rerum Novarum appearing in the press
and regular discussion meetings being held on it. This is related by him to the
regularly expressed fears about Irishmen voting for "no-hope" Labour
candidates. After the election of 1892 the Observer fulminated against the
"traitors" who had supported Labour in Camlachie and Tradeston; the
virulence in itself being an indicator that sufficient numbers had done just
that.54
Despite the failure of the Liberal Government to secure the Home Rule Bill
against the hostility of the Lords the General Election of 1895 again saw the
INL throw its weight behind the Liberals. A complicating factor for Irish
electors, however, was the Church-School question and the view taken by
many of the heirarchy, including Cardinal Vaughan (successor to Cardinal
Manning), that Catholics should support Tories since they, at least, wanted to
have religion taught in schools.55 The Observer strenuously opposed this
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attitude which actually threatened to push Home Rule into the background.
Charles Diamond, proprietor of the Observer, had been Nationalist MP for
North Monaghan from 1892, but was de-selected' by his constituency in 1895,
partly due to this issue and partly due to his opposition to the drink trade.56
The Observer argued that the Liberal Nonconformists and the Radical
Secularists had good reason to oppose the Tories over the imposition of
Church of England schools, and that while the Radicals were not as hostile as
commonly supposed the Tories had been in power for six years (1886-1892)
and done nothing to relieve Catholic complaints about rate-support for
schools.57
This dispute between the clergy and politicians indicates that Irish was not
simply reducible to Catholic, that religion had to respond to political demands
and priorities, as well as vice-versa. For the Observer the issue was
clear-cut; the "first duty" of the Irish Party was "to get Home Rule for
Ireland":58
If Catholic Ireland were offered denominational schools,
and Catholic colleges and other advantages to religion in
exchange for Home Rule, she would not accept them. THE IRISH
PARTY WOULD BE BOUND IF THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THIS
COUNTRY WERE CALLED ON TO VOTE TORY AT THE GENERAL
ELECTION, TO OPPOSE THAT ADVICE, AND IN SO DOING THE
BISHOPS, PRIESTS AND PEOPLE OF CATHOLIC IRELAND WOULD
SUPPORT THE IRISH PARTY.
Moreover, there were other considerations as well as Home Rule per se. It
was argued that any call to vote Tory on this one issue was unlikely to have
any effect, since the Irish vote was a radical and social reform vote:59
I believe that if at the General Election his Eminence and
the Heirarchy called upon us to vote with the Tories on the
school question and ignore other considerations that such an
appeal would not be widely responded to. This is an
indisputable fact. The Irish Home Rulers will not vote Tory while
Home Rule is advocated by Radicals and opposed by Tories.
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That is certain. Labour men, temperance men and others
interested in social reform, will not be easily got into the Tory
camp on this education question ...
On the other hand the Observer was just as hostile to the ILP candidates as it
was to the Tories, indeed it insisted on regarding them as opposite sides of
the same coin; "in this contest Labourite means Coercionist".60 Any vote for
Labour was not only a wasted vote but a direct vote for the Tories since
Labour's policy was not based on actually winning seats but on keeping the
Liberal out. The example of Camlachie in 1892 was kept in mind, when
"Cunninghame Graham, posing as a Labour candidate, succeeded in doing the
work of the wrecker and handing over the seat to the Tories".61 On this
occasion there was, apparently, no dispute between the Observer and the INL
in Glasgow. The Father Maginn Branch, one of the two Bridgeton branches,
refused the ILP candidate, Professor Watson, permission even to address the
membership. John Ferguson was fully behind the Liberals, and much more
definitely so than in 1892. Gone was the view of Labour replacing the Liberals
and he explicitly contradicted his own argument of three years before, viz,
"that the Independent Labour Party are only doing as the Irish Party did". In
general terms Ferguson's position had not changed, indeed it could not
change, logically, until Home Rule was won, or the Liberals began to oppose
the movement, but there was an identifiable hardening in his attitude as
regards the intervention of the ILP 62
They could easily have been adopted by the Liberal Party
upon the same principle of general support of Liberal measures
with complete independence on Labour questions. They now
have to be opposed because they will not agree to form the
combination for the advance and support of the Liberal Party
upon its great programme."
The ILP stood five candidates in Glasgow in 1895, a challenge riot to repeated
on the same scale prior to the First World War, but its performance was very
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disappointing, averaging only 7.5% of the poll with Robert Smillie doing best
with just under 11% (see Chapter Three). The result of the election was bad
for the Liberals who were left with just two of the City's seven seats, though
it is not clear that the ILP intervention was responsible. Most of the Unionist
majorities were very small, but only in one seat, St Rollox, would the
combined Liberal - ILP vote have defeated the Conservative, and this was the
seat where the ILP vote was proportionately the lowest. The Observer did not
immediately seek to blame 'traitors' for the disastrous results. There was a
common agreement that it had been the absence of working-class voters due
to the 'Fair' holidays, a cause cited by the Observer, Ferguson and the parish
priest in St Rollox.63 However, Labour's relatively high poll in Camlachie may
have been due, as in 1892, to a level of Irish support from within the HGB. It
was a few months after the General Election, in the run-up to the municipal
polls, that the Observer laid the blame for the Liberal defeat in Camlachie at
the door of the HGB:64
It is notorious that the Home Government Branch did all it
could safely do against Baillie Chisholm in Camlachie, and only
by a sort of death-bed repentence came into line at the
eleventh hour, when to persevere in its schematic disposition
would have resulted in the branch being cut off from the
organisation.
The re-opening of this old wound was the prelude to a new and much more
significant division within Irish opinion, over the role of the Irish vote at
municipal elections and in particular, its relation to Labour candidates.
The Municipal Alliance and Irish Disagreements
Although at first sight the General Election of 1895 would have appeared
likely to have worsened relations between Labour and the Irish, this was only
true as regards the attitude of the Observer, while the INL drew much closer
to the ILP and Trades Council. After 1895 there was a change in Irish and
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Labour approaches to the vexed question of what stance to be taken towards
General Elections. By 1900 there was considerable Irish disenchantment with
the Liberals, leading to the INL in Blackfriars & Hutchesontown actually voting
Tory, a policy supported by the Observer.,65 The Gladstone-MacDonald pact of
1903 allowed the INL to recommend support for Labour candidates where they
were solid on Home Rule, thus allowing more leeway to the local branches.66
Even though this agreement did not run in Scotland it, nevertheless, had an
impact on thinking within the INL with the Executive giving support to Labour
in a number of three-cornered contests. Alongside of this Labour's
parliamentary ambitions became more limited after 1895, in subsequent
General Elections it only contested two, at most, of the Glasgow seats, and
always the same two. At the same time Labour's share of the vote began to
increase markedly.
We shall return to the parliamentary scene below but the first major
breakthrough in terms of electoral arrangements occurred in local elections.
As we saw in the previous chapter the ILP in Glasgow followed the lead of
John Ferguson in municipal politics, and the INL played a significant role in
the formation and early years of the Workers Election Committee [WEC], a
development which further split Irish opinion in the City.
The crucial divide lay, on the one hand, between the Home Government
Branch of the INL and, on the other, the Glasgow Observer.67 In 1894 the
Observer came under the sole ownership and control of Charles Diamond who
was a keen advocate of temperance and the local veto, and though he could
agree with men such as John Ferguson that the Irish vote was largely a
working class, social reform vote, he was determined that nothing should
stand in the way of Home Rule, neither the ILP nor the Cardinal of
Westminster. The Home Government Branch was the oldest and largest
nationalist organisation in Scotland and was also the wealthiest, and hence,
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most independent, of ail the INL branches. It also had a number of publicans
amongst its membership and office-bearers. We have already seen that the
branch or, at least, large elements within it, had given succour to Labour
candidates in 1885, 1892, and even 1895, much to the chagrin of the
Observer. However, it was the much more open support given by the HGB to
ILP candidates for the Town Council that really brought the simmering dispute
out into the open.
During the General Election campaign of July 1895 Hugh Murphy, President of
the HGB, had sailed very close to the wind in following the instructions of the
Executive. He had spoken of the duty of unity in the Irish camp which could
only be translated in practical terms as meaning support the Liberals. But
Murphy did not, unlike Ferguson, make any direct reference to, or criticism of,
the Labour candidates. The Observer made no bones about the matter,
regarding Labour as open accomplices of the Tories; 'They are our enemies.
Have at them."68 And later it was to fulminate at the HGB's "coquetting" with
Smillie in Camlachie. Only a few months after the General Election Murphy
was working assiduously for the ILP candidates at the municipal polls. The
closeness of the relationship can be gauged from the fact that it was Murphy
who proposed George Mitchell of the ILP at the Committee meeting of the
Second Ward (Mitchell, incidentally, topped the poll at the Ward Committee).
Speaking in support of putting Mitchell forward as a distinctively Labour
cq
candidate, Murphy argued that
during the past ten years they had seen candidates calling
themselves temperance candidates, and candidates calling
themselves publicans' candidates, but they found that all in the
Town Council, Liberal, Tory, Publican and Temperance united to
put down the workingman (cheers) These men only used the
workman as a ladder to get into power and then kicked them
away.
For the Observer this was "dabbling in political heresy" and it urged its
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readers, "Do Not Support the ILP".70 It was particularly critical of Hugh Murphy
who, as well as being the most assiduous proponent of Irish co-operation
with the ILP was, as President of the HGB, one of the most influential figures
in Irish circles in Glasgow. His heresy lay, in the eyes of the Observer, in that
the ILP was effectively anti-Home Rule due to its tactic of opposing Liberals.
Mitchell had been particularly active in the Camlachie parliamentary contests
of 1892 and 1895 which, on both occasions, saw the Liberals lose to the
Tories. The ILP's intention in standing Mitchell -"the brains-carrier of the [ILP]
in the city" - was the same as the Irish would have in standing candidates,
not simply to add to their number, but to increase their status and prestige in
the district and city. Thus, to permit the return of any ILP candidate, for any
position, weakened the cause of Home Rule in Glasgow, and the Observer
attacked the reasoning which led Irishmen to support Mitchell:71
Their theory is that Municipal and Parliamentary elections
stand quite apart, that we can support a man and a party at a
Municipal election and assail them when a Parliamentary
election comes round. But in local politics this water-tight
compartment fighting is really impossible.
The Observer devoted a specific editorial to Murphy entitled, "Mr Murphy, ILP",
in which it argued that it was time he joined the ILP outright since that was
where his heart was anyway:72
and there is nothing to distinguish him from Pete (Pat)
Curran and the other Home Government men who have gone
before him into the camp whither most of them tend.
It has been argued that Catholic hostility to the ILP in the 1890s was due to
the nature of 'Ethical Socialism' with its biblical imagery, New Testament code
of ethics, revivalist fervour, etc, and which seemed almost like a rival and
sacriligious religion.73 Whatever the significance of this it is notable that the
Observer did not bring religion into the debate. It was obviously concerned at
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the secularising tendency of involvement with the ILP, witness its obsession
with Pete (Pat) Curran, though this was concerned with his loss of Irishness
as much as his religion, but in terms of the debate with the HGB the Observer
was concerned only with political issues as such.
The strongest point that Irish figures like Murphy had in their favour was that
ILP councillors would be supporters of John Ferguson's municipal programme.
This the Observer accepted, as it did that the programme was a "good thing"
and, yes, it did want supporters of it returned to the Town Council, but not if
they were opponents of Home Rule; "then we stick by the greater and let the
lesser go". Ferguson's programme would just have to wait until Home Rulers
could be found to support it.74
Though its attitude was determined by Home Rule the Observer also partly
based its opposition to any dealings with the ILP on the temperance issue by
claiming that, "The ILP are just as welcome to the whisky people as the Tories
are".75 The evidence for this was that "one of" the ILP candidates had, at a
previous Parish Council election, been supported by a circular emanating from
the Publican's Association. The level of innuendo was continued with the
comment, 'This throws a white light on the anxiety of the Home Government
Branch to promote ILP candidates".76 This lurid scenario of a 'publican
conspiracy' involving the HGB and ILP does have some circumstantial, though
tenuous, evidence to support it: Murphy and other HGB members were
involved in the drink trade; the ILP had already suffered from the publicity
surrounding a wine dealer who had provided the party with funds; a few years
later Boyd S Brown, likely to have been the candidate referred to above, was
dropped by the WEC due to his liquor connections. Yet to claim the ILP was
acting as a front for publicans was mere political abuse. While there was
plenty of scope for corruption on the licencing court, the ILP and WEC always
stood, no matter the private actions of individuals, with municipal control as
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part of their programme. When the INL attempted to get this item dropped
from the WEC programme it failed, but did not then resign from the
Committee. (See chapter Three.)
While the furore over relations with the ILP was continuing there was an
attempt being made to better organise the Irish vote at municipal elections.
As with any other organisation the INL had its eye cast on the re-division of
wards due to take place in 1896 and the subsequent general' municipal
election. It was attempted to establish a Central Municipal Election Council in
order to increase Irish representation or, as it was put, "to safeguard Irish
interests in municipal contests and afterwards to establish committees in
each ward in Glasgow."77 At a delegate conference this resolution was passed
by the votes of five branches against one, with one abstaining. The delegates
of the opposing branch, the Sir Charles Russell, were castigated as "Whigs",
and the argument for "a sternly independent attitude towards both political
parties" was directed at them.78 Against the centralised focus of the projected
Committee the Russell branch wanted "Home Rule" for each branch (and the
dissolution of the Committee). One of its delegates stated that he had:79
canvassed the 6th Ward [i.e. Blackfriars] over and over
again and he did not think that the Irish held overwhelming
power in that district at least.
The whole point about the Central Committee, however, was to bargain the
Irish vote in wards where it was numerous but not "overwhelming" for
support in wards where Irish candidates could hope to get returned. Such a
strategy demanded central control over local autonomy. In turn, however, it
begged the question of exactly where the Irish were strong enough to return
their own candidates. The interesting point about the quote above is that
Blackfriars was commonly regarded as an area with an important Irish vote -
at every election special appeals were made by candidates to the Irish
178
electors - yet here was a Nationalist with, presumably, close knowledge of
the ward, denying the significance of that vote. It is not too much to
speculate that a similar recognition was shared by the by the other INL
branches who still wanted concerted Irish action but realised it could never
be fully independent. This, and an existing sympathy with Labour anyway,
explains why come the General municipal election of 1896 there was no
evidence of the Irish Central Municipal Election Council, but that the INL had
joined with the Trades Council sponsored Workers Election Committee.
As we saw in the previous chapter the success of the WEC was also the key
to the return of Irish councillors, though not as the Observer had hoped for,
as straight Nationalist or Catholic candidates. Although somewhat muted,
temporarily, by the results in 1896, the Observer's opposition to links with the
ILP continued throughout the 1890s, as did its opposition to the HGB. The
main target remained Hugh Murphy whom it denied, "speaks for the Glasgow
on
Irishmen", but only for:
a very narrow circle of Glasgow publicans and Glasgow
ILP men who happen to be Irish in nationality and anxious to
use the Irish movement to further their own purposes.
As the alliance with the ILP was maintained via the WEC the Observer even
turned on John Ferguson, accusing him of being a Parnellite and a supporter
of the Tories, i.e. by supporting Labour candidates against Liberals. 81 Even
when the INL withdrew from the WEC the quarrel did not end. In 1903 the
HGB bought over the Glasgow Star and Examiner and published it as their
own organ in opposition to the Observer. However, they could only maintain
the venture for five years when they were forced to sell out to, of all people,
Charles Diamond, who then published the Star as a mid-week supplement to
the Observer.82
A New Century - New Perspectives on Labour
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Throughout the 1890s, after the 3rd Home Rule Bill, it became increasingly
clear that the Liberals were dragging their feet over Home Rule with the
development of an 'Imperialist' wing under Lord Roseberry. The year 1900
brought this into clearer focus in terms both of Liberal commitment to Home
Rule at the General Election, and attitudes to the Boer War. For Hugh Murphy
it was clear that the Liberal Party could be divided into two separate wings
and that the Liberal Imperialists who supported the war in southern Africa
were also staunch defenders of the Union of Ireland with Britain. Whereas in
1895 the struggle had been between Liberal and Tory there was now a
struggle within Liberalism itself. This, and the sympathy felt by the Irish for
the Boer Republics led Murphy to propose a policy of standing independent
Ol
candidates against Liberal Imperialists and:
failing this,they should sweep away the Liberal Jingo and
have the genuine Jingo elected. ... By doing so they would have
the forces of liberty and reaction fighting over again.
Murphy's position was perhaps made easier by the fact that he believed a
Tory victory to be inevitable, and this would therefore make it easier for Irish
voters to support 'independent', i.e. Labour candidates. For the Observer, still
clinging to its faith in the Liberal Party, such a strategy was far too drastic a
step to take and it counselled voting for anti-Boer Liberals so long as they
supported Home Rule, though not for "any seceder or backslider who chooses
84
to use the Liberal name." The Catholic education question was still an issue,
though not so prominent as in 1895, and the Observers attitude was still the
same; the Tories were not sympathetic to Catholic claims, the Liberals, at any
rate in Glasgow, were, and that Home Rule remained the decisive issue
anyway85
The differing perspectives of Murphy and the HGB, and the Observer did not.
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as things worked out, precipitate any clash between them. The Liberal
candidates in four of the city's constituencies re-affirmed their support for
Home Rule, and in Blackfriars & Hutchesontown where the sitting Liberal
would not agree to give the undertaking to, "keep Irish Home Rule in the
forefront of my programme both in and out of Parliament", Irish opinion was
united against him. There was no contest in Central with the sitting Tory
being returned unopposed. There was only one Labour candidate, in
Camlachie, which offered the rare spectacle of the HGB and the Observer both
supporting Labour; the reason being that there was no Liberal in the field. The
HGB passed an unanimous vote in his favour and the Observer approved of
him as "just the kind of man the constituency ought to have." Diamond's
paper had not changed its mind over Labour candidates handing seats to
Tories in three-cornered contests but that problem did not arise in Camlachie
on this occasion since, "the Liberals and Labour people have come to a wise,
07
mutual understanding on the matter."
The 1900 election is famous in Glasgow's history as the only occasion in
which the Conservatives won all the seats. In this Tory clean-sweep what
was the role of the Irish? As McAffrey has argued the Irish vote was unable
on its own to combat the general swing to the Conservatives.(See above.) In
1900, however, it is difficult to get a clear picture since the two seats where
Irish influence was reckoned greatest were fought under very particular
circumstances. In Blackfriars and Hutchesontown the Irish electors were
advised to vote Tory in order to punish the recalcitrant Liberal. A Liberal
majority of almost 400 was turned into a deficit of just under 1,000, but given
the other results in Glasgow, however, it is difficult to see the Irish action as
the determining factor.
In Camlachie the Unionist had an even greater majority, defeating the Labour
candidate by 1,238 votes, though in this case the seat had already been lost
181
by the Liberals . While Labour had established a relatively strong position in
Camlachie and enjoyed a good relationship with the INL it was still not
popular enough, even with united Irish backing and no Liberal opponent, to
win a Parliamentary seat. According to the Observer Fletcher's defeat was
due, not to any hesitance in the Irish vote, but to a Liberal "boycott" of the
QQ
Labour candidate. A point of related interest is that the Observer also stated
that William Maxwell, the Liberal candidate for Tradeston who was President
of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, would be opposed by Liberal
89
shopkeepers in the district because of his co-op connections. Given the
antipathy of Liberal Associations in Scotland to labour candidates, and the
recent history of the small traders failed "boycott", both these assertions
appear very likely.
1900 and Irish backing for Fletcher in Camlachie marks a watershed in the
practical arrangements between the Irish and Labour as regards parliamentary
elections in Glasgow. In 1906 not only the HGB, but also the INL Executive
and the Observer, would support the Labour candidates in Glasgow, both in
three-way contests. However, this did not indicate a straightforward shift
from Liberal to Labour allegiance, and in the municipal arena the attitudes of
the HGB and the Observer seemed almost to swap over. Just as the Observer
began to regard Labour as a potential ally, though it remained insistent upon
judging each candidature separately, so the HGB began to retreat from the
Stalwart alliance.
At the municipal elections of 1901 the Observer was jubilant about the defeat
of Shaw Maxwell in Mile End for which it claimed the responsibility. The
Observer had always been hostile to Shaw Maxwell but the specific reason on
this occasion was that Maxwell had sacrificed the candidature of Hugh
Murphy in attempt to appease the local Tories and prevent them opposing his
own re-election. The Observer was still opposed to Murphy but chose to
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regard this as a slight to the whole Irish-Catholic community and advised its
readers to vote for the Tory who, despite Maxwell's efforts, did stand, and
QQ
won by 29 votes. At the annual "Workers' Concert on the night of the poll
Shaw Maxwell made, "bitter ... references to the cause of his fall". He stated
that he had had to fight, "an extraordinary combination of Tories, Liberals,
Unionists, Orangemen and Catholics", and argued that his advocacy of Home
Rule for the past twenty-one years deserved, "a little more gratitude".91 There
were also veiled threats from his supporters of retaliatory action against John
Ferguson the following year in Calton. While 1901 was a bad year for the
Stalwarts, in which they were defeated in the five wards where they stood
and lost two seats - the only bright spot being P G Stewart's unopposed
return in Hutchesontown - the effort was made by defeated ILP candidates,
like Carson and Hunter, not to indulge in recriminations. Stewart explicitly
qo
countered Shaw Maxwell by saying that:
He would consider himself a traitor to his party if he
uttered a single word there which would prevent the advanced
forces coming together..
Out of this tangled web certain threads can be grasped. One being that the
Irish identified themselves as 'Progressive' or 'Labour' voters (the labels being
interchangeable) but, they expected a quid pro quo in that they had a
separate identity within the larger framework and should receive reciprocal
rights:93
The Irish voters in the city are progressive voters;
perfectly willing to vote on the progressive side, since their
interests lie that way, if only the progressive party would have
the courage and loyalty to agree to give comrades' rights to
their Irish allies.
Another point to emerge is that, and despite the clash with Shaw Maxwell, the
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Observer was more clearly identifying with Labour, to the extent of now
offering advice on how to improve its performance. The Observer agreed
with George Carson that what was needed was better organisation and
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argued that the Stalwarts should conduct:
a constant campaign the whole year through in all the
Wards which they represent or desire to represent ... It is clear
that the method of attempting to raise a splash in three or four
weeks before the election is one which cannot end in success.
As an example of what could be done it referred to Scott Gibson, not as
someone to be supported, but whose methods of organisation were, "worthy
of exact imitation in every detail" 95
The poor level of organisation by Labour was examined in the previous
chapter and the Shaw Maxwell incident simply puts it into sharper focus.
Both Shaw Maxwell and Hugh Murphy were recognised WEC candidates yet
they appear to have been at loggerheads with one another, and the dispute
seems to have continued the following year when John Ferguson only
96
managed to win in Calton by 60 votes. Shaw Maxwell regained Mile End at a
bye-election in 1903 when he stood against the WEC candidate, none other
than Hugh Murphy, and retained it in November, this time as the official
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candidate of the WEC; behaviour which would seem guaranteed to raise
Irish tempers to boiling point. This absence of any central authority not only
encouraged the rise of the maverick Scott Gibson but also permitted
personality clashes to threaten and seriously weaken Labour's position. As the
very 'particular' concerns of municipal politics re-asserted themselves, with
candidates operating as freelancers, it was becoming rapidly apparent that the
WEC was no more than a mere shell.
The conflict between the HGB and the ILP largely revolved around the
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phenomenon of Scott Gibson whom the HGB firmly supported, while the
Observer was as equally scathing in condemnation of him as was the ILP.
This new element in Glasgow's municipal scene was, by and large, a cult of
personality, but did, on occasion, threaten to erupt into an actual political
movement. After the polls in 1902 the Glasgow Herald bemoaned the
"indignity put upon the Council by the election of two Scott Gibsonites", and
went on to draw a distinction between this "type", and the "earnest
Socialist":98
Of course, the existence of a class capable of believing in
the Scott Gibson type of candidate is a formidable obstacle in
the way of reform; but, if the earnest Socialist has come to
stay, surely it is impossible that the electors will be very long
in finding out Town Councillors who shirk committee work and
devote themselves to the cause of making rows at open
meetings of the Corporation.
While Scott Gibson's genius for creating controversy was one reason for the
dislike felt for him across all shades of the established' political spectrum, the
reference to a certain "class" indicates a more fundamental cause for concern.
The outstanding feature of the Scott Gibson election campaigns, apart from
his personal success, was the massive turnout at the polls. In his first
election, for Springburn in 1901, the turnout was 69% with Scott Gibson
securing 73% of the poll against a sitting member. The following year when
Scott Gibson fully came to public prominence with his sensational unseating
of the incumbent Lord Provost in Woodside, the turnout was an
unprecedented 83%. In 1905 when he successfully defended his seat, and in
1906 when he won in Dalmarnock, the polls were again in excess of 80%, the
average polls for contested wards in these years were 57%, 70%, and 64%
respectively.
While Scott Gibson was able to galvanise interest and support much more
effectively than Labour candidates, it was also the case that he was perceived
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as bringing a new body of electors to the polls, very much of the lower
working class. The self-styled scourge of municipal extravagance and
advocate of the "claims of the poorer classes" was originally identified by the
Labour Leader as a socialist and regarded by the Herald as a Stalwart or, at
least, representing what had originally been understood as a Stalwart.
However, despite claims of his having been a member of the ILP at one time,
Scott Gibson was never part of the Stalwarts nor a candidate of the WEC. In
1902 Labour supported Lord Provost Chisholm in Woodside because of his
support for municipilisation and housing reform, and Labour's relations with
Scott Gibson can be regarded as in an open state of hostility from then on.
From Scott Gibson's populist perspective, however, the Labour members were
simply part of the municipal establishment. In particular he clashed with
Joseph Burgess (ex-editor of the Workman's Times now a labour Councillor,
whom S G dubbed "the Cockney Columbus who discovered Glasgow). Scott
Gibson claimed that Burgess had misused Corporation funds regarding
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expenses for a journey to London and it was claimed that Burgess later
"intrigued" with the Liberal- Temperance caucus in Woodside against Gibson
in 1905.100
The question of temperance brought out all the usual accusations and counter
accusations of publican influence and machinations on the magistrates bench.
Forward claimed that Scott Gibson won in Woodside in 1902, "with the
support of the Publicans and the Landlords", while posing as a temperance
advocate.101 In 1904 the defeated sitting member for Woodside (ousted by a
"Scott Gibsonite"), replying to accusations by Scott Gibson that he, Martin,
was, "one of the drinking set", claimed in return that it was his opponents
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who represented, "an unscrupulous section of the drinking set". Martin was
particularly incensed by the role played by the Star, and set out to prove that
it was, "Mr Scott Gibson's party organ". The evidence for this was that of
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forty "Scottish shareholders" in the paper over thirty were, "publicans or
brewers travellers, and one was a retired publican". The lawyer, M J Connell
was also a shareholder and he was Scott Gibson's closest associate on the
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Town Council, as well as being an office-bearer in the HGB.
The Irish, and particularly, the HGB's connections with the drink trade, had
long been a cause for comment in Glasgow politics and it may well have
been the case that their support for Scott Gibson was merely a marriage of
convenience useful to the business careers of certain nationalist politicians.
However, there is also the fact of Scott Gibson's popular appeal to consider.
The Star commented on the superior attitude displayed by supporters of
Martin in Woodside in 1904 to the "type" of people who voted for Scott
Gibson. It reported one such, a sausage manufacturer, as saying:104
He believed the better class were in favour of Baillie
Martin. There was a great many of the unthinking, may be the
unwashed, whose support they could not hope to get. They had
not the power or sense of reasoning.
It is not difficult to see in this attitude (and that of the Glasgow Herald) a fear
of the residuum, of the slum-dweller and slum-voter, a fear also expressed
from within the ranks of Labour. For the Irish, however, the effort to extend
the franchise was a constant pre-occupation, not, it is true, by any protest
movement, but by organising to submit claims to the registration courts, and
by attempting to manipulate the terms of the lodger franchise.105 For a
community largely made up of the poorer working classes this is hardly
surprising and also helps explain Irish sympathy for Scott Gibson. It is an
interesting point that M J Connell, who won in Cowlairs in 1902 had
previously been unsuccessful when he had been a Liberal and Ward
Committee nominee in 1896, and as a WEC candidate in 1899. At the same
time, while municipal affairs had their own momentum and particular
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concerns, for the HGB, as part of the United Irish League, Home Rule could
not be forgotten, and the alliance with Scott Gibson did not survive the
General Election of 1906. Irish National support for Labour in Glasgow, as had
occurred in 1900, was repeated at the General Election of 1906. Though on
this occasion there were two Labour candidates this was still a moderate
challenge as compared with 1895. What was different from 1900, however,
was that the Labour candidates were standing against Liberals in
three-cornered contests, yet still received official' Irish support; the Executive
of the UIL, the Observer, the Star, and the HGB were all united in calling for
Irish votes for Labour in Blackfriars & Hutchesontown, and Camlachie, and also
N W Lanarkshire which included part of municipal Glasgow.
A crucial factor in Labour getting Irish support lay in having their candidates
in the field first, in the case of Hutchesontown George Barnes began his
campaign seriously as early as 1902. Obviously, Irish hostility to the Liberal in
1900 made the adoption of a Labour candidate solid on Home Rule that much
easier. In Camlachie the absence of a Liberal candidate in 1900 allowed
Labour to justifiably claim priority in challenging the sitting Unionist. There
was some local opposition to Barnes amongst the Irish with a move from
within the William O'Brien branch of the UIL for a repeat vote for Bonar Law,
the Conservative. Though Wood describes this as a "major split" within the
local branch it seems clear that the majority were for the Executive's directive
and Barnes.106
While Barnes secured a historic first for Labour in Glasgow and pushed the
Liberal into third place over one thousand votes adrift. Labour came last in
Camlachie where a Liberal Unionist topped the poll. Irish support may have
been difficult to organise given that Labour's candidate was Joseph Burgess,
yet the Star made it clear that no matter their (low) opinion of Burgess in
municipal politics they were solidly behind him in the General Election; he
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was the choice of the UIL Executive, he was first in the field, and he was
judged sincere over Home Rule.107 For his part. Burgess, speaking at an ILP
meeting declared himself "delighted" with UIL support with which he was
1 no
certain of victory. In the event Burgess did not succeed, though he did poll
2,568 votes and received 30% of the turnout. This represented a drop of 539
in the Labour vote from 1900 which, considering there was a Liberal in the
field, was not a bad performance, but one which, nevertheless, indicated how
far Labour had still to go to achieve any significant change in the party
system, even when it had Irish support.
At the same time as it was supporting Burgess in Camlachie the HGB was
distancing itself quite markedly from Scott Gibson who was standing as a
Unionist in Mid-Lanark. There was plenty of sympathy for Scott Gibson
because of his municipal work and even suggestions that he could have
chosen another constituency such as Bridgeton, but the HGB was clear that,
on this occasion, "The Irish electors had to give him 'A SOUND THRASHING"',
even though, "In municipal politics we have accorded our fullest support to
Mr Scott Gibson."109 The fact that the Liberal in Mid-Lanark, Caldwell, had
previously stood as a Unionist in St Rollox did not give too much cause for
concern - the UIL Executive had given him their mandate, and the Star
declared him to be, "a tried and trusted friend of Ireland".110 Scott Gibson
was, if anything, even more inconsistent since it had first appeared that he
was going to stand as a Liberal in Tradeston.111
The HGB may have looked forward to a resumption of normal relations after
the General Election112, but Scott Gibson's decision to transport himself to
yet another Ward precipitated the final parting of the ways. Scott Gibson
resigned his Woodside seat two years early in order to challenge Hugh
Alexander in Dalmarnock whom he charged had, as Chairman of the Licensing
Bench, obstructed his elevation to magistrate.113 Once again Scott Gibson
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was successful. In another massive poll he defeated Alexander by almost a
thousand votes, and his first action on returning to the Council was to claim
his magistrate's chain. For the SAarthis was egotism gone too far:114
Mr Gibson has come out of the contest successful, but
covered with mud. He stands now for nobody but himself; he
is "the great I AM of Glasgow. ... He has ... left his record behind
him in the mud of Dalmarnock. Instead of making himself the
rallying centre of the advanced forces in the Council, he is
completely isolated from the small body of men who have
hitherto been associated with him.
Despite supporting Burgess in Camlachie and the disengagement from Scott
Gibson, Irish relations with Labour at the municipal level did not improve and
may well have been at their worst ever. Pointing out that the Labour
candidate in Dalmarnock polled less than Scott Gibson's majority over
Alexander, the Star commented that, "such freaks" as Scott Gibson were only
permitted by, "the present contemptible condition of the Labour organisation
throughout the city".115 John Ferguson - "practically the founder and the
original guiding spirit of the Municipal Workers' Committee" - had died earlier
in the year and with his death relations with the ILP had further
deteriorated:116
In recent years the Workers Committee fell more and more
into the hands of narrow-minded cranks, and, since Mr
Ferguson's death, it has practically been dominated by the ILP.
Indeed, we are somewhat at a loss to know how they can
continue to honestly maintain the name of the "Workers'
Municipal Committee.
The final straw was the ILP's decision to run a candidate at the bye-election
to replace Ferguson without consulting with the Irish in Calton. As a result
the Irish electors were advised to vote against Labour and the seat was lost.
Further insult was made in November when Baillie O'Hare, one of only two
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Catholics on the Town Council, retired in Springbum and the ILP put up Hugh
Lyon against the man intended as the replacement Catholic, Daniel Harvey. As
a Parish Councillor, it was claimed that Harvey had been, "a consistent
upholder of the Labour cause ... [who] invariably supported the policy of the
Glasgow Trades Council." As such there could be no objection to him, "from a
democratic standpoint".117 But, the unity which had underpinned the 'Stalwart'
alliance was a thing of the past. The WEC was now, more or less, the ILP, and
its emphasis was upon, not the broad "forces of the democracy", but a more
precise consideration of "Socialist and Labour votes".118
The November election of 1906 was Labour's worst year at the municipal polls
in terms both of share of the vote and average poll. Eight candidates were
run, six under the aegis of the WEC, one ILP, and one Labour'; no fewer than
five came bottom of the poll. They were, as the Star righteously commented,
"completely wiped out".119
As the various twists and turns in Glasgow politics during 1906 indicate the
Irish political constituency was a "sophisticated" one, capable of distinguishing
between local and national priorities, and between individual candidates. To
reiterate McAffrey's point regarding, "the main characteristic of the Catholic
1 20
vote in Scotland", prior to 1914, it was:
a conditional vote, organised and given to whichever
power in the State would accede to Catholic wishes as
expressed in this conjunction of religion and nationality.
However, and as McAffrey himself warns against regarding the Catholic vote
as "homogeneous and monolithic" due to the existence of different national
groupings, it needs to be added that the Irish Catholic vote was by no means
always united, as the dispute between the Observer and the HGB makes clear.
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An Uneasy Alliance, 1910-1914.
After the lack of friction over Irish support for Labour at the General Elections
of 1900 and 1906, controversy resumed in 1910. There was no difficulty over
George Barnes in Blackfriars & Hutchesontown. He had proven himself a
popular MP to Irish-Catholic opinion, solid on Home Rule, and detached from
the secular position on education. The Liberals had accepted their defeat in
1906 and did not contest the seat in 1910; Barnes was triumphantly returned
with 62% of the poll. However, in Camlachie, there was another
three-cornered contest. Labour still had ambitions for the constituency and
put forward J O'Connor Kessack whom the HGB was eager to support. The
decision of the UIL Executive to support the Liberal, Cross, provoked perhaps
the deepest split in Irish ranks in Glasgow, as the officers of the HGB
resigned en masse. That this was principally due, not to a desire to support a
fellow Irishman, but to a general pro-Labour position, can be seen from the
fact that the Chairman of the HGB Murphy (brother of the late Hugh) resigned
his seat on the UIL Executive after it had decided to support the Liberals in N
W Lanark in preference to Labour.121 Though the Observer claimed that there
was no split in the ranks in Camlachie and that the Executive mandate for
Cross was "enthusiastically adopted" by a 500 strong meeting of "Nationalist
electors of Camlachie", its own reporting of the passionate debate aroused in
the HGB proved otherwise. At a tumultuous meeting one member of the HGB
declared:122
he had been at an Irish meeting in Camlachie where 95%
of those present were agreed that they were no longer to be
kept in the slums by Mr Cross or Mr Mackinder.
The significance of the above remark is that it emphasises, not Home Rule,
but class issues confronting Irish workers in Britain. At another Nationalist
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meeting in Glasgow, at College where there was no Labour candidate, it was
declared that the Irish in that Division:123
would have to consider their position as British working
men as well as their position as Irishmen.
Certainly it would appear that, at the January election, the Irish vote stayed
with Labour in Camlachie. Kessack's poll of 2,443 was only 125 adrift of
Burgess's 1906 total, representing a fall of only 1.1% in share of the vote. The
Tory vote slightly increased and the Liberal vote slightly fell. In the December
election, however, there was a significant change in voting, even though the
overall result remained the same. Labour lost 904 votes while the Liberals
gained 660 to come within 26 votes of the Conservative. What is important, in
terms of the Irish influence, is that on this occasion there was, more or less,
unanimous backing of the Liberal124 and Labour's drop of 904 votes matches
almost exactly the 912 extra votes divided between Liberal and Tory (the Tory
vote rose by 252). This could be explained simply by anti-Tory voters giving
up on Labour after three unsuccessful efforts, but the arithmetic of the
changed vote does offer significant circumstantial evidence as to the
existence and size of a recognisable Irish vote; the Scotsman in 1910
estimated a figure of 700 Catholic voters in Camlachie.125
At the local level Irish relations with Labour had improved from the low-point
of 1906, but there was still a great deal of uncertainty and flux. Irish-Catholic
opinion still demanded recognition of its interests and some level of
representation in return for its support. At the municipal election of 1910 the
Observer laid down the, by now familiar, line on whom to support and why:126
The great bulk of the Catholics in Glasgow are
working-people, wage- earning people, and where conscience
and dignity allow them to support Progressive candidates, they
are more than disposed to do so. But it would be unreasonable,
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as it is unfair, to expect that where any political scarecrow is
put up to bear the Progressive banner, the Irish vote can be
reckoned on as a certainty in his favour, irrespective of his
record, position or programme.
The big issue that year was the tramway surplus and what use it should be
put to. The "Progressive" or Labour view, as expressed by the Trades Council,
was that it should be used to reduce fares, in this way benefitting the people
who created the surplus. The alternative, Tory, policy was to use the surplus
to reduce the rates. This, which became Corporation policy, was depicted by
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the Trades Council as, "vicious [and] unspeakably mean". The Observer took
its position on which candidate to support on his line on the trams, ie the
same view as the Trades Council. In three Wards, however, there was a
different priority.
In Townhead and Cowcaddens the issue for the Observer was that of
amour-propre. Hugh Lyon was opposed in the former because of his having
defeated the Irish-Catholic candidate in a bye-election and his opposition to
O'Hare in Springburn four years ago.(see above.) Irish support was advised to
go to his opponent who also had the right line on the tramway surplus. In
Cowcaddens the issue was the very personal one of Shaw Maxwell now no
longer having any connection with Labour, but whom the Observer had not
forgotten or forgiven. Here the tram question was not even referred to. The
third contest involved George Carson in Maryhill. Carson, Secretary of the
Trades Council, was one of the most prominent Labour men in Glasgow and
one who had worked closely with the Irish; "In general circumstances",
declared the Observer ,"[he] would be a Labour candidate whom Irishmen
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would readily support". However, the Trades Council had adopted the
"Secular Solution" to the education question, which opposed any public
money being used to maintain sectarian education. Though Carson attempted
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to avoid answering the question directly the Observer was clear that, "He
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should be asked to drop the "Secular Solution" or drop the Catholic vote".
The election results were an overwhelming rejection of the Council policy of
using the tramway surplus to reduce the rates. Even the Glasgow Herald
admitted as much;130
The defeat of Mr Wilkie in Whitevale on the tramway
surplus issue may be taken in conjunction with the significant
success of the Labour candidates as an indication that the
Corporation allocation does not find favour among the working
classes.
And as a result of the November polls the Town Council dropped its rates
'subsidy' policy.131
In fact 1910 was Labour's most successful year in municipal elections in
Glasgow in terms of share of the vote and average poll. Out of five
candidates three were returned and the other two only lost by 196 and 13
votes. In addition two sitting Labour members were returned unopposed. Of
the three elected, however, only one had the blessing of the Observer, Dr
Erskine in Anderston, while both Lyon and Carson won their seats by very
comfortable majorities, 1278 and 772 respectively (Shaw Maxwell was no
longer connected with Labour and his defeat is therefore of little
consequence). Judging by these two results alone - in Wards the Irish
claimed influence - it would seem that Labour could either do without the
Irish vote altogether, or get that vote without an official' mandate. (That the
Star was no longer the mouthpiece of the HGB helps to cover up any
differences within Irish opinion.)
The following year, 1911, saw the Observer much more enthusiastic in its
backing of Labour. The 'secular solution' had been settled satisfactorily but
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the main reason was that two Nationalists were standing to whom, 'The
leaders of the Labour Party unhesitatingly accord their support".132 Yet, this
arrangement became the prelude to another fierce debate between the ILP
and the Irish-Catholics which came to a head in 1912. Amongst the
rank-and-file of the ILP, and amongst younger leaders such as Tom Johnston
and Pat Dollan, there was undoubted resentment over this deal, especially as
the two candidates were publicans, and it was regarded as an electoral fix by
Labour Councillors with overtones of association with the drink trade. In the
event neither candidate won, though Labour was particularly successful in
gaining four new seats. How far Labour voters were prepared to vote for Irish
- Catholic candidates is, therefore, a moot point. One of the Irish nominees
was in Calton, John Ferguson's old Ward, and he was easily defeated by a
thousand votes. The other candidate, Thomas White, was the more interesting,
since he actually stood as an official LRC nominee and, in a four-cornered
contest in Anderston, was opposed by W G Leechman standing as an
"Independent Socialist". Leechman, who was "repudiated by the leaders of the
Labour Party",133 came last with only 300-odd votes, and although White only
managed third place, their combined vote would have been (just) enough to
win the seat. The only Labour candidate not given the Irish mandate was
George Hardie in Gorbals who came over a thousand votes adrift. The
Observer's refusal to support him was not through any fault in, "an excellent
candidate", but because of a long standing commitment to the sitting
member.134 The only other Labour defeat was James Allan, again, in bourgois'
Dennistoun, where there was not a particularly numerous Irish presence.
As we examined in the previous chapter the labour forces in the City
eventually faced up to the problem of organisation and a tortuous negotiation
was started by the ILP in 1910, eventually culminating in the inaugural
conference of the Glasgow Central Labour Party in March 1912.135 Although
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Irish opinion, both the Observer and the Star under HGB control, had argued
for a more organised Labour presence, the actual shape it took came as a
shock to them.
Along with any degree of organisation comes a certain degree of
centralisation and exclusiveness. As indicated previously the Glasgow Central
Labour Party was a "controlling body" as opposed to the old Workers' Election
Committee which had been a "composite body", (see previous chapter.) In an
organisational sense, as well as political, there was a change in emphasis
from the forces of the democracy' to the constituent parts of Labour, and in
this re-organisation there was no room for the UIL.
The Observer reacted furiously. It was particularly galling that, at this time,
there were no Catholic Councillors. The connection between race and religion
was now made perfectly clear. Whereas, "Jews and atheists", could be freely
returned:136
The Catholics of Glasgow, the Irish Nationalists of
Glasgow (the terms are entirely synonomous) have no
representative professing their creed or policies in the
Corporation of Glasgow.
The rules of the new Party dictated that it would not support any candidate
who was not a member of the ILP or the Trades Council or any of its
affiliates. Thus any Catholic candidate, who did not qualify on the above
lines, could not be supported, far less adopted by the Labour Party. The
Observer connected this to the furore caused the previous year by the
support of Labour councillors for the Nationalists in Calton and Anderston; the
Councillors were carpeted by the membership and a compromise only
reached by the resolution restricting the labour mandate to members of
official labour bodies. However, the Observer drew a distinction between the
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rank-and- file, whose rule this was, and the leadership, i.e. the sitting Labour
Councillors who remained true friends and deserved continued support. Thus
the Irish vote was not to be uniformly hostile but to be given- only to existing
Councillors and ex-Councillors, and only withheld from new candidates.
At the November poll the two sitting labour members given the Observe?s
mandate were returned. The three other candidates in 'old' Glasgow, this
being the first election to include the newly incorporated areas, ail lost. In the
'new' wards Labour won two seats, one being John Wheatley in Shettleston &
Tollcross, both without Irish support. The result of the poll was declared
satisfactory by the Observer since it had contradicted Labour's evident belief
that it, "could secure Irish support in defiance of Irish organisations or the
Irish Press".137 The Observer however, had "fought as much as we want to
fight", and appealed for peace by requesting Labour to revise the offending
rule.138
The following year the antagonism was much more muted. The Observer did
not expect the rule excluding nationalist candidates to last another year and
even though it remained, literally, party policy, the Labour leadership were
wholeheartedly supporting the Irish-Catholic candidate, O'Hare, in
Cowcaddens, and the Labour Party had even, "furnished a contingent of
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willing workers", to aid his campaign. Labour's results it declared
'excellent", adding only that they would have been better had all friction been
avoided with the Irish. More to the point, however, was the fact that Labour's
six successes were all new men, the two sitting members being defeated.
This somewhat challenged the Observe?s pre-election claim that, "any Labour
candidature in any Glasgow Ward [running without Irish support] would be a
mere bootless piece of propaganda".140 The paper did make the effort, rather
half- heartedly, to claim responsibility for the defeats in Townhead and
Maryhill, but Lyon and Carson had both won easily three years before in the
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face of much more definite 'official' Irish-Catholic opposition. Their defeats
were, as we have previously seen, much more to so with alienating their own
supporters by having failed to vote for the Wheatley-Stewart cottages
scheme. (See previous chapter.)
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Conclusion
Evidence for the existence of an influential Irish vote in Glasgow is, on the
basis of the above, contradictory, though there can be no doubt as to the
widespread belief in a powerful Irish electoral force. On occasion the Irish
vote appears to have been decisive, e.g. the municipal poll of 1912, and at
other times to have been totally inconsequential, e.g. Lyon and Carson in
1910. Confusion is partly due to the fact that this vote cannot be regarded as
a constant, undivided unit; the recurring conflict between the Observer and
the HGB indicating clearly enough that the Irish community did not speak with
one voice. As it is hoped the above has also made clear, the pole of
attraction for Irish-Catholic workers was always going to be Labour, and
Catholic opinion recognised this. Individuals such as John Ferguson, and
branches of the Nationalist movement such as the HGB reached this
understanding first - an understanding based upon the class nature of the
Irish in Britain - and their lead was eventually followed by the originally
hostile Observer. The Irish remained careful never to totally subsume their
identity within Labour and continued to press for recognition of themselves as
a separate community. However, unlike in Liverpool, the Irish community in
Glasgow was not located specifically enough to permit it to return its own
candidates unaided. And, as the early successes of the Stalwarts showed, as,
in a different way did the success of John Wheatley, it was through
co-operation with Labour that Irish-Catholic candidates would be returned to
the Town Council. Getting such candidates adopted, however, was another
matter. There is no doubt that Labour wanted the Irish vote and, certainly in
the early years, was willing to support Irish Nationalist candidates. That there
was, nevertheless, a reticence in so doing, could have been due to a
multiplicity of factors: awareness of a working class 'Orange' vote; awareness
of a more general anti-Irish antipathy; prejudice within the ranks of Labour
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itself; temperance respectability' wanting nothing to do with publicans; desire
for a more democratic and better organised Party structure. As regards the
latter point the Observer saw a clear division between Labour's rank and file
and the Labour Councillors.141
In Parliamentary elections Home Rule still predominated. Yet, as we have
seen, support for Labour even here was strong and divisions within Irish
opinion ran very deep. Of importance here is the limited aspect of Labour's
challenge in Glasgow after 1895 which permitted a more or less, united Irish
support for the Labour candidates in 1900 and 1906. The bitter controversy
surrounding the UIL Executive's command to vote Liberal in 1910 in
Camlachie, the HGB's home constituency which included Mile End Ward
where, with the exception of Hutchesontown, Labour enjoyed most success in
the municipal elections between 1896 and 1913, can only be explained if we
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Chapter Five
Women, Socialism and the Suffrage
Of all the 'communities' which Labour made appeal to the most potentially
significant, and the most neglected, was that half of the population which was
female.1 Women's 'issues' made scant impact upon the Labour and Socialist
movement yet, in claiming to represent the working class this movement also
claimed to speak on behalf of women. In a period when all women were
explicitly denied the Parliamentary vote on the grounds of their sex and only a
small minority allowed the vote in municipal affairs, it is particularly apposite
to refer to women as being 'represented' or 'spoken for'. Women's interests,
where they were not explicitly middle class, were not assumed to be any
different to the general interest of the (male) working class. The achievement
of socialism would negate inequality between the sexes, though for many
socialists as well as trade unionists domestic bliss would be achieved through
making it unnecessary for women to seek paid employment outwith the
home.2 However, this period also witnessed the emergence of a movement -
led by and for women - for the purpose of gaining equal electoral rights,
which demanded a response from Labour and Socialist men. Our concern here
is not so much with the Suffrage movement itself, but with the relationship
between women and the Labour and Socialist movement, and the role played
by and allowed to women in that movement.
The organisations which constituted Labour as a political force were
overwhelmingly male in membership. The Glasgow Trades Council - the
'parliament' of the City's working class - had extremely few female members.
In 1891, out of a total of 160 delegates, four were female, all members of the
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Women's Protective and Provident League (WPPL). Ten years later there were
only two women - again from the WPPL - out of 228 delegates. In 1911, by
which time there were 288 delegates to the Trades Council, there was a
grand total of seven female members, five from the National Federation of
Women Workers, and two from the Weavers' (Women) Society.3 As we have
already seen, the ILP, apart from its Women's Party in the 1890s, only had one
women branch secretary in Glasgow. (See Chapter Two.) While there was
likely a much more significant level of female membership within societies
and branches, the chance that a women might rise to any position of
prominence was extremely unlikely.
The other forces of the 'democracy' were little different. Within the
Irish-Catholic community the INL branch was, as Handley has informed us, for
"the men of the parish".4 The Co-operative movement, perhaps surprisingly
given its concentration upon consumption rather than production, was hostile
to women's participation in the work of the societies. The example of the
Kinning Park Society shows this clearly enough. In 1891 there was a large
demonstration of Co-operators to mark the laying of the memorial stone of
new Society buildings, at which not a single woman was permitted to attend.5
The following year the Scottish Women's Guild was formed, ten years after
the creation of the English body, and through its efforts the position of
women in the movement was improved.6 In 1892 women were able to attend
"a public occasion in the life of the [Kinning Park] Society for the first time",
the opening of the new buildings, due to the pressure of the newly formed
Guild.7 The Women's Guild had to struggle hard for whatever recognition they
received, and it remained even more difficult for women to take an equal part
in the running of the Societies themselves. Kinning Park, which was amongst
the most progressive of Societies, only elected its first woman Director in
1916.8 Nontheless, the Co-operative Women's Guild is of crucial significance
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in relation to working class women and political activity, and we shall have
more to say on its role at the end of this chapter.
Women, Employment and Marriage.
Underpinning such different roles and attitudes were the very different
experiences each sex had of paid employment. As Table 1 shows, during this
period, while almost all men aged 15 or over (i.e. 96%+) were regarded as
occupied, only around 40% of ail women of the same age were so entered by
the Census.
Table 1: Proportionate male and female occupied populations aged 15+ in
Glasgow 1891, 1901, 1911.
i.e. those employed aged 15+ as a percentage of total male and





SOURCE: Census of Scotland. City of Glasgow, 1891 and 1911
These general figures, however, tell only part of the story of what were two
almost totally different labour markets. As has been recently commented:9
Glasgow's female labour market differed in three crucial
respects from its male counterpart. It offered relatively few
openings for school leavers to acquire a skilled training; its
occupational range was much more restricted; and a minority of
women was listed as gainfully employed in successive
Censuses.
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A fourth element, or the combined effect of the other three, could be added,
that of wages. Women's actual, and expected earnings were significantly
lower than male earnings. Relegated, primarilly, to unskilled jobs where the
supply of labour tended to exceed the demand, it is hardly surprising that,
"women workers were massively over-represented among the ranks of the
low paid throughout this quarter of a century."10 Even in 1911, domestic
service was still, by far, the largest single employer of women in Glasgow,
and this was not including servants working in hotels or institutions, etc.11 In
her evidence to the Glasgow Municipal Commission on the Housing of the
Poor, Margaret Irwin pointed out that there was little or no consistency in
female wage rates, and that trying to estimate an average wage was
particularly fraught.12 Amongst shop assistants while "charge hands" could
expect to earn between 12s. and £1, with a few able to earn over £1, most
"girls" - i.e. young women over 16 years of age, got between 4s. and 12s. per
week. According to Irwin the highest paid occupations for women were
tailoresses and textile workers, but only among those who were the most
highly-skilled and regularly employed. For the former, wages of between 15s.
and 18s. could be expected with possible high-points of 19s. or 20s. This,
however, was only during the busy period, while in slack times earnings could
fall to half that. Amongst the least skilled and worst paid workers in the
"finishing" department of the clothing trade, women could earn around 6s. or
7s. in the busy period, and could fall to 4s., 2s. 6d. or even nothing at all in
slack times.13
We shall return to the question of (male) wage rates in Chapter Seven when
we come to consider the gap between the 'poorer' and 'better-off' working
class but, for the moment our point is simply that of the low wages paid to
women compared with men. As we shall see, unskilled men could expect
earnings of between 16s. and 24s. per week, which was at least as high as
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the highest wages paid to skilled women workers. Behind the poor wages
paid to women was not just the fact of the jobs they happened to be in but
predominant attitudes of why women worked and what they should, therefore,
be paid, i.e. the whole notion of 'pin-money', that a woman's wage was
merely a 'supplement' to the wage of her husband. It was this that led to a
"competition" between single and married women, which kept female earnings
down. As Professor Smart, of the Glasgow Municipal Commission, expressed
the matter:14
the single woman has to suffer from the fact that she is
single; that is to say, while the wages of wives and daughters
are supplementary to the wages of the head of the house, and
therefore increase his ability to pay rent, the wages of single
women are determined by the competition of these
supplementary women, and therefore remain low.
While it is impossible to distinguish figures for single women who were
dependent solely on their own earnings and single women who lived with
their parents and were contributing to a larger, household income, we do at
least know the number of wives who were returned as employed. In 1911
there were, in Glasgow, 7047 married women listed as occupied, which
accounted for only 5.5% of the total number of married women, and only
6.5% of the total number of occupied females aged 15+. As Treble has
commented, 'This distinctive pattern [of female employment] owed everything
to the impact of matrimony upon the female labour market."15 The "impact of
matrimony" had been an increasing influence over the previous half century;
in 1851 the proportion of married women working had been three times as
great, at 16.9%.16
It is from this perspective that we have to approach the subject of working
class women and political involvement, i.e. of the overwhelming significance
of marriage and the expectation that, upon getting married, a woman should
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stop working for a wage. Particularly among skilled workers, it became a
crucial element to their notion of 'respectability', an indication of their earning
capacity and status, that their wives should not 'work'. This domestic
ideology went further than simply the male egotism of artisans, however, as
even Margaret Irwin objected to young married women going out to work, "if
her husband is earning good wages."17
Socialism and the 'Woman Question'.
The 'modern' women's movement, in the sense of a growing body of opinion
which was able to consistently promote the demand for woman's suffrage,
can be traced back to 1867 and John Stuart Mill's attempted amendment to
the Second Reform Act to include women in the extended franchise. The
defeat of Mill's proposal (by 174 to 93 votes) led to suffrage societies being
formed in Manchester, London and Edinburgh. In 1868 the National Society
for Women's Suffrage was formed which became in 1897 the National Union
of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS).18 The NUWSS was to be the main
organising force behind the constitutional' campaign for the vote, as opposed
to the 'militant' campaign of the Pankhurst led 'suffragettes', the Women's
Social and Political Union (WSPU).19
The main motivating force behind such women as Lydia Becker, Secretary of
the NUWSS, and Elizabeth Garrett, the pioneer doctor, was the sense of
20
vacuity and frustration bred by a life of enforced triviality and dependence.
By the end of the century a number of significant gains had been made in
woman's social and legal status: there was a recognition of married women's
rights as regards ownership of property, access to children, maintenance;
women householders had the municipal franchise (in England from 1867 but
not introduced to Scotland until 1882), and could stand for election to local
21
authority bodies. From Mill's first effort until the outbreak of the First World
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War there was no issue, other than Ireland, debated so much in Parliament as
women's suffrage, and eight Bills actually passed their second reading.22
Repeated failures in Parliament, despite strong support, gradually forced the
NUWSS away from being simply a pressure group to building a national,
campaigning movement. The suffrage' demand was for the vote to be
granted to women on the same terms as it was, or may be, given to men. As
such, and given that the suffrage societies were for long almost wholly
middle class, it could be argued in conservative terms. As one sympathetic
M.P. put it, "It is property which votes in this country and not man."23
It was hardly surprising that the Socialist bodies of the 1880s should have
little sympathy with such a bourgeois perspective, as rights through property
were exactly what socialists opposed. The founding manifesto of the Socialist
League looked forward to a future equality under socialism when:24
Our modern bourgeois property-marriage, maintained as it
is by its necessary complement, universal venal prostitution,
would give place to kindly and human relations between the
sexes.
Though there was a wide acceptance among socialists that there was a
'woman question', the issue was, conveniently, left over until the attainment
of actual socialism when all inequality would be transcended. As such there
was little debate on the specific content of what might constitute female
emancipation. In his great Utopian romance, News From Nowhere, William
Morris depicted the sphere of women as remaining domestic, or
"semi-domestic", concerned mainly with housework and motherhood.25
However, Morris did see this role as being freely chosen by women in a
society where domestic and productive labour would be performed in mutual
harmony. The issue of socialist' relations between the sexes did cause some
comrades difficulties. This may have been particularly so in "religious
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Scotland" where the membership of the SL&LL wanted the reference to
2fi
"property marriage" dropped from the Party Manifesto. Andreas Scheu
recalled of his young Edinburgh comrade John Gilray how, "on his first visit to
me, I frightened him off with my advanced remarks on the question of sexual
relations."27 This was not simply a "bourgeois" reaction, but was equally
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informed by working class respectability. This was at a time when:
it was not considered good form for women to appear on
the platform at Co-operative or other working class meetings.
Socialists in the 1880s gave little support to women's demand for the vote.
Partly this was due to a general hostility or ambivalence towards electoral
politics, and a concentration upon social' issues which were regarded by
many as being distinct from constitutional or 'political' matters. (We shall
discuss socialist attitudes to the franchise more fully in Chapter 7.) Partly it
was due to the women's demand for votes on the same terms - i.e.
property-based - as men. And partly it was due to an antipathy or sheer
indifference to political matters affecting women. An attitude well expressed
by H.M. Hyndman, leader of the SDF:29
I have never been able, while fully admitting the justice of
giving suffrage to all women, if they claim it, to get up much
enthusiasm for female suffrage by itself ... I cannot believe in
Suffrage, limited practically to well-to-do women as being
worth serious effort...
There were a number of prominent women members in the early Socialist
movement, such as Annie Besant and Eleanor Marx-Aveling. Outwith London it
was likely more difficult for women to make their mark, certainly there is little
indication of women taking a leading role in either the SL or SDF in Scotland.
We have already indicated in Chapter One that, out of 55 members of the
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SL&LL in Edinburgh in 1885, only one was a woman. Glasgow would not
appear to have been any different in this respect, though there is some
indication that women did have a different perspective on certain issues.
Bruce Glasier recalled the intervention of Mrs. Neilson, a member of the
Ruskin Society and the "first woman recruit" to the Glasgow branch of the SL,
on the occasion of a visit by William Morris. She criticised the men for their
militarism, their lack of attention to women's suffrage, and the danger of
Morris becoming conceited due to the hero-worship bestowed on him. Glasier
30
commented that:
This was, I believe, almost the first definitely anti-militarist
note, and the first sound of the new woman's agitation that any
of us had yet heard.
The emergence of independent labour and the formation of the Scottish
Labour Party and then Independent Labour Party, did mark a change in female
involvement in politics. The SLP/ILP concentration upon electoral affairs had
more of a bearing on women's concerns, particularly as regards the demand
for the vote, thereby creating a space where women could be active and push
for demands of their own. Much of the ILP's responsiveness was due to the
influence of Keir Hardie who, of all the socialist leaders, had the most
advanced perception of women as constituting a distinct 'constituency'.
Although much of Hardie's championing of the WSPU may have been due to
his long-standing friendship with the Pankhurst family, his concern with
female emancipation had much deeper origins than this. However, despite his
assertion that, 'The sex problem is at bottom the labour problem.", Hardie had
no particular socialist perspective to offer on the subject; his arguments were
based on on 'democratic' grounds alone.31 Hardie saw women, and this went
against the perceived wisdom of women as innately conservative, as potential
electoral assets to Labour. He suggested to the SLP in Glasgow that it should
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choose a woman as a candidate in the School Board elections.32 It was in
School Boards and Parish Councils that women made their first breakthroughs
as elected representatives pre-1914, though they were not selected to
contest the more important Town Council elections. This suggests that Hardie
saw women as being suitable for a particular sphere in politics only, but
nontheless, he was encouraging their direct involvement. In this Hardie
remained constant and he became one of the most outspoken men
supporters of women's suffrage.
Part of the SLP's contribution to encouraging women's political involvement
lay in having a separate Women's Branch or, "Scottish Women's Labour Party"
as it was styled prior to the SLP joining the National ILP. Based in Glasgow it
has, unfortunately, left no records and we know next to nothing of its
formation, membership and activity. As we saw in Chapter Two the Women's
Branch survived until 1898 and had a possible high-point of 50 paying
members in 1896. Like many other branches it experienced difficulties over
raising money. In April 1897 the Secretary of the Branch informed London that
they would be unable to forward their dues that month since, "Our members
are dropping off (we have now only 29) and we are meanwhile straining very
nerve to pay our rent."33
Financial problems were likely more acute for the Women's Branch given the
fact of women's lack of earning power. In 1894 the Branch decided to look
for more central premises in the City, necessary as they were not based in a
single locality like other branches, and eventually they took up the offer of
rooms in the SLP's headquarters in Brunswick Street. Rent, however, still had
to be paid and raising the wherewithal! represented a difficulty. Kate Taylor,
the Secretary, estimated that they needed a commitment from 100 women to
pay 5 shillings a year into a club and suggested that this could be given by
"monied people in the country", in order to help the Glasgow women. She
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argued such a club was necessary for a City like Glasgow:34
not only for local need, but also to serve as one of the
centre's of the forward "women's" movement now so rapidly
developing.
The Scottish Women's Labour Party was both an expression of and a
contributor to this women's movement. One of its contributions was to raise
the matter of votes for women within the Labour movement. At the Fifth
Annual Conference of the SLP the Women's Labour Party moved a motion:35
That this Conference urges the Government to take steps
at once to extend the Parliamentary Franchise to women.
As it stood this resolution was, basically, the standard women's suffrage
demand for the vote on the same terms as men. However, the movers
accepted an amendment - moved by a delegate of the SDF - which turned
the issue into an adult suffrage motion, i.e. that all men and women aged 21
36
years and over should have the vote. Ten years on and the suffrage debate
within the Labour and Socialist movement would revolve around this exact
point - women's suffrage versus adult suffrage. Though partially successful, in
at least making votes for women part of the political agenda, the Women's
Branch did not succeed in making the issue one of immediate importance,
since the suffrage generally was regarded as a finished matter. During the
debate, which was a short one, two points were raised by men which are
worth mentioning. The first was an amendment that the resolution be
extended to cover all women, married and single. This, it was argued, was
because the municipal franchise, "had only been given to single women, with
the result that their votes had simply been handed over to their spiritual
advisers."37 This reflected the widespread belief that the existing women's
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vote was determined by the Churches. The amendment was, however,
accepted. An attempt was then made, by a delegate of the Glasgow
Shoemakers, that the resolution be dropped altogether, on the argument
that:38
the proper sphere of women was the home; but if they
went further in the direction in which they had been going, the
time would soon come when men would remain at home to
discharge the maternal duties, and the women would go out to
do all the work.
Although this managed to raise a laugh, the amendment was unable to find a
seconder and fell.
The following year the Women's Labour Party took the fight into the National
ILP. At the Annual Conference held in Newcastle the Glasgow women
successfully amended a NAC resolution, "in favour of every proposal for
extending electoral rights and democratising the system of government", so
that it included specific reference to "men and women" after "electoral
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rights". The actual formulation was suggested by Hardie, as he put it, "in
order to avoid opening up a wide question". Presumably this was a coded
reference to women's suffrage. However, Mrs Pearce, the Women's Labour
Party delegate, declared that, "this would satisfy her."40 Adult suffrage
remained the universal socialist and labour position until in 1903 the ILP
decided to promote a female suffrage bill.41
The ILP did not have a separate women's section, as the Liberal and Tory
Parties had, and this equal membership of the sexes is seen as having
encouraged a greater female participation.42 Amongst the Socialist
organisations, however, the ILP also had a 'better' record. This may have
been partly to do with the fact that the ILP was the largest socialist society.
The pro-feminist attitudes of Hardie and George Lansbury were also a help.
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More fundamentally, however, was the actual practice and outlook of the ILP
which distinguished it from the Marxist SDF and Socialist Labour Party. The
latter body, so significant in the development of the shop stewards movement
on Clydeside, placed its emphasis on industrial and workplace struggles,
which could, only too easily, ignore the predicament facing women in the
home. Although the SDF was more politically orientated it, nevertheless,
shared a similar myopia in regard to women. This was largely due to the
approach adopted by British Marxism which based its propoganda on the
analysis of the extraction of surplus value from the worker at the point of
production, and had no understanding of the re-production of the labour force
and the particular oppression of women under capitalism, far less any critique
of patriarchy.43
The ILP, on the other hand, was neither industrially based nor was it
dominated by an economic-reductionist approach to theory - in fact the ILP
had little or no theory. This and its concentration on electoral politics,
allowed the ILP to base its propoganda on more than exploitation at the
workplace. According to Sheila Rowbotham, the attraction of the ILP to
women lay in:44
The fact that the ILP's origins had been very much to do
with local politics and they campaigned on local councils for
things like education, parks, recreation - those sort of things
that did affect women's everyday lives.
All this did not make the ILP immune from anti-feminism, or guarantee
equality in practice. The ILP still remained a man's party in which a lot of
women, who joined through their husbands, found their role was that of
making the tea.45 At the same time there were significant numbers of female
activists within the ILP, at both the local and national level. Annie and Ada
Maxton, sisters of James Maxton, and members of the ILP in their own right,
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recalled that there tended to be a bigger proportion of women speakers at ILP
4fi
meetings than at any other organisations' meetings.
In the same year the ILP voted in support of women's suffrage Mrs.
Pankhurst was elected to the NAC of the ILP. Both this and the vote in favour
of a female suffrage bill were indicative of the growing strength of the
women's suffrage movement, particularly among working class women. The
emergence of a "radical suffragist" campaign was based among the women
textile workers of Lancashire and Cheshire and represented a significant
broadening of the established, middle class base of the suffrage movement.47
1903 also saw the formation of the Pankhurst-led Women's Social and
Political Union (WSPU) in Manchester. The WSPU, in a sense, grew out of the
ILP, and shared much the same background as the working-class radical
suffragists. Under the guidance of Christabel Pankhurst, however, it chose to
concentrate solely upon the vote and base its appeal to middle and upper
class women, a growing social exclusiveness marked by its move from
40
Lancashire to London in 1906.
Women's Suffrage in Glasgow.
From the mid-1900s the women's suffrage campaign moved to a new height
of activity. Much of this was due to the increasingly militant tactics of the
WSPU, though historians have more recently tended to question the
effectiveness of the suffragettes' and emphasise the continued significance of
the 'constitutional' NUWSS, its links with the Labour Party, and the role of
49
working class women. As far as Glasgow is concerned two points need to
be identified. One is that the links between the suffrage campaign and the
Labour and Socialist movement were conducted largely through the WSPU,
and secondly that the suffrage campaign itself did not involve working class
women. The 'failure' of Glasgow to produce a working class suffrage
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movement like that of Lancashire can be explained largely by the different
experience of female employment in the two areas. In that part of the North
of England women had a long tradition - through the textile industry - of
working outside the home even after marriage, of earning relatively high
wages, and of being organised in trade unions. In Glasgow, where the
previously strong cotton industry had been overtaken by Lancashire earlier in
the nineteenth century, there had been a continuous decline in the
employment of married women, and female workers had only a precarious
sense of organisation.
As the WSPU distanced itself from the ILP and Labour generally (it even
turned on Keir Hardie), in Glasgow a close relationship was maintained largely
through the pages of the Forward newspaper under the sympathetic
editorship of Tom Johnston. The first issue of Forward in October 1906
carried a large advertisement for a meeting to be addressed by the
Pankhursts in the Glasgow City Halls.50 In the second issue Johnston himself
described the women's suffrage movement as, "another Chartist revival", and
argued the connection between women's rights and socialism:51
We can never have socialism without complete democracy,
and every privilege broken, every barrier burst, every sex and
social hallucination swept aside makes clearer the road and
clearer the eyesight for the struggles which are before the
people of this and all other countries.
As well as such general support Forward carried a regular feature, "Our
Suffrage Columns", which was under the control of the WSPU. Here, the
arguments against women having the vote were dissected and exposed, and
the arguments for women's rights, not only the vote, were promoted. The
Glasgow women were aware of the limitations of the vote per se but argued
that it was the requisite first step in the (continuous) battle for equality:52
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But the vote, after all, is only a weapon, not a stronghold,
a symbol not a magic key. The possession of the weapon is
necessary for the greater conflicts; and the symbol of political
equality and responsibility is necessary to the self-respect of
women.
It was this 'symbolic' value attached to the vote that was, perhaps, the single
most telling factor behind a woman's decision to join the ranks of the
'suffragettes'. Helen Crawfurd of the Glasgow WSPU recalled that:53
The members who became most prominent in the WSPU
were middle class women, to whom the best-paid professions
were closed because of their sex.
And that the majority of activists were:54
serious, thoughtful women who were far from satisfied,
not only with the position, but with the unjust social laws, over
which they had no control. It was gall and wormwood to these
intelligent women to see the most ignorant and undeveloped
men allowed to participate in elections as voters while they
were debarred.
There were women who agreed with the denial of the enfranchisement of
their sex, but of more significance were those women who supported the
adult suffrage argument. Although adult suffrage was used to block women's
suffrage in the Labour movement, rather than as a consistent demand in its
own right - Keir Hardie said of the Adult Suffrage Society, "it is never heard
of save when it emerges to oppose the Women's Enfranchisement Bill"55 -
the argument that a limited suffrage bill would only strengthen the forces of
property and reaction to the detriment of Labour was a powerful one. Many
Labour and Socialist women supported adult suffrage because of this basic
class solidarity.56 Agnes Pettigrew, Secretary of the Shop Assistants' Union in
Glasgow argued that the demand of "votes for women" was, as things stood,
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essentially a middle class measure which would only work to the advantage
of the Conservative Party and would subsequently weaken the Labour Party.57
In 1906 the Labour Party formed a women's section, the Women's Labour
League (WLL) which, by the end of 1914, had three branches in Glasgow.58 Its
function was an essentially supportive one of working for the Party's
candidates at elections - its President was Margaret, wife of Ramsay
MacDonald - and, not surprisingly, it echoed Party policy as regards the vote
and supported the adult suffrage position.59 At the 1914 Labour Party
Conference, the WLL, which held its own conference at the same time,
attacked the militant tactics of the WSPU as divisive and the result of a "sex
war" attitude. The Executive, while expressing itself, "as keen as anybody for
women's suffrage", accepted that there were other, more immediate issues
that should have prior claim on the Labour Party's attention, such as the
Dublin Lockout and the South African General Strike.60 The general view of
such 'labour women' was that the struggle for women's emancipation was
part and parcel of the wider struggle for socialism and for the emancipation
of the working class, which was to be effected through the Labour Party and
the trade unions. Thus, their political strategy was to work 'from within' the
Labour movement to fight for improvements in the wages and living
conditions of the working class. However, put in simplistic terms the WLL
'line' could in fact read:61
The role of women in revolutionising society is to join the
Women's Labour League.
To the members of the WSPU this position not only failed to counter anti-
feminism within working class organisations, but was also a betrayal of
women's interests. Janie Allan, Glasgow of the WSPU and editor of "Our
Suffrage Columns" in Forward, attacked this willingness to relegate the vote
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and women's issues generally from primary consideration:
So long as women are willing to accept the last place, so
long will they find there is no other place for them.
In spite of its middle class complexion the Glasgow WSPU appears to have
had a strong socialist influence amongst its membership. Janie Allen was the
sister of James Allan the shipping magnate and member of the ILP.63 Helen
Crawfurd had strong socialist sympathies and joined the ILP on the outbreak
of war. One of the organisers of the Rent Strike, Crawfurd became a
prominent figure in the ILP before joining the Communist Party.64 Jessie
Stephen came from a very different background, but her politics were similar
to Crawfurd's, and she also left the WSPU when war was declared in 1914.
Her family were working class and socialist, her father a tailor (who was
frequently out of work), and a member of the ILP. Jessie worked as a
domestic servant and became active in the Domestic Workers Federation.
She became an office-bearer in the Maryhiil Branch of the ILP when only 16
and at the same time joined the WSPU. Because of her own background
Stephen was aware that the growing tendency towards violent outrages on
the part of the WSPU had an alienating effect on working class women.
Nevertheless, she still felt that the cause itself had a strong support among
working class women and men. Critical of the existing written history of the
suffrage movement, Stephen recalled, "the aspirations of the ordinary member
of the WSPU."65
These were about jobs, about wages, about the present
matrimonial laws. All that sort of thing used to be discussed
by us ... And those of us who were socialists were far more
interested in economics than they gave us credit for. Some of
these women who were really active in the WSPU had deep
convictions about the economic structure of society, and there
was the question of housing, and the question of making life
easier for women in the home, and maternity benefits. The
vote was only a means to an end, to a new state of society
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where women could be treated as human beings, not as second
class citizens.
Women and Politics
Throughout the debate over women's suffrage little mention was made of the
actually existing female electorate, nor has much been said about it since.
Though introduced later in Scotland than in England (see above), women
householders did qualify for the municipal vote. However, only single women
were allowed the vote, married women were not permitted to register.66 This
crucial qualification effectively curtailed the development of a significant local
female electorate. In Glasgow in 1901 the number of women on the electoral
register for the 25 municipal wards numbered some 23,223, which accounted
for 17.13% of the total electorate of 112,322.67 The proportional size of the
female electorate varied considerably between wards, from less than 10% to
just over 30%. There was no fixed gradation by social class. The slum' area
of Cowcaddens had more women voters, both numerically and proportionately
than middle class Dennistoun - 1258 female electors (20.20%) to 887 (15.09%).
Those wards with the lowest proportion of women voters were the artisan'
wards of Springburn (8.72%) and Cowlairs (9.14%), and the 'business' wards in
the city centre, Blythswood (10.41%) and Exchange (7.16%). At the other end
of the scale, however, those wards with the greatest proportions of female
electors were the most clearly bourgeois residential areas, such as Kelvinside
(28.13%) and Park (30.31%.
It was pointed out by pro-suffragists like Tom Johnston, that allowing women
the vote in municipal affairs made the denial of it in national and imperial
matters an even greater anomaly.68 Johnston argued that, "no evil effects
have followed", from women voting in local elections.69 Yet, for many
socialists it was accepted wisdom that the existing female electorate was a
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reactionary force, dominated by the Churches. This view was expressed
implicitly at the SLP Conference of 1894, as mentioned above, but at other
times, it could be stated quite explicitly. Thus, William Stewart explained his
defeat as a Labour candidate at the Glasgow municipal election of 1904:70
In reality we did win on the men's vote. There are twelve
hundred women voters, mostly controlled by the churches, and
the most of them voted against labour, the result being that Mr
Harvie joins his friend Mr Willock as the representative of the
old women - of both sexes.
Stewart actually listed other reasons why Labour did not win: previous labour
nominees had lost the confidence of the constituency; Tories and Liberals
combined; religion was used to denigrate Labour, as was temperance; the
unpopular sitting candidate was replaced by a new man; a third candidate was
introduced, "to confuse the issue".71 And yet, despite all this, Stewart's defeat
was, ultimately, laid at the door of the "old women", or the "bible women".
The following year, after a second defeat, Stewart's explanation remained the
same, "So we were beaten comrades by the old women of both sexes."72
Those women who managed to get on the electoral register would likely have
been 'old', in that they had to be householders and would tend, when not
unmarried, to have been widows. The influence of the Churches upon women
was testified by many, as was religion's general hostility to socialism. Helen
Crawfurd, who was brought up in the Gorbals during the 1880s in as strongly
religious and Tory household, recalled that, as a child, "If I heard the word,
(socialism) I fled as from the devil."73 Married in 1898 to a Presbyterian
Minister, her growing awareness of inequality and questioning of the place
allotted to women, received the stern admonition from her husband, "Woman,
that is blasphemy."74 At a more general level Crawfurd could see that, while
working class men were organising and educating themselves, this was a very
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one-sided development:75
The women in Scotland, however, were still bound hand
and foot to the Church in its various forms, to evangelical
religion and even Spiritualism. The men failed to see the
importance of educating their women folk and bringing them as
intelligent fellow comrades into the struggle for human
betterment.
Socialists had to defend themselves constantly against the charge that they
were advocates of an enforced free-love', and it is likely that such an
identification would have harmed them in the eyes of many people who were
deeply religious. Numerically, the women voters of Dalmarnock could have
swayed the result. There were around 1200 female electors and Labour lost
by 358 votes in 1904 and 750 votes in 1905.76 However, women only
accounted for about 15% of the total municipal electorate in Daimarnock, and
when Stewart lost for a third time in 1906, this time coming last of three and
over 2,000 votes adrift of Scott Gibson, he did not mention the "old
women."77
The 'true' picture of Labour's local fortunes at this time was that the electoral
alliance behind the WEC had collapsed and the ILP was, as yet, unable to
re-organise a successful campaign, (see Chapter Three) While there is almost
a mark of desperation in Labour's explanations for its poor performances at
this time, the type of language used reveals something about personal
attitudes towards women amongst male socialists. Even Thomas Johnston
was not immune from this sort of castigation of women. After the municipal
election of 1906, at which Labour did particularly badly, Johnston attacked the
'Temperance Party" for its hypocritical opposition to Labour and characterised
them as, "old women wearing trousers to pose as men."78 The derogatory
meaning behind the repetition of this phrase "old women" is clear, as is the
assumption that women were somehow inferior to men. Few socialists
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would, publicly, defend such an argument, and most would have argued the
basic equality between men and women but, to varying extents, these
attitudes did exist and can be glimpsed in such 'throwaway' remarks about
wearing trousers and the like.79
Johnston, nevertheless, was a committed supporter of women's suffrage and
women's rights generally. His choice of words do not prove him to have
been a secret mysogynist, but the pejorative tones do indicate a tension, to
say the least, between 'official' political views, no matter how sincerely held,
and more 'personal', possibly unconscious antipathies towards women. We
cannot say much more on this issue without entering the dangerous waters
of 'psycho-history', but the tensions which operated at an individual level also
operated, albeit more clearly, at the level of organisations.
As we have seen above, women had to struggle to gain even the most basic
public involvement and recognition. Advances, however, were made and
women became, increasingly, part of the Labour and Socialist movement. The
point has been made that, in regard to women inhabiting leading positions,
the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) has a much better record than the
on
all-British TUC. The first Secretary of the STUC was a woman, the very
capable and experienced Margaret Irwin. However, the contradictions involved
in a women taking such a prominent role are exhibited in this instance. The
original choice of Secretary had been a man named Andrew Ballantyne who
was forced to give up the position because, as a Factory Inspector, the
Government objected to his appointment. Irwin, who had topped the poll to
the Parliamentary Committee at the first Congress (with 60 votes, Robert
Smillie came second with 56) was then appointed Secretary. However, she
would only accept it as an interim appointment and refused nomination as a
permanent secretary. She had already refused nomination as Chairman and in
ft 1
both instances her reason was the same, she:
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feared that at this early stage of the Congress work, it
might be somewhat prejudicial to its interests were the post to
be filled by a woman.
Too great an emphasis on leadership, however, misses the crucial point about
women and political activity, which is that their general involvement was so
limited. Membership of executive councils and such-like was a number of
steps removed from being a simple member. As indicated by the delegates
to the Glasgow Trades Council, there were few female delegates mainly
because there were few female trade unions and few female trade unionists.
To explain why this was so would involve not only discussion of labour
market experience, but domestic divisions of labour, predominant social
attitudes and the socialisation of children. All this is beyond our resources
here, but we have attempted to deal with women's different experience of the
world of paid employment and we must, again, emphasise the impact of
marriage upon women's experience and expectations.
With this in mind, the organisation which takes on a greater significance is
the Co-operative Women's Guild. Although formed later in Scotland than in
England it grew from 22 branches with a combined membership of 1500 in
1892 to 157 branches with a membership of 12420 by 1913.82 The founding
document of the Guild stated its object:83
The Women's Guild is an Association of the Women of the
Co-operative Movement. Its object is to assist in the
propoganda of Co-operation, and to draw a closer bond of
union between the wives, mothers and daughters of
Co-operators, by mutual aid and social intercourse.
Most of the work of the Guilds was in fund-raising for Co-operative causes
such as the convalescent homes established at Seamill and Abbotsinch, and
most of their "social intercourse" revolved around cookery and dressmaking
231
lessons and discussions. As such the Guild re-inforced women's domestic
84
role, and came to be seen in this light by men co-operators, an attitude of:
The Guild should be to the movement what the wife and
mother is to the home.
Despite the 'limitations' of the Guild's activities and role, it did play a
significant role nontheless. It was through the influence of the Guild that
women began to take up positions within the Co-operative Societies and,
gradually, the Guilds took their place in the Labour movement with the right
to delegate representation on local Labour Parties. Although any movement
with an official women's section runs the risk of thereby relating women and
women's issues to secondary consideration, there can be little doubt that the
Guild played a crucial role in developing the self-activity of many working
class women, particularly housewives, whose isolation within the home should
not be under-estimated. As the Guild's own historian argued, the Guild was
oc
important in teaching women how to organise, and:
the real attraction , no doubt, lay in being brought out of
their own little narrow groove, and so becoming acquainted
with what other women had to contend with in life, and through
combination trying to make life sweeter to many women
workers.
The space provided by the weekly Guild meeting - free of any male
domination - was crucial in allowing the members to, "be their natural selves,
86
and freely express their ideas and opinions." Within such an atmosphere
women could more easily learn the mechanics of organisation and gain the
confidence to chair meetings and speak in front of an audience. What was
learned within the Guild could then be applied elsewhere.87
As regards women's suffrage the Guild claimed, "an active interest", but not
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to have been, "in evidence with the militant party. In 1893 it petitioned the
Government for votes for women but, apart from this and various resolutions
in favour and branch discussions, the Guild appears not to have been involved
in the suffrage campaign. The likelihood that Guild members would have
husbands who qualified for the vote may well have lessened any sense of
disenfranchisement. The suffrage movement itself, being predominantly middle
class, may have discouraged involvement. Likewise, the very tactics employed
by the suffragettes were likely to discourage working class women, as Jessie
Stephen believed. Vet the working class housewives of Glasgow showed
themselves more than prepared to directly challenge the power of the law
and Government during the Rent Strike of 1915, an intensely 'militant'
campaign in which individual members of the Co-operative Women's Guild
took on leading roles.
We shall discuss the Rent Strike and the First World War in relation to
women's political role in our concluding chapter but, for the moment, we
need only emphasise the 'domestic' nature of that struggle. The Rent Strike
was a campaign conducted, pre-eminently, by housewives in defence of their
homes. And the strength of their response lay in this and in the fact that the
campaign was organised physically around their homes, i.e. at their point of
production, - a fusion of class consciousness and family consciousness
QQ
around a single demand. For most working class women the vote remained
an abstract right, whereas the question of rents and housing generally had a
direct and immediate bearing on their own lives and those of their families. It
was only after the War, however, that women were able to use one to affect
the other.
From 1912 the question of the vexed relationship between Labour and
women's suffrage would appear to have been resolved, as the Labour Party
Conference in that year decided upon a formulation that, while still for adult
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suffrage, decided that the Party in Parliament would refuse to support any
QQ
Suffrage Bill that did not include women. This decision made little impact
upon the WSPU but for the NUWSS it was an important breakthrough since it
lessened the chances of any further extension of the franchise to men only,
and it decided to support Labour Party candidates at by-elections.91
Important as Labour's new position was, its effect was still limited. The
Labour Party was too weak a force in Parliament to effect any measure of
suffrage reform. Furthermore, Labour had no intention of making the
franchise a major priority in or out of Parliament. The Labour Party's attitude
was, essentially, a negative one - it would refuse to support a Bill that did not
include women. The fact that more than half the adult population had no say
in the political life of the country was not seen by Labour as outrage or
affront to British pretensions about Democracy. The total disenfranchisement
of women was a fact of political life that Labour had accepted and could
continue to live with, as it could with the fact that significant numbers of
working class men were also without the vote. To explain this we must now
turn our focus much more closely upon the franchise.
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Rent Strike obviously fits such a scenario.
90. Liddington & Norris, op cit, p 247.
91. Ibid.
Chapter Six
The Franchise and The Electorate in Glasgow
The whole basis of the movement for independent labour representation was
based upon "electoralism". The ILP and the other organisations contributing
to 'Labour' in a political sense never lost sight totally of their campaigning
and educative roles but the overriding emphasis was on securing
representation upon local and national bodies. Ironically, it was this which
most compromised Labour's supposed independence since deals and
arrangements could be justified in order that Labour secured at least a
presence within the State. Whatever Labour's ambitions might have been,
rhetoric apart, they could never have realistically considered actually taking
power (in the sense of forming a majority administration) at either the local or
national level. Keir Hardie had spoken of the end of the Liberal era as early
as 1887 and of the gradual replacement of the Liberal Party by Labour, but by
1914 there was little evidence of the likelihood of this ever occurring. So long
as the Liberal Party retained its national strength and viability, the prospects
for Labour were limited indeed.
Labour's ambition seemed to have included a long and a short-term view. The
long-term was outlined by Hardie when he spoke of Labour provoking a split
among the Liberals which would force the Whigs into an alliance with the
Tories and lead the remainder into an alliance with the rest of the
"democracy", paving the way for a clear clash of interest between Capital and
Labour. The short-term view regarded the successful formation of a pressure
group in Parliament as the major achievement. The model to follow was that
of the Irish Party (and to a lesser extent the Crofter's Party) and it was argued
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that such a group or Party though small in numbers would 'revolutionise' the
workings of Parliament by holding the balance of power and, more or less,
extorting its demands from the Government (assumed to be Liberal) of the
day. These views were not competing strategies but were held by the same
people and regarded as complementary.1
The analogy with the Irish, however, was a false one. Labour had no solid
constituency which could guarantee it majorities in any significant number of
seats. Even where the working class constituted a clear majority, as in the
mining divisions, Labour had to compete amongst an electorate which was
already largely committed to either Liberal or Tory.2 Despite the fact that this
electorate was not based upon even a close approximation to universal adult
suffrage, Labour saw no difficulty - or opportunity - on that account.The
strategy, as outlined by Hardie in the mid 1890s was based upon the already
existing "democratic" constituency which had to be won from the Liberal Party
to support for Labour. Surveying the task confronting Labour at this time
Hardie made no mention of any further extension of the franchise, the system
appeared more or less perfect.
There is no need now to fight the battle of the franchise.
Our fathers did that, and today only the details remain to be
adjusted.3
The emergence of the women's suffrage movement a decade later forced
Hardie to reconsider his position on at least one count and he became, and
remained, one of the firmest supporters of the women's cause.4 Yet, as
regards the large proportion of men who remained outwith the franchise,
Hardie had nothing to say. In fact, the inclusion of women could be seen as
one of the "details ... to be adjusted", especially when the demand was for the
vote on the same terms as men. However, Hardie's silence on this issue has
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been largely shared by British historiography which, for a long time and in
some cases continues, to regard the issue of the franchise and democracy as
unproblematic, particularly post 1885. It is only in the last two decades that
historians have begun to recognise the levels of disfranchisement amongst
the adult male population and to consider what possible effects this had upon
politics in general and upon the Labour Party in particular.
While British constitutional history has witnessed five Reform Acts on the way
to universal adult suffrage, British historiography recognises only three; the
Representation of the People Act of 1917 and the Act of 1928 which
eventually gave women equal status with men have not qualified for
membership of the exclusive club of three. The "myth" of British democracy
limits the process to the Acts of the nineteenth century only. In 1832 the
middle class got the vote, in 1867 it was the turn of the urban working class,
and in 1884 the Third Reform Act gave the vote to the rural workforce; the
redistribution of seats in the Act of 1885 recognised the new social reality of
the country.
This was, more or less, the accepted wisdom until about twenty years ago
when Neal Blewett published his seminal article, "The Franchise in the United
Kingdom 1885-1918".5 Fundamentally questioning the standard view that the
electoral system in those years was in no way different to present day
practice, Blewett pointed out the major discrepancies in:6
an electoral system in which less than 30% of the adult
population was on the the electoral register, in which some
constituencies were eight times larger than others, and in which
polling struggled over nearly four weeks ...
Blewett's work and, in particular, his estimate that only 60% of all adult males
had the vote, marks a watershed in our understanding of the limitations of the
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pre-1917 Franchise, though the implications of this are only beginning to be
applied to the political history of the period. In his recent, A Century of the
Scottish People 1830 - 1950 T.C. Smout considers the failure of the Liberal
Party and working-class Liberal leaders to maintain the reform movement
beyond 1885.7 David Howell, in his history of the ILP, also pays attention to
the limited electorate and the question of how it affected the fortunes of
Labour.8 Yet, there remains a very strong sense that even though the
limitation is noted (in many constituencies the adult male electorate was
under 50%) the broad analysis concerning late Victorian and Edwardian
politics has not been altered in any fundamental sense. This is despite the
fact that the whole question of the rise of the Labour Party has been directly
related to the franchise in an article in 1976 by H.C.G. Matthew, R.I. McKibbin
and J.A. Kay.9
Matthew et al consider not just the size of the electorate but also the
implications about Britain's status as a Parliamentary Democracy and they
directly relate the level of enfranchisement to the fortunes of the Labour
Party. Entitled, "The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party", the
article argues that the rise of Labour and the decline of the Liberal Party has
at least as much to do with the Representation of the People Act of 1917 as
it had to do with social and political consequences following from the Great
War.10 Their argument is that the mass electorate created by the 'Fourth'
Reform Act favoured both Labour and the Conservatives at the expense of the
Liberal Party:11
... the Liberals were wedded to the forms of the 1867 to
1914 political community as their opponents were not, that the
ideologies of both the Labour and Conservative parties made
them better able to exploit a fully democratic franchise...
The authors construct a comparison between the pre and post 1918
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electorates, on the basis of which they argue that: One, there was pre-1914
no significant element of the existing electorate that was not committed to
either of the two big parties: Second, that post-1918 there is no evidence of
a single "progressive" vote that transferred from the Liberal Party to Labour.12
This allows them to conclude that:13
It follows that the substantial post-war growth in Labour's
relative strength must in large measure be attributable to the
franchise extension and registration reform of 1918. ... We
cannot say how many votes the introduction of universal
franchise was worth to Labour, but we can say that it was a
critical element in the emergence of the party as a major
political force.
Glasgow's Electorate
I shall consider later the post-1917 development of labour in Glasgow but for
the moment my concern is: How democratic was the franchise system or,
how deliberate were its exclusions?
Let us begin by considering just how many men in Glasgow were on the
electoral register. In 1911 the adult male population of Glasgow
Parliamentary Burgh was 161,543. [i.e an estimate of those aged 21+] In the
same year there were 87,049 Parliamentary electors which gives an estimated
level of adult male enfranchisement of 53.89%. This figure is slightly higher
than that given by Matthew et al (p 732) of 52.40%, but I don't consider this
to be statistically significant. 1911 is taken as the standard year of
comparison by Matthew et al since the Census for that year gives the
necessary electoral and population figures. The information would appear to
be more precise for England and Wales than for Scotland. To get levels of
enfranchisement for particular constituencies we have to 'reconstruct' the
Divisions from the municipal Wards they were comprised of since we have
much more exact age and gender information for the Ward level. This
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permits a more precise estimate of enfranchisement levels than simply
applying the proportion of adult males for the City as a whole to each
Division, as it would appear Matthew et al have done. Within the City there
were wide variations. The Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885 had turned
Glasgow Parliamentary Burgh from a single three-member constituency into
seven separate Divisions each returning one M.P. Some idea of the different
levels of enfranchisement can be got from looking at the Divisions and not
the City as a whole.
TABLE 1 LEVELS OF ENFRANCHISEMENT. PROPORTIONAL MALE ELECTORATE.
GLASGOW PARLIAMENTARY DIVISIONS 1911
i.e.The number of male electors as a percentage of the




No 1. Bridgeton 43.71%
No 2. Camlachie 48.74%
No 3. St Rollox 57.53%
No 4. Central 75.60%
No 5. College 52.04%
No 6. Tradeston 50.00%
No 7. Blackfriars and Hutchesontown 48.31%
Total for the City as A Whole 53.89%
At one level there is Bridgeton in the East End with just less than 44%
enfranchisement and at the other, the largely business dominated Central
Division with over 75%. Central stands on its own with by far the highest
proportion of electors, due mainly to the high level of plural (business) votes.
Of the others, only St Rollox comes close to Blewett's national figure of 60%
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though it matches almost exactly the average figure for Scottish Burghs of
57.30%, while the remaining five are all below this and three are actually
below 50% enfranchisement. (Matthew et al give a somewhat lower figure for
Bridgeton - 40.60% - but this is due, as I have said, to their applying the age
structure for the whole City to each Constituency.)
By 1921 the level of male enfranchisement for all Britain was over 94% and in
Glasgow, now enlarged to 15 Divisions, it was 101.3%.14 Thus, in ten years
the national male electorate had increased by more than 50% and in Glasgow
it had almost doubled. A development of such magnitude could only be
expected to have have major political consequences (and this is without
considering the newly created female electorate). A recent work on Scottish
political history has accepted the thesis of Matthew et al as regards Labour's
growth and has connected the massive increase in trade union membership
to the expanded electorate, seeing both as coming from amongst the "less
skilled portion of the workforce."15 On the basis of statistics alone, the case
against British Democracy pre-1918 would seem secure yet there remains an
argument that the electoral and franchise system was more or less
democratic and not legally or systematically exclusive of any significant
section of the population, i.e. that it was not class biased.
This view is put forward by Martin Pugh contra Matthew et al in his Electoral
Reform In War and Peace 1906 -7<77<216 Pugh accepts the findings of Blewett
and that the assumption prevalent until the early 1960s that "manhood
suffrage had virtually been achieved by 1900 [was] a gross exaggeration".17
Nevertheless, he does not agree with Matthew et al whom he regards as
"going to the other extreme and underplaying the democratic quality of the
system." Like Matthew et al he identifies the "complexities of the registration
system" as the main reason for disenfranchising most men, but he does not
agree with the conclusion that this was the very reason for those
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complexities. He points out, correctly enough, that men could move on an off
the register and concludes from this that "the dividing line between the
enfranchised and the unenfranchised was therefore much less significant than
the gross numbers would suggest."18 In Pugh's estimation the system was,
despite any flaws, "broadly representative"; the electorate was comprised in
the majority of working class voters who were only slightly less represented
than the middle class.
However, if the figures in Table 1 above do represent reality, even if not 100%
accurate, what is the explanation behind them? If they have nothing to do
with the inherent biases of the franchise system what then explains the
differential? Our interest in these figures lies not just in the numbers involved,
but in the differences between areas. That there were major differences
between areas is quite clear from the figures for the Parliamentary Divisions
but this is still a large and cumbersome level to deal with. If, however, we
consider the smaller Municipal Wards the variation between areas becomes
much more apparent and we are much better placed to relate the electorate
to social factors such as housing and health and therefore take forward the
discussion of the franchise system in regard to class.
The popular perception of Glasgow was (and remains) of it as an
overwhelmingly working class city.
Glasgow is not only a great city, but it is also the
industrial capital of a populous and thriving district crowded
with busy towns which depend upon iron and steel and coal. ...
The working class districts in Glasgow are in all parts of the
city, north, south, east and west, and they are mostly in closest
proximity to areas of factories, mills and workshops.
The basic truth of this picture was supported by official statistics. The Census
of 1911 recorded a male working population of 253,210 of which over 49,000
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or almost 20% were employed in Iron Manufacture alone. Glasgow's main
industry was, broadly speaking, engineering though Clydeside (most of which
had been swallowed by Glasgow by 1912) was equally, if not more, famous
for shipbuilding; almost half of Govan's adult male population were employed
in shipbuilding and engineering. Referring only to those employed in
Glasgow itself. The Board of Trade in 1908 pointed out, "the diversity of
industrial activity" and "that Glasgow is a great railway centre , a great port, a
great engineering shop, and that it occupies a prominent place in the textile
trades."22 Moreover, Glasgow also provided a home for thousands of people
who worked outside the City boundary, as with the giant Singer sewing
machine works at Clydebank, many of whose workers travelled daily from
Bridgeton.23 Yet the industrial and occupational structure of this working class
city found only an uneasy reflection in support for Labour in the political field.
The truth is that once we examine the electoral map of the City - as Henry
Pelling has done for the Parliamentary Constituencies of Britain - the
predominance of the working class becomes a much more attenuated
phenomenon.
Matthew et al take issue with one view of the Edwardian electorate which
estimates that 75-80% of voters were working class.24 This appears to be
based upon an estimate that the working class comprised 80% of the
population This itself is likely an overestimate since it includes agricultural
labourers and is almost certainly so in terms of enfranchisement.25 Blewett
estimates a figure of 38% of the electorate being middle class, which
Matthew et al revise upwards to 40% or even higher.26 Pelling's work in
mapping constituencies, however, shows that, prior to 1914 only 89
constituencies - which were responsible for electing 95 MPs - were,
"predominantly working class in character."27 Thus, although Pugh can argue
that, "a substantial majority of the eight million Edwardian voters were, none
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the less, working class", this was a majority which was not as overwhelming
as appearances might have suggested and which was effectively nullified by
the careful drawing of constituency boundaries.29
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TABLE 2. LEVELS OF ENFRANCHISEMENT PROPORTIONAL MALE
ELECTORATEGLASGOW MUNICIPAL WARDS 1911
i.e. The number of male electors as a percentage of the number of
males aged over 21 in each Ward.
1. Dalmarnock 46.94
2. Calton 38.88
3. Mile End 46.67
4. Whitevale 50. 94
5. Dennistoun 67.45
6. Springburn* 48. 05
7. Cowlairs* 57. 54
8. Townhead 54. 18
9. Blackfriars 51. 61
10. Exchange 282.90
11. Blythswood+ 272.01
12 . Broomielaw+ 67.27
13. Anderston 53.43
14 . Sandyford 57.31
15 . Park 64. 96
16. Cowcaddens 36. 83
17 . Woodside 58.56
18 . Hutchesontown 47.13
19. Gorbals 46.55
20 . Kingston 55.28
21. Govanhill* 66.38
22. Langside** 86. 68
23. Pollokshields** 85.16
24 . Kelvinside** 83.88
25. Maryhill** 56. 59
26. Kinning Park** 53.97
* = Those wards partly outwith Glasgow Parliamentary Burgh. Figures in parentheses are those
for the area within the Parliamentary Burgh.
** = Those wards totally outwith Glasgow Parliamentary Burgh.
+ = Those wards with a particularly high plural voting element. It is most likely that the number
of men with the municipal franchise was significantly greater in these wards.
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What is most strikingly evident from this table is the phenomenally wide
differential between wards, from under 40% at the bottom to close to 300%
at the top; a much greater level of magnitude than that operating at the
Divisional level. Before we proceed to attempt to account for these
differences we need to explain how the figures in Table 2 were arrived at.
The table is constructed from two sources: The Glasgow Post Office Directory
(GPOD) for 1910-11 which provides the numbers of electors in each ward;
and the Census 1911 published by the Corporation of Glasgow under the
aegis of the Medical Officer of Health which provides much more detailed
information than the official Census Report, in particular age and sex
breakdowns in five year bands for each Municipal Ward. We know, therefore,
how many men there were in each ward aged 20+ and we can simply deduct
an estimated number for those aged 20 based upon the proportion of males
at that age for the City as a whole. This gives us a, more or less, exact
number of males of voting age, i.e. 21+.
The main difficulty arises from the City boundaries and the categories of
voters used by the GPOD. In some years there is no problem since the GPOD
gives a breakdown of Male, Female and Total Municipal Electors. However, in
other years, and 1911 is such a year, the categories are Parliamentary,
Supplementary and Total Municipal. This latter arrangement is confusing on
two counts: One is that women could only qualify for the municipal franchise
whereas men could qualify for both separately. Normally men on the Electoral
register qualified for both but certain outside', i.e. plural voters could - due
to the different rules about distance of residence - have a municipal vote
while not qualifying for a parliamentary vote: Secondly, the boundaries of the
Municipal Burgh were not contiguous with the Parliamentary Burgh; the
former was much larger and contained wards partly and totally outwith the
latter. Thus, for 1911 the GPOD only gives figures for those men who had a
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parliamentary vote in one of the Glasgow Divisions,; for the area outside all
electors are grouped together as "Supplementary". The way around this
problem is to apply the proportional Male/Female divide in 1901 (as given in
the GPOD 1901-02) to the Parliamentary/Supplementary divide in 1911. That
this produces, more or less, a true representation is indicated by the fact that
for those wards totally within Glasgow Parliamentary Burgh the proportions
between Parliamentary/Supplementary in 1911 are largely the same as those
between Male/Female in 1901, apart, that is, from those wards with a high
plural voting element.
Unfortunately, any examination of enfranchisement rates and class is limited
by the paucity of figures relating to occupational and industrial structure. The
Census only deals with Glasgow as a whole and gives no breakdown on
occupations at a smaller area level. The statistics produced by the City
Corporation - detailed as they are for the Ward level - are concerned mainly
with sex, age, health and housing and make no reference whatever to
occupation. It becomes necessary, indeed unavoidable, to use the figures
produced by the Corporation - collected either by the Medical Officer of
Health, or extracted from the Census schedules - as indicators of social
structure within the City of Glasgow. However, we can at least make brief
descriptive references to the industrial nature of some of the Wards and their
levels of enfranchisement.
Glasgow's Municipal Wards
The two wards which stand out as having by far the highest rates - Exchange
and Blythswood - constituted the commercial heart of Glasgow. They were
also the two smallest Wards and were the preserve of the City's business
community. Though Blythswood still housed a bourgeois element (as
Glasgow's early West End), the electorate in it and Exchange bore little
253
relation to the actual resident population. It is impossible to estimate the size
of the plural vote from any printed sources but, at least here, there can be no
question as to its existence. The high levels of enfranchisement in these two
wards can only be explained by a phenomenally high number of plural votes.
Simply put, there were more electors in these two wards than there were
men of all ages; in Blythswood in 1911 the ratio was almost 2 ; 1. Because of
the rules concerning Burghs and plural voting those whose business interests
gave them a second vote in Glasgow would have had to reside outside the
City. Those who lived within the boundaries of the City could choose to vote
at their place of residence ortheir business address, but not ax both. On one
of the few occasions when there was actually a contested election in these
Wards the Glasgow Herald provided a revealing description of the polling
procedure of the "commercial electorate":
Blythswood Ward ... shares ... with Exchange Ward the
honour of embracing the bulk of the commercial intelligence of
Glasgow. As became such a constituency, the proceedings
were characterised by business-like precision and activity, and
gentlemen came and went to exercise their right brooking
interference or promptings from no-one. ... As in the case of
the neighbouring ward (Exchange) a large number of electors
had residential qualifications elsewhere The majority of these
who desired to vote in Blythswood Ward had done so before six
o'clock.30
Nowhere else was the plural vote so evident, though the other wards which
together with Exchange and Blythswood made up the Central Constituency -
Anderston, Sandyford, and Broomielaw - would have had a significant plural
element since they all at least bordered the City Centre. This was particularly
so with Broomielaw which was very much in the heart of the City and which,
although it had a relatively high enfranchisement level of over 67% was very
definitely one of the "poorer class districts" of Glasgow.31 Because of the
obvious disparity between population and electorate in Exchange, Blythswood
254
and Broomielaw we shall have to consider them separately from the other
wards.
Langside, Pollokshields and Kelvinside all enjoyed enfranchisement levels of
80%+ and in these cases this did reflect their social composition. These wards
were the residential areas of Glasgow (especially the last two) and were
situated outwith the boundaries of the Parliamentary Burgh. The first two lay
to the south of the City while Kelvinside (which was where the University was
removed to from the High Street) was the "new" West End of Glasgow.
Kelvinside was seen as being the home of the more anglified, almost trendy
wealth while Pollokshields represented the more douce and respectable
Scottish bourgeoisie. These were the districts where the businessmen of the
City tended to live and, given that many of them chose to exercise their
franchise in Exchange, Blythswood or Broomieiaw, the true or actual
enfranchisement rate for adult males most likely was significantly greater than
even these high rates indicate; i.e. more or less 100%.
The other wards which can be categorised as having "high" levels of
enfranchisement were Dennistoun, Park and Govanhill. Park was famed as a
rich district, dominated as it was by the great houses overlooking Kelvingrove
Park. At the same time it was more "mixed" than the suburbs since although
on one side it was bounded by Kelvinside it was also bordered by the working
class areas of Anderston, Sandyford, Woodside and Cowcaddens and we can
expect there to have been a good deal of overlap or "contamination."
Similarly Dennistoun (or this "bourgeois ward" as it was referred to by the
Forward2 had a strong middle class presence in the centre but also had a
working class population overlapping with Townhead and Whitevale.
Govanhill is an especially interesting case. Commonly identified as an
"artisan" ward33 it lay partly within and partly outwith the Parliamentary Burgh
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and the enfranchisement rates between the two parts are significantly
different. To the North Govanhill was bounded by Gorbals and
Hutchesontown and was part of the Blackfriars and Hutchesontown Division.
This section of the ward had less than 50% enfranchisement. To the South it
was bounded by Langside and presumably Govanhill itself became more
"residential" the further South it went. Given that the overall rate of
enfranchisement was over 66% and we know the "Glasgow" end had less than
50%, that part of the ward outside the Burgh must have enjoyed an even
greater level, something more akin to that of Langside and the other
residential wards. What is of added interest is that Govanhill was the only
Ward with a "high" level of enfranchisement that ever returned a Labour
candidate, in the local municipal election of 1911. In none of the others, with
the exception of Dennistoun, did Labour ever bother to stand a candidate.
The remaining wards (two-thirds of the total) were largely working class and
situated in all parts of the City - North , South, East and West.34 The
enfranchisement rates for all seventeen were below 60% while seven of these
were actually below 50% and two fell under the 40% mark. Though there was
no immutable demarcation between these wards we can make a general
distinction between "artisan" and "poorer" working class areas (which were
the descriptive categories used by the Medical Officer of Health). Broadly
speaking those wards with rates higher than 50% were artisan or skilled areas
while those below were poor or unskilled. Thus Sandyford, Woodside, Maryhill,
Kingston and Kinning Park were regarded as artisan as were Townhead,
Cowlairs and Springburn which were largely dominated by railway
engineering. Cowlairs and Springburn were very often regarded as one and
the same though, as we can see, there is a noticeable gap between their
levels of enfranchisement. (Like Govanhill, Cowlairs and Springburn were only
partly within Glasgow Parliamentary Burgh but there was not the same
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discrepancy between enfranchisement rates between the two parts.)
Wards which can be categorised as poor or unskilled were Cowcaddens,
Calton, Hutchesontown, Dalmarnock, Anderston and Gorbals, and the first two
in particular represent this in their enfranchisement rates. Blackfriars would
also fit into this category containing, as it did, some of the worst of
Glasgow's housing stock around the High Street, but it was also an area of
small businesses and likely had a greater plural voting element than the rest.
Whitevale and Mile End together comprised the East End Division of
Camlachie and though recognisably "poor" in many ways they were more
"mixed"; Whitevale bordering Dennistoun and Mile End stretching out further
East to the engineering districts of Parkhead and Shettleston.
This rough, descriptive guide to the social structure of the wards is ragged at
the edges with a degree of overlap, particularly between working class areas.
However, it does confirm a "commonsense" view of Glasgow and correctly
identifies the broad trend and the extremes. Thus, the phenomenally high
levels of enfranchisement in the business wards of Exchange and Blythswood
are obviously due to the plural vote and neither they nor the rates in the
middle class, residential wards are unexpected. At the other end of the scale
Cowcaddens was renowned as a "slum area" and its low rate is just as clearly
understood. Nevertheless, an attempt can be made to verify the connection
between the franchise and class using the social indicators available to us.
First among these is housing.
Housing
Though the Reform Act of 1867 enfranchised (part of) the working class it did
so in terms of property, not as an inalienable human right. Thus the pre and
post-1867 franchise systems remained "conceptually" the same.
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This was because the nineteenth century Reform Acts had
widened the membership of the electorate but had not
fundamentally altered the nature of the franchise system: the
right to vote was a privilege purchased through property,
whether by its occupation, its ownership, or in the case of the
servant franchise, by an economic relationship to an owner of
property.35
The relationship was either to business property or to residential property and
could be through ownership or simply renting. The majority of electors were
registered on the basis of the Occupation or Household franchises.36 Given
that Blewett estimates the plural vote at 7% of the total37 it is clear that most
people were registered by residence. In Glasgow nearly everyone rented their
property (business and residential); in 1911 less than 2% of Glasgow's
electorate were owners or life-renters, in contrast to Edinburgh where the
figure was over 15%, though it is likely that the middle class suburbs outwith
3ft
the Parliamentary Burgh had a higher proportion.
As we are already well aware, housing was a crucial factor in determining
3Q
Labour support within Glasgow at the municipal level. Our interest here,
however, is in examining the direct relationship between housing and
enfranchisement.lt is safe to assume that the type of housing people lived in,
i.e. could afford to pay for, reflected their wealth and social status. In terms of
electoral registration housing type was crucial. Poorer quality housing tended
to be let for shorter periods which reflected the necessity of many unskilled
workers to move around after work and thus run a likely risk of not getting
on the register or being removed from it due to the twelve month residency
rule. There was a further difficulty in Scotland because householders had to
pay their rates personally but for houses with an annual valuation of less than
it was the landlord who paid. Though the number of such houses in
Glasgow were not particularly numerous, their inhabitants (presumably of the
poorer working class) were effectively disenfranchised.40
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TABLE 3: HOUSING IN GLASGOW WARDS 1911.
Column 1 gives proportion of houses of 1 and 2 rooms. Column
2 gives proportion of population living in houses of 1 and 2 rooms.
WARDS 1 2
1. Dalmarnock 91. 58 00 CO CD vo
2. Calton 76.71 69. 67
3. Mile End 91. 41 88.25
4. Whitevale 76.38 70.75
5. Dennistoun 52. 89 47.25
6. Springburn 86.29 82. 84
7. Cowlairs 80.13 76.04
8. Townhead 74. 35 68. 53
9. Blackfriars 73.30 63. 37
10. Exchange 42.77 30.20
11. Blyt hswood 18. 45 10. 52
12 . Broomielaw 63.16 52. 87
13. Anders ton 73.19 66. 47
14. Sandyford 53.15 48. 36
15 . Park 15.64 12. 40
16 . Cowcaddens 72.26 66. 50
17. Woodside 71.48 66.47
18. Hutchesontown 92.06 88. 82
19. Gorbals 56.13 47. 89
20 . Kingston 58. 35 52. 30
21. Govanhill 70.49 65. 53
22 . Langside 22.41 19. 53
23 . Pollokshields 8. 52 7.27
24 . Kelvinside 4. 28 4.09
25. Maryhill 69.18 67.00
26. Kinning Park 85.23 82.13
Totals 66.41 62.14
Source: Corporation of Glasgow, Census 1911
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TABLE 4: HOUSING IN GLASGOW WARDS. 1911
Column 1 gives number of persons per windowed room.
Column 2 gives number of windowed rooms per inhabited house.
WARDS 1 2
1. Dalmarnock 2.73 1.74
2. Calton 2.20 2.09
3. Mile End 2.68 1.76
4. Whitevale 2.31 2.05
5. Dennistoun 1.63 2.69
6. Springburn 2.46 1.94
7. Cowlairs 2.35 2.03
8. Townhead 2.16 2.21
9. Blackfriars 2.18 2.23
10. Exchange 1.20 4.39
11. Blythswood 0.92 5.89
12. Broomielaw 1.99 2.63
13. Anderston 2 .12 2.20
14. Sandyford 1.63 2 .93
15 . Park 0.99 4.79
16 . Cowcaddens 2.13 2.21
17. Woodside 1.92 2 .35
18. Hutchesontown 2.63 1.76
19. Gorbals 1.93 2 .52
20. Kingston 1.99 2.40
21. Govanhill 2.02 2.27
22 . Langside 1.13 3.67
23. Pollokshields 0.78 6.08
24. Kelvinside 0.75 5.98
25. Maryhi11 1.81 2 .56
26. Kinning Park 2 .57 1.89
Totals 1.83 2.55
Source: Corporation of Glasgow, Census 1911
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Tables 3 and 4 provide statistical detail on the size of houses and density of
occupation in all the Glasgow wards for 1911. These figures do not tell us
what the value or letting conditions of houses were but they do provide
indicators as to the quality of the housing stock in the different areas of the
City and thus to the status of the population in each area. Generally speaking
we would expect those wards where the houses were larger, i.e. with a low
proportion of 1 & 2 roomed houses) to be representative of middle class
areas, and the converse to be true for working class areas. Similarly those
with a lower number of persons per room would likely be better off while
wards with a greater number of persons per room we would expect to be
poorer. The gradation runs from the opposite end though for number of
rooms per house; those with a high number would be better-off and those
with low the poorer.
Hardly surprisingly the ordering of the four categories is replicated in the four
categories. Thus Hutchesontown, Dalmarnock, Mile End, Springburn, Kinning
Park, Cowlairs, Whitevale, Calton and Townhead inhabit the bottom places in
all four leagues. At the top of the tables are Dennistoun, Exchange,
Blythswood, Park, Langside, Pollokshields and Kelvingrove. If we apply the
total figure for Glasgow as the average we find that these seven wards
always fall on the right side of the divide so to speak. It can hardly be
coincidence that these seven wards were also among our group of nine
"high" enfranchisement wards and that Broomielaw, another of the nine, falls
on the plus side on three out of four occasions.
At the other end of the enfranchisement scale, however, the "fit" is not quite
so neat. The two lowest wards in terms of enfranchisement, Cowcaddens and
Calton, are by no means the worst areas for housing. The three wards with
clearly the poorest housing conditions on all four counts (e.g. 90%+ of 1 & 2
roomed houses) were Hutchesontown, Dalmarnock, and Mile End, have very
261
similar levels of enfranchisement, i.e. under 50% and all within 0.5% of one
another. Yet Gorbals with a similar enfranchisement rate of 46.55% had,
relatively speaking, good housing conditions; less than half or its population
lived in houses of one or two rooms.
Cowlairs, Woodside and Sandyford were three of the better-off "artisan"
wards at the top end of the enfranchisement scale for working class areas, i.e.
c. 58%. Their housing conditions, however, varied considerably with
Sandyford being above the average in all four categories. This contrasted
sharply with Govanhill which was a high category ward as far as its electorate
was concerned but which was below average on all four housing counts.
Springburn and Cowlairs not only "scored" worse than Sandyford but were
even worse than Cowcaddens.
The statistics contained in Tables 3 and 4 provide indicators about social
status, and are particularly clear in identifying "high status" or middle class
areas. However, they are not so reliable in identifying differences between
working class areas. In housing, insofar as the working class population was
concerned, size was not a consistent guide to quality of accomodation or
status of tenants. As Joe Melling has commented;
Even the more affluent skilled workers often preferred to
begin married life in a one room tenement flat, before
progressing to larger dwellings with families and "doubling up"
with other households in periods of unemployment.41
There was also the pressure of trying to get a house near one's place of
work. The above average levels for 1 and 2 roomed houses in Springburn
and Cowlairs were due, presumably, to the expansion of the railway
engineering industry; between 1901 and 1911 the population of these two
wards increased by 25.6% and 10.7% respectively.42
With this qualification in mind we can, nontheless, claim a statistically
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verifiable relation between housing and enfranchisement based upon the
figures we have available. As the scattergrams below graphically indicate
there is a significant correlation between the proportional adult male
electorate in each ward and house size and density of occupation. The
correlations are:
1. Proportional male electorate with proportion of 1 & 2
roomed houses = -.82087
2. Proportional male electorate with proportion of population
living in 1 and 2 roomed houses = -.82274
3. Proportional male electorate with number of persons per
windowed room = -.84815
4. Proportional male electorate with number of windowed
rooms per house = .79904
NOTE: The number of cases plotted is only 23. This is because Exchange, Blythswood and
Broomielaw wards were not included because their high level of plural voters meant that their
electorates had only a limited relationship to their residential populations.
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Closely linked to housing was the issue of health, and Glasgow managed to
provide some of the worst statistics for both in the whole of Europe.43 A
pivotal figure in the debate on health and housing was James B. Russell,
Medical Officer of Health for Glasgow in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century. Russell was convinced that mortality and susceptibility to disease
were related to the "physical differences" between areas, "especially as to
air-space". Such were the contrasts that he produced in the mid-1880s, a
four-fold division of Glasgow or, as he put it, "We can classify the inhabitants
of one city so as to produce four cities. ...
...to amply illustrate the law that the comparative
healthiness of sections of population, whether they be
traditionally separated and known by name as distinct
communities, or are merely artificial divisions of the same
community, is determined by the air-space within and without
their dwellings."44
While we need not share Russell's over-riding concern with air-space, he
does provide us with a lead to follow, though we will not attempt any similar
division of the City. This would be impossible, in the sense of producing a
comparison with Russell's statistics for two reasons: One is that Russell was
dealing with a smaller area, i.e. the Parliamentary Burgh only and not the
extended area incorporated in 1891 which included districts such as
Kelvinside, Pollokshields, Maryhill: Furthermore the geographical entities for
the collation of health statistics were changed in 1902 from the old Statistical
or Sanitary Districts which Russell worked on to the Municipal Wards; as
Russell himself said, "Change in the constitution of such Districts is fatal to
the comparability of their statistics."45 For the Medical Officer of Health this
changeover may have produced problems46 but for us it provides an
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opportunity to relate health to politics, namely the level of enfranchisement.
Socialist propagandists were not slow to exploit the figures produced by the
Corporation's health officers. John Wheatley, for example, illustrated his
arguments for municipal housing with references to the massive gulf in
mortality rates between working class and middle class areas.47 Death was
built into the class structure. Tables 5 and 6 give the Death Rate and the
Infant Mortality Rate for Glasgow's Municipal Wards in 1911.
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26. Kinning Park 16.82
Total 16.44
Source: Glasgow Corporation, Report of the Medical Officer of Health, 1913
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9. Blackf riars 180
10. Exchange 200
11. Blythswood 160
12 . Brooraielaw 234
13. Anderston 126
14 . Sandyford 145
15. Park 85
16 . Cowcaddens 163
17 . Woodside 144
18 . Hutchesontown 140
19 . Gorbals 145
20. Kingston 145
21. Govanhill 76
22 . Langside 59
23. Pollokshields 86
24 . Kelvinside 29
25 . Maryhill 106
26. Kinning Park 145
Total 136
Source: Glasgow Corporation, Report of the Medical Officer of Health,
1913
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The picture that emerges from these Tables is very similar to the situation
regarding housing as depicted in Tables 3 and 4. The identifiably residential
middle class areas - Dennistoun, Park, Langside, Poilokshields, Kelvinside -
have the lowest death rates and, along with Govanhill, the lowest rates for
infant mortality as well. The three city centre or business wards - Exchange,
Blythswood, Broomielaw - score badly on both counts, particularly Exchange
and Broomielaw, the latter having the worst rates for both death and infant
mortality for the whole city. Their geographical location in the heart of the
City had, presumably, a lot to do with their poor health record, but this does
give added weight to the decision not to include the wards in the correlations
of electorate and social conditions.
The gradation of working class wards follows a pattern we would expect from
the descriptive categorisation of 'artisan' and 'poorer', e.g. Cowcaddens is the
worst of the working class districts in both tables. This gradation is
particularly clear for Death Rate. At the top (with the highest or worst rates)
there are Broomielaw, then Cowcaddens, then three of the four East End
wards, Blackfriars, Kingston (the only artisan' ward), Hutchesontown,
Anderston and Whitevale (the last of the East End Wards). Below this with
healthier rates come the recognisably artisan' wards of Kinning Park,
Townhead, Springburn, Sandyford, Cowlairs, Woodside and Govanhill. Apart
from Exchange (business) and Gorbals (poor) the pattern is fairly consistent.
The strength of the relationship with the electorate is shown, once again, by
the scattergrams reproduced below. The correlation for proportional male
electorate with infant mortality is similar to those of the various housing
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On the basis of the above statistical correlations it appears clear that the
electorate was largely determined by class and status. However the franchise
system was meant to operate,whether or not deliberately to exclude the
poorer through the mysteries of registration or whatever, the end result
4ft
clearly discriminated against the working class. Furthermore, there were
significant variations between working class areas which clearly relate (even if
not 100% consistently) to differences in social conditions.
These figures, however, deal at a general level and it is important for our
purposes to try and focus our attention, to some extent at least, upon the
working class electorate itself. Some detail on its complexion can be got
from an examination of the delegate membership of Glasgow Trades Council.
The Trades Council was by no means representative of the whole working
class, but it does provide a sample' of the organised (male) working class,
precisely that element we would expect to find on the electoral register.
In 1911 the delegates to the Glasgow Trades Council numbered 287, of whom
only five were women. Of this number 205 could be traced to addresses
within Glasgow Municipal Burgh, and of this figure only 113 and 114 appeared
on the Electoral Register for each of the two years 1910-11 and 1911-12; an
enfranchisement rate of c. 55%. The proportion of delegates appearing on
the Register for both years was 45% while the figure for those appearing on
either year was 66%. Even this higher figure leaves out a significant element
of what must have been not only the most organised but also most politically
aware section of the working class. The figure of 55% in any single year was
only slightly greater than the figure for Glasgow as a whole.
Even within this group of activists, however, there were variations. If we take
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and the Municipal Employees
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Association (MEA) as broadly representative of skilled and unskilled workers
respectively, we can see a marked difference in their enfranchisement levels.
The ASE had 14 delegates representing 7 branches on the Trades Council and
the MEA 36 delegates representing 22 branches. Of the ASE members, 11
lived within Glasgow Municipal Burgh and of these, 10 were on the Electoral
Register for either of the two years. Of the MEA members 25 could be traced
of whom 16 appeared on the Register for either of the two years. The
difference in enfranchisement rates between the two Unions in the two years
were 30% and 18%. Though these numbers are quite small (still the MEA
accounted for one eighth of all Trades Council delegates) they do indicate a
tendency for skilled workers as more likely to have the vote than unskilled. In
fact the actual gap between skilled and unskilled or tradesmen and labourers
was likely to have been much greater since the MEA was not a labourers
union but a general union with a large number of semi-skilled and skilled
members. Of those delegates of the MEA on the voter' roll only four could be
regarded as simply unskilled, with a greater number having at least some sort
of skill, including an electrician, engineer, plumber, joiner, and a brassdresser.
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TABLE 7.ENFRANCHISEMENT LEVELS OF DELEGATES TO
GLASGOW TRADES COUNCIL 1911
DELEGATES NO. TRACED NO. ON ELECTORAL REGISTER
1910-11 1911-12 BOTH YEARS EITHER YEAR
GTC 205 113 (55%) 114 (56%) 93 (45%) 135 (66%)
MEA 25 13 (52%) 16 (64%) 13 (52%) 16 (64%)
ASE 11 9 (82%) 9 (82%) 8 (73%) 10 (91%)
GTC = Glasgow Trades Council; MEA = Municipal Employees Association; ASE = Amalgamated
Society of Engineers.
Table 7 shows the enfranchisement levels for all delegates to Glasgow Trades
Council in 1911 and for the delegates of the ASE and MEA in particular. By
examining the Electoral Register over two consecutive years we can clearly
see the tendency for individuals to move off and on the voters' roll. We know
from our examination of ILP branch secretaries that changing address could
mean losing the vote for a year or two before managing to get back on the
49
Register. Given this it could be argued that the number appearing on the
Register in either of the two years - the highest figure - was the more
representative, since it indicates the true number of those likely to qualify as
electors. However, the fact remains that the number with the vote in any
single year was significantly less and this, of course, was a difficulty (i.e.
registration) faced by everyone who otherwise qualified for the vote. As
Matthew et al have commented:
It is hard to disagree with the Liberal agents ... that mass
disqualification was inherent in the occupation franchise. It is
hard, also to avoid the conclusion that is precisely why it was
there.50
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It was well-known that it was the poorer, unskilled sections of the working
class who suffered most from registration difficulties.51 Anyone, be they a
middle class businessman, shopkeeper, boilermaker, labourer, could lose their
vote temporarily through moving house, but as Table 7 shows in the contrast
between the members of the ASE and MEA, in fact between the ASE and the
rest of the Trades Council delegates, there were simply more skilled workers
getting onto the Electoral Register than unskilled in the first place.
As with our figures for the Municipal Ward populations so the above
information on the Glasgow Trades Council shows that different sections of
the population - who can be identified on a class and status basis -
experienced significantly different enfranchisement levels. The division that
existed between the middle and working class was replicated within the
working class itself. What we now have to consider is how this limited
electorate affected the fortunes of the Labour Party and why Labour accepted
an inherently and obviously biased franchise system.
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Chapter Seven
Labour and its Constituency:
Respectability versus Residuum
Largely missing from recent writings on the pre-1917 franchise system is any
discussion of divisions within the working class. The restrictions and
inequalities facing the working class electorate vis-a-vis the middle class
have been effectively detailed but, as we have seen, major discrepancies in
enfranchisement levels occurred within the working class itself. Even in
Matthew et al the subject is not broached and the impression given, therefore,
that the working class and the working class electorate were homogeneous.
Even sociologists, approaching the issue from a different perspective, make
the same, implicit assumption. H.F. Moorhouse, in his discussion of the
political incorporation of the working class, argues against notions of
"deference" and stresses the influence of " 'external' control and restraints".
The nature of the franchise system up to 1918 is identified by him as a major
factor in restricting working class involvement in the political system. Yet,
Moorhouse does not consider the possible consequences of certain workers
being more likely to have the vote than others; in electoral terms the working
class is treated as homogeneous. The only possible conflict Moorhouse refers
to - in electoral terms - is that between the mass of the working class and
the labour leadership.1
Unfortunately, Moorhouse does not relate this point to the franchise system,
and this leads on to the second major gap in the literature on the franchise,
which is the attitude of the Labour Party on the issue. At one level there is
no problem - the Labour Party supported full adult suffrage which was part of
its official policy, passed overwhelmingly at successive Conferences.
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However, as indicated by Hardie's disparaging remarks about the Adult
Suffrage Society, Labour's commitment to adult suffrage was more of a
blocking manoeuvre against any commitment to votes for women; the debate
at Labour Party Conference was not for or against adult suffrage per se but
was a choice between adult v. women's suffrage, (see Chapter Five.) Labour
and Socialist organisations had always been for adult suffrage and it was
accorded a place in most manifestoes. With the honourable and partial
exception of the SDF, however, this paper commitment was never translated
into action. Why? Why did not Labour and the ILP whom, superficially at least,
could have been expected to gain most from an expanded electorate, make
adult or even male suffrage a campaigning issue with which to break out of
its permanent minority position?
Interestingly enough, it is Martin Pugh (whom, as we know, dismisses ideas of
mass bias against the working class in the franchise system) who provides at
least the basis of a considered answer to this question. Pugh points out that,
contrary to possible expectations, Labour never pressurised the Liberal
Governments of 1906 to 1916 over suffrage reform, and that this mirrored
Labour's preoccupation with consolidating its existing areas of support;2
... the party's immediate interest lay in the organised,
politically aware sections of the working class already on the
parliamentary register; nothing was as yet to be expected from
domestic servants living with their employers or labourers
residing with farmers who bulked large among the
unenfranchised, or indeed from many industrial workers in areas
in which, in Ramsay MacDonaid's words, 'poverty and
degradation are of the worst type'.
More generally, Pugh offers some reasons why (male) suffrage reform did not
bulk large in the public domain. One was that the women's suffrage
campaign overshadowed the exclusion of men and also, given the extremism
of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), prejudiced the whole issue
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for many. Secondly, and this seems to us the most significant3
... the unenfranchised men tended to include the least
organised, least politically conscious and least articulate
sections of the population. The Trade Union leadership was
largely absorbed with exploiting to the full the benefits which
were available through the political influence their members
already possessed. Those outside the pale did not constitute a
coherent class within the community ...
Thirdly, there was the possibility that sufficient numbers of workers were so
disenchanted with the Labour Party that they totally rejected electoral politics
and concentrated solely on the industrial struggle. Pugh himself is dismissive
of this view since, for him, syndicalism was "too sophisticated to appeal to
most unenfranchised men", and any search for a theoretical alternative to the
Labour Party was, "characteristically the dilemna of middle class intellectuals
like the Webbs rather than of the working man."4
There is something to all of these points though, it is interesting that Pugh
clearly does accept that there was a class bias operating in the franchise
system and that it operated most forcefully against the poorer and least
organised sections of the working class. This appears to contradict his own
argument that the system was "broadly representative".5
Despite what conservative opinion might argue about electoral reform leading
inexorably (the first steps on the slippery slope) to democracy, it is clear that
the likely outcomes of each and every Reform Bill were carefully weighed and
balanced; the British Ruling Class did not take any sudden leaps in the dark.
The Whig Cabinet of 1830 set up a four-man Committee to handle the Reform
Bill and instructed it to prepare:6
...the outline of a measure ... large enough to satisfy public
opinion and to afford sure ground of resistance to further
innovation, yet so based on property, and on existing franchises
and territorial divisions, as to run no risk of overthrowing [the]
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existing form of government.
Though the Government of the day may not have had available to it
particularly sophisticated statistical techniques it did make the effort to
discover the numbers likely to be enfranchised - particularly in the burghs.
Their calculations decided them upon the £10 franchise rather than the (too
democratic) & qualification or the (too exclusive) £20. There is no doubt,
however, that, despite the different effects the new franchise would have in
different parts of the country, (i.e enfranchising more men in some areas than
in others) their eventual choice gave the Government exactly what they
wanted, especially as regards splitting the middle class off from its alliance
with the working class:7
It was not merely a matter of letting the middle class into
the outer defences while still barring them from the citadel
itself. Once given the privileges of voting they were to become
part of the garrison. The Bill was founded on the belief that
when the middle class had been allowed a subordinate share of
power they would side with the aristocracy and help keep the
working class in order.
In this light Reform seems not so much a process of gradual but inevitable
inclusion but one of continually re-defined exclusion. In 1867 the net was
opened yet wider and this led some of the more excited reactionaries to fears
that the aristocracy had committed political suicide and that Parliament was
about to be handed over to the mob. Their terrors and prejudices are well
expressed in a poem by Coventry Padmore:8
In the year of the great crime,
When the false English Nobles and their Jew,
By God demented, slew
The trust they stood twice pledged to keep from
wrong,
But, when the sordid Trader caught
The loose-held sceptre from your hands distraught,
And soon, to the Mechanic vain,
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Sold the proud toy for nought,
Your charm was broke, your task was sped,
Your beauty, with your honour, dead,
However, despite such gothic horrors, the cooler heads who were the
architects of the Act were certain of one thing, democracy was not on the
q
agenda. As Disraeli himself put it:
There are four and a half million inhabited houses in
England. ... Not more than a moiety of these, even if the Bill
passes, will be inhabited by persons qualified to exercise the
franchise. Then if household suffrage be democracy what is
this all about?
The Tories took no little trouble to get statistical forecasts of the likely impact
of the reform proposals and it was known to them that the complexities of
registration alone would disenfranchise many who could expect otherwise to
have the vote.10
The 1867 Act did, nevertheless, increase the industrial electorate markedly. In
Glasgow, the increase was nearly three-fold; at the General Election of 1865
there were 16,819 on the register while, following the Act, the Election of
1868 saw 47,854 voters.11 Despite the fact that Glasgow's representation had
been increased from two to three MPs. it remained the case that, as with the
rest of industrial Britain, the City was still under-represented in Parliament.
The redistribution of seats in 1885 gave Glasgow seven separate seats five of
which were predominantly working class, but the general bias against the
working class remained.12 If, after 1867 there were about sixty seats in which
the working class electorate predominated, after 1885 the number of such
constituencies had only risen to eighty-nine.13 This restriction on seats where
the working class predominated did limit any independent challenge by Labour
forces, as did the constraints of money with which to finance and maintain
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candidates. Moorhouse is right to highlight these points, as he is also correct
to add that working class leaders, nevertheless, did make definite political
choices - the constraints were not all external.14 The fact that working class
leaders were happy to work with the Liberal Party for so long and to have
been able to do so without any significant, sustained pressure from below,
surely indicates more than the careerism of a few trade union leaders. Seen
in this light, the Second Reform Act - as with the middle class in 1832 - can
be regarded as having given the "privileges of entry" to the "citadel" to a
section of the working class who, in their turn, became "part of the garrison".
T. C. Smout has drawn out the distinction between the Painite and
Gladstonian views of the suffrage. In the former a man's right to vote "was
innate, resting on his nature as a human being." For the Whiggish Gladstone,
however, "the right to vote was a moral privilege to be extended to a
respectable class as and when it showed itself capable of acting
responsibly."15 In Britain it was the latter, of course, which triumphed from
1832 on. As the franchise was extended so barriers were deliberately created,
"in the way of those least likely to be respectable and independent in the
working class."16 While this was understandable from a Whig or middle class
Liberal point of view it represented a retreat by working class radicals who, in
following the Liberal Party lead on this matter, abandoned the notion of
"humanity" (a man's a man for a' that) in favour of "respectability". While the
Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 can be regarded as stepping stones on the
road to democracy there was a conspicuous absence of pressure being
exerted by working class Liberal leaders to hurry or continue the process.17
Smout's point about working class Liberals could, however, be as easily
applied to independent labour leaders in the decades after 1885, franchise
reform simply did not register on their list of priorities.
As we saw in the case of Keir Hardie in the mid-1890s, he had something of
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a blindspot as regards the franchise, apparently believing the Charter had
more or less been achieved. Matthew et al see in this evidence of Hardie's
"complete naivety about electoral statistics".18 Yet, it also appears "naive" to
think that Hardie and other Labour leaders were simply ignorant of the
franchise system and of its inbuilt biases against the poor. The major reason
why the leadership of the movement for independent labour representation
could have accepted such an undemocratic system is because they shared
sufficiently in the notions of "citizenship" and "respectability" around which
the reformed system had been created.
As Smout shows, respectability was not simply a piece of false consciousness
foisted upon the working class but was part of the lived experience of the
working population.19 Respectability had many connotations which affected
the whole household and not just the individual male worker. It can be seen
as having been particularly onerous on wives and mothers as they were
forced to 'keep up appearances' through the unremitting toil of housework
and ensuring the physical cleanliness and 'respectability' of the home, children
20
and husband. It was always possible for a labourer and his family to be
respectable but it was undoubtedly easier for a skilled tradesman with his
better pay and more regular earnings to aspire to and achieve the desired
status. While 'respectability' was not necessarily exclusive it was,
nevertheless, defined in relation to something else, to an altogether more
parlous state - that of the poor, the lumpen proletariat, the thriftless, the
slum-dweller. In the 1900s the generic title of the "residuum" became
common currency but if the label was new the phenomenon to which it
referred was not. Similarly, as middle class efforts to draw distinguishing
lines between sections of the working class (deserving and undeserving poor)
were not new, neither was it new for the working class itself to draw
distinctions, and both resounded in pejorative, moralistic terms. As Smout
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points out, the reason why "Respectability was a divisive element within the
working class" was because, "it gave a moral dimension to the craftsman's
feeling that he was a cut above the labourer in more than just his level of
skill." In terms of suffrage reform:21
There is no doubt that most working class radicals and
trade union leaders revelled in their reputation for respectability
in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and they were
not at all averse to the Gladstonian idea that by their manifestly
excellent qualities they had won' the vote.
Even with the advent of independent labour candidates, reliance upon the
Liberal Party and upon Liberalism did not end. As we saw in Chapter Three,
Labour's electoral challenge was limited, both in terms of success and actual
elections contested. Furthermore, within the socialist and independent labour
movement itself, the belief in Liberalism was maintained. Bob Smillie the
Lanarkshire Miners' Leader and one of the most prominent figures in the ILP,
regarded Gladstone as "the greatest of all modern political leaders".22 Liberal,
or perhaps, radical- liberal values were not simply opinions held by significant
individuals but were part and parcel of the "commonsense " of the industrial
working class. As Joan Smith has argued, this commonsense view of the
world encompassed beliefs in Free Trade, democracy, the freedom of small
nations, hostility to landlordism and the House of Lords. 23 Intrinsically
connected to such beliefs were the societies people joined - "the friendly
society branches, the co-operatives, and trade union branches".24 In Glasgow,
socialism and particularly the ILP, had a Liberal inheritance - there was much
that was progressive in the radical- liberal tradition. However, the inheritance
was not made available to everyone and its implications were ambivalent, to
say the least, when applied to the whole of the working class:25
In Glasgow skilled working [men] ... were Liberals by
conviction, but they could also afford to be Liberals.
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It is with this in mind, i.e. the reality of material divisions within the working
class which had ideological and political consequences, that we must
approach the question of Labour and Socialist attitudes to the franchise. To
do so we will firstly look at the position of the poorer working class in
Glasgow, with special reference to the Irish, and then discuss the nature of
the 'respectable' working class, with particular emphasis upon the role of the
Co-operators.
The Poor
Glasgow may well have been dominated by the skilled, male worker -
certainly in comparison to a city such as Liverpool - but this did not include
everyone. There is also the opposite side of the coin to consider, i.e. those
who could not afford to be Liberals, who could not afford to join the Friendly
Society, the Trade Union and the Co-op. James Treble has examined the
2fi
unskilled and casual labour market in Glasgow for this period. A number of
occupations listed in the Census are "identified as being the preserve, or
containing an element of unskilled male labour in the Municipal Burgh of
Glasgow". In 1911 these occupations accounted for 27.16% of the total
occupied male population.27 As Treble points out this is something of an
overestimate because it includes occupations which involved different
gradations of skill but which cannot be disaggregated, and it also includes
youths who would subsequently have gone on to an apprenticeship in a trade.
Nevertheless, this does give some indication of the extent of poverty within
the working class of Glasgow. This is not to say that everyone in such
occupations were poor but, nevertheless, given likely, though irregular, wage
2 ft
rates of between 16s. to 24s. per week:
... it is impossible to dispute that the majority of the
families of unskilled workers must have lived at or below the
poverty line if they solely depended upon the income of the
head of household.
287
The poverty line was usually regarded as 'around a pound a week'. This was
the figure which the Glasgow Presbytery Commission on Housing focussed on
29
in 1890. Two decades later there were still many men earning this amount;
wages of women and young people were even less. Concepts like poverty
and standard of living are not just absolutes but are also relative issues. The
labourer worked beside, and for, the skilled man and the most immediate
reference point for both were the wages of each other. In his polemic against
the labour aristocracy thesis, Moorhouse argues against any notion of the
'aristocrats' taking more than their 'share' of wages, at the expense of the
30
unskilled. While it is true that the wage costs of the workers were borne by
the employers, this ignores the relevant point that skilled men were always
determined to maintain their differential over other grades. This was not
simply a phenomenon of the nineteenth century, but has remained a crucial
factor in Clydeside industrial relations down to the 1970s.31
In Glasgow in 1905, weekly wage rates for male workers varied considerably.
This was the case even amongst skilled workers in the same trade, e.g.
weekly rates, which were recognised by the unions, for cabinetmakers ran
between 29s. 9d. to 42s. 6d. The major gap, however, was that between the
tradesmen and their labourers. In the building trades the rates for skilled men
were between 38s. 3d. and 40s. 4.5d., while the rates for labourers were 23s.
4.5d. to 25s. 6d. In engineering skilled men's rates were between 36s. 1.5d.
and 41s. 9d., while the labourers' rate was a mere 18s. Seven years later most
wage rates had increased, though not all. Amongst the skilled trades in
building, plasterers had actually experienced a fall in the hourly rate from 9.5d
to 9d., while masons remained at 9d. Painters, however, had seen their wages
rise from 9d. per hour to 9.5d., bricklayers, carpenters and joiners had risen
from 9.5d. to 10d., while plumbers had increased their rates most of all from
9d. to lOd. Labourers, though, remained at exactly the same level; 6d. per
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hour for plasterers' labourers and 5.5d. for bricklayers' and mason's labourers.
Translated into weekly rates this meant that the skilled men varied from 38s.
3d. to 42s. 6d., and the labourers stayed at their previous rates of 23s. 4.5d.
and 25s. 6d. It should be remembered that all these rates are based upon a
normal, summer, working week of 51 hours and that earnings in winter would
be considerably less.32 In engineering all the skilled trades experienced rises,
and their weekly rates in 1912 were from 38s. 3d. to 42s. 9d. There was a
general increase for labourers in engineering and their weekly rates ran from
a low of 18s. to a high of 20s. 3d. In overall percentage terms the skilled
workers in engineering benefitted most between 1905 and 1912 with an
increase in wage rates of 8%. Next came labourers in engineering with a rise
of 6%. Tradesmen in building had gone up by 4%, while building labourers
had experienced no increase at all.33
The Board of Trade Enquiry of 1912 gave each wage rate a weighted index
number in comparison with London which was given the base figure 100. The
index numbers for skilled men in building and engineering were 92 and 96
respectively, while for labourers the figures were 81 and 79 respectively.34
This divergence had been getting steadily greater over the previous decades.
In 1886 the difference in hourly rates between a carpenter and a labourer in
Glasgow was 2.75d., while twenty years later the difference was 4.75d.; or,
while in 1886 a labourer's hourly rate was equivalent to 63.33% of a
carpenter's, in 1906 it was equivalent to only 60.53%.35 Whatever the actual
trend of real wages, as distinct from wage rates, and whether or not Glasgow
by 1912 was part of a high wage economy, what is apparent is that the wage
differential between skilled and unskilled was getting wider.36 While no man
was denied access to any civil right simply by dint of the type of work he did,
the financial factor was, nonetheless, crucial. And it would have been those
workers whose wages approximated closer to one pound a week than two
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pounds a week, who would have found it most difficult to organise at work,
to create, or even join mutual aid societies, and to get, and to keep their
names on the electoral register.
The whole question of 'the pooT in Glasgow was complicated by the
existence of a large Irish community. At one level it gave an extra twist to
discussion of the residuum who could be identified not only by individual
failings but also through cultural and racial stereotyping. Though the Irish in
Glasgow were not concentrated in particular 'ghettoes' as in Liverpool, they
were by no means evenly distributed throughout the City. When James
Russell made his four-fold classification of Glasgow for the 1880s the
percentage of Irish-born for the City as a whole was 13% but, for Russell's
four areas, the percentages were, in ascending order: Group 1 - 7%; Group 2
- 12%; Group 3 - 17%; Group 4 - 20%. The number of Irish corresponded to
worsening social conditions. In Russell's own words, the areas that
comprised group four:37
will be at once recognised as the worst districts of
Glasgow, both morally and physically.
The connection of Irish and Catholic with poverty and the slums was well-
established in Glasgow, as shown in the social investigations of 'Shadow' in
1858: "In almost all the other places visited ... the majority ... are Roman
3ft
Catholics." By the turn of the century, the Irish-Catholic population remained
concentrated in the older and industrial parts of Glasgow. In 1901 the
proportion of Irish-born of Glasgow's total population was 8.68%, in the
'inner' city it was 9.11%, while in the post-1891 incorporated areas it was
smaller at 6.71%. The contrast within these areas, however, was much greater.
In the 'older' City the proportions for Woodside and Blythswood districts was
under 6%, while in Anderston and Cowcaddens the proportions were around
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15%. In the 'newer1 city there was an even sharper division between the
suburban districts to the south and west (Langside, Pollokshields, Kelvinside,
Hillhead, &c) where the proportion of Irish-born was only 2.95%, and the
industrial districts to the north (Maryhill, Possilpark and Barnhill) where the
oq
proportion was 11.96%. The racial divide did not just operate between the
middle and working classes but also within the working class itself, between
artisan and labourer.
That the Irish tended to be concentrated in certain occupations we have
already seen.40 Whereas eleven occupations accounted for over 42% of all
Irish-born male workers, these same occupations only employed c. 23% of
the total male workforce. Seven of these occupations also appear in Treble's
list of unskilled jobs and while this unskilled sector' accounted for 27.14% of
Glasgow's workforce in 1911, it was where 43.77% of Irish-born males were
employed.41 It would hardly be overstating the case to argue that certain
occupations - all in the unskilled sector - were, more or less, the preserve of
Irishmen. Irish-born males accounted for, in 1911, almost 20% of all
engineering labourers, almost 27% of all general labourers, over 32% of those
employed in the gas works service, almost 40% of dock labourers and over
47% of builders', masons', and bricklayers's labourers. These figures, of
course, only refer to those actually born in Ireland and do not include first or
subsequent generation Scots-Irish, so the true representation of the Irish
community would have been considerably greater. A particularly clear contrast
with the skilled trades is offered by the figure for Builders, Masons and
Bricklayers, where the Irish-born amounted to just over 8%. Twenty years
previously John Bruce Glasier had pointed out to the Glasgow Presbytery
Commission on the Housing of the Poor that Irish children took much the
same jobs as their parents and that:42
it is very well understood that the large proportion of
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labourers are Irishmen.
Glasier was called as a witness before the Commission as the Secretary of
the Socialist League and also partly due to his familiarity, "with the condition
of the Irish poor", having been Secretary of a branch of the Irish National
League.43 Interestingly, no representative of the Irish and Catholic community
itself gave evidence, though whether this was due to a decision by the
Commission or Catholic hostility to a Protestant affair, is not known. The
questioning of Glasier (as a surrogate Irishman) showed the prejudice held
against the Irish as being responsible for their own poverty. One member of
the Commission in particular, the Rev. Dr. Donald McLoed, made a clear
connection between the Irish and, "drunkenness and self- producing of
poverty". He accepted that, "when the Irish come over here they do not rise
so much as the other races to be craftsmen", but argued that Irish children
enjoyed the same educational advantages as Scots children and that
Highlanders who came to the City as labourers, nevertheless, were able to
44
rise, "into good positions." In countering such bias Glasier had recourse to
some stereotypes of his own:45
I do not believe that it is vice that is against the Irishman,
but rather virtue. The improvidence of the Irish springs rather
from virtues; while the success of Scotsmen is on account of
their canny disposition and desire to make money.
As we have seen in previous chapters anti-Irish feeling existed within the
Labour and Socialist movement. Even Glasier was affected by it, though his
was mainly hostility to Catholicism. When a Protestant evangelist was killed
in 1902, Glasier confided in his diary that he regarded the man as a "martyr"
and that, "I feel honest sympathy with his anti-Romanist crusade".46 However,
the strength of support for Home Rule among socialists and Irish involvement
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in Labour politics in Glasgow meant that relations never deteriorated to the
sectarian level of Liverpool.47
The political role of the Irish and the existence of a sizeable irish electorate
further complicates any analysis of poverty and the franchise. Although we
have already indicated that the Irish community and its electorate was simply
not large enough to bear the explanatory weight placed upon it by some
historians of early Labour politics it, nevertheless, remains the case that there
were Irishmen who had the vote and that they would have been, in the main,
poorer working class. If we are correct in our argument that, prior to 1914,
the Irish provided a significant portion of Labour electoral support in Glasgow,
this begs the question about the source of Labour's support in general. Did
Labour gather most of its votes from the unskilled and poorer sections of the
working class or did it rely upon its 'preferred' constituency of the respectable
artisanate?
The Respectable Working Class
If there was an identifiable group which represented most closely the image
of the respectable working man, it was the Co-operators. Because of the
weakness of Scottish trade unionism the co-operative movement took on a
greater political significance for independent labour politics in Scotland than
in England. The involvement of Co-operative Societies in labour alliances was
more of a recurring phenomenon than a consistently maintained policy but
the Co-operators were, nevertheless, courted assiduously by the ILP. One of
the most prominent of the 'stalwart' councillors, Shaw Maxwell, regarded the
Co-operators as, "the most powerful organised section of the workers of
Glasgow", and calculated them in 1898 as representing 25,000 to 30,000 of the
City's electorate.48 A decade later, and with the Co-operators facing renewed
threats of boycott and considering re-engagement in Labour politics, Maxwell
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estimated their voting strength at 50,000. The Co-operators, as Shaw
Maxwell had to admit, were in the main, "moderate Liberals",50 and there is no
substantive evidence that they provided any firm basis of support for Labour
candidates. Nevertheless, the sheer size of their organisations made them a
force to be reckoned with and a force to be admired and appealed to by
socialists. Like his comrade in the SDF, William Nairne, John Maclean was a
conscientious member of his own Co-op society and took every opportunity
this "great popular movement" permitted to push marxist educational classes
and to appeal to co-operators to take their political place alongside the trade
unionists and socialists.51
Although Co-operative Societies had existed in Scotland from the eighteenth
century, the movement as it is known really began in about I860.52 In earlier
societies weavers had often taken a prominent role and there had been close
links with Chartism in many areas. Weavers continued to play a significant
role into the 1860s but in the modern' period the initiative in establishing
societies was mainly taken by skilled men in trades like building and printing
as well as the emerging engineering and shipbuilding industries. Quite often
a society would be set up by men employed in a single firm. The St George
Society in Glasgow was formed in 1870 by employees of the Grovepark
Weaving Factory, while the Cowlairs Society, established in 1881, was formed
by employees of the North British Railway Company's Hydepark Locomotive
Works.53 Both the Dumbarton and Port Glasgow Societies were established by
artisans from the local shipyards.54 St Rollox in Glasgow, was formed largely
by employees of the St Rollox Chemical Works.55 In the east end Barrowfield
Society most of the original members worked at the Barrowfield Printworks.56
Co-operation was not exclusive to any particular industry and it can be seen
that Societies reflected the structure of local employment. The largest Society
in Scotland, Edinburgh's St. Cuthberts, was built up by men from printing.
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building and cabinetmaking.57 Such concentration, as well as being a source
of strength initially, could create difficulties. The Cowlairs Society faced
problems when the Hydepark Works went on short-time in 1894,58 as did
Kinning Park in 1897 when "hundreds" of its members fell victim to the
engineers lock-out.59 Despite the overlapping membership, the Co-operative
movement had an ambiguous attitude toward union activity, particularly
strikes; Kinning Park was split over a donation to the Amalgamated Society of
Engineers during the lock-out, with some members believing the employers
to be in the right. Speaking in 1873, the then Chairman of the Scottish
Co-operative Wholesale Society, Alexander Meldrum, expressed the
class-consciousness of the Co-operative outlook when he said, "I hold that
the working people should never depend on any rich man to help them." He
then went on to offer some advice to trade unionists, with particular
60
reference to the miners
Instead of hoarding up their money ... and struggling with
the owners of coal pits ... working men who believe themselves
slaves can, by means of co-operation, make themselves free by
becoming their own employers.
This was a co-operative version of the ILP argument that by voting Labour
the workers could avoid strikes, i.e. the progress of the working class need
not entail direct involvement in the class struggle. Co-operative independence
and respectability received its ultimate accolade from the Liberal leader,
Rosebery, when he attended the Co-operative Congress held in Glasgow in
1890 and described the movement as "a State within a State".61 However, as
with the trade unions, citizenship of this "State" was not open to everyone.
The basis of the survival of retail co-operation was the no-credit rule and
this effectively excluded many of the poor who would have to remain, through
necessity, with the private trader.
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The growth of the modern' co-operative movement coincided with the
beginnings of an increase in living standards amongst the working class, in
the late 1880s, as more working people began to share in higher real wages
and even some leisure time, so the previous steady growth of the movement
accelerated. Continued expansion, however, was dependent upon the
continual increase in working class living standards and the depression of
62
1905-08 effectively curtailed the movement's growth. Nevertheless, to be a
member of a Co-operative Society indicated thrift and sobriety - there was
no 'tick' and the Co-op would not trade in liquor. There was, therefore, a
heavy implication that non-members did not join because of personal failings.
The way Co-operators saw it the problem was that of the slum-dwellers. In
his history of the Kinning Park Society published in 1924, Patrick Dollan
wrote:63
Schemes for bringing the benefit of mutual aid within the
reach of the poorest were discussed but did not come to
fruition. The promoters maintained that the poor would only be
won over to Co-operation by selling them the best goods at
the cheapest price. The artisan and technical sections of the
community have always been willing Co-operators, but not so
the poorer folk who are forced to live in congested areas. The
problem of making them practitioners of mutual aid is still
awaiting solution.
By the early 1900s, Kinning Park had become, "the premier retail concern in
the West of Scotland", with its branches covering Kinning Park, Govan and a
large area of Glasgow and new developments southwards towards
Pollokshaws and Cathcart.64 The move south was also a move to a new
customer and member in the lower middle class suburbs of Shawlands and
Govanhill. Dollan refers to these new suburban members as,
'non-industrials' who sometimes escape the minor effects of trade disputes",
e.g. the engineers lock-out of 1897.65 Their influence grew during the 1900s.
As trade depression, "diminished the turnover in artisan areas", and many
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workers emigrated, so it was the influx of new suburban members and their
purchasing power which balanced the Society. 66 In this development of the
Co-operative movement the poorer workers, with their lower earnings,
appeared to have little, or no, role to play.
A basic level of working class self-organisation was reflected in figures for
trade union membership. In 1888 the degree of union organisation for Britain
as a whole was around 10% of adult male manual workers, rising to 25% in
1901 and around 30% by 1910.67 Progress, though, was uneven: there was a
decline after the initial upsurge of "new unionism" during 1889-91, and there
were wide discrepancies in union densities between trades and industries, e.g.
while mining in 1910 had 60% union membership and shipbuilding 46%,
woodworking and clothing had only 12% and 5% respectively. Nevertheless,
the underlying trend was towards greater unionisation (though at an uneven
pace for different workers), and from 1910 a second surge in organisation
occurred alongside major outbreaks of industrial unrest. By 1914 there were
over 4 million trade unionists in Britain - nearly half the adult male workforce
- which made the British labour movement, numerically at least, "the
strongest in the world".68 Though Scotland's level of union membership was
slightly lower than that for the rest of the UK, it shared in the same rate of
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growth, with Glasgow being the traditional centre of strength; in 1892
two-thirds of Scottish trade unionists were in the Glasgow area.70
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Labour, Socialism and the Franchise
This industrial strength, however, did not translate well onto the political field.
The Labour Party, even by 1914, had only a weak presence in Parliament
which was due largely to Liberal sufferance and with few seats it could regard
as "safe" outwith the mining constituencies. In Scotland, without any
understanding with the Liberals, the position was even worse. However, could
it be that this weakness was related to the limitations of the franchise?
Internationally, Britain's democratic credentials did not compare very
favourably with other capitalist societies. As Moorhouse puts it:71
... though Britain was the first country to industrialise, it
was among the last of the industrial nations to grant
unencumbered universal male suffrage.
In fact, of all "representative" governments in 1914, "the United Kingdom and
the Kingdom of Hungary alone did not have manhood suffrage".72 Yet, despite
this, the Labour movement simply did not take the issue of adult or adult
male suffrage as important. Historians cannot look for the traces of a debate
on the issue because - once we accept that motions on adult suffrage were
basically blocking manoeuvres against votes for women - there was simply
no debate to speak of. What was seriously discussed, and largely supported,
was the call for proportional representation.73
Labour's inactivity on the issue must also be seen in the light of counter
examples from abroad. Both Australia and New Zealand, with their particularly
close links with Britain, enjoyed adult suffrage (at least for the whites) and
had a strong labour influence and representation in Government. Even
Bismarkian Germany had introduced an adult male franchise, and the German
SPD was the model of a mass working class party. Swedish social democracy
campaigned vigorously for adult male suffrage, and in Belgium there were
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general strikes called in 1886, 1888, 1891, 1893, 1902 and 1913 in an attempt
to win the suffrage.74 In Britain there was neither adult male suffrage not was
there a sizeable Labour, never mind Socialist, presence in Parliament.
Socialists in Britain proved incapable of shifting the mass of the Labour
movement behind a demand for full democracy. This "failure" is partly
explained by the fact that a considerable section of British social- democracy
was simply uninterested in electoral politics. As we saw in chapter one the
moral reaction against "politics", which were understood to mean electoral
politics, was integral to the early socialist movement and particularly the
Socialist League. It was not only anarchists who opposed
"parliamentarianism" but also respected socialists like William Morris. His
view was that if there was a time for socialists to play the electoral game it
would only be some time in the future when the necessary work of educating
for socialism had taken root. The 'Tory Gold" fiasco of 1885, when the SDF
accepted laundered money to allow it to stand candidates at the General
Election - with derisory results - only seemed to confirm such an analysis.
(See Chapter One.)
It did not take long, however, for members of the SL to argue for an electoral
strategy and the formation of a socialist labour party. This debate split the
League and led directly to its early demise, as the "parliamentarians" were
expelled and control gradually came to rest with the anarchist wing. Ordinary
members in Scotland voted with their feet and became involved in the
fledgling Scottish Labour Party. Despite the fact that Morris in turn left the SL
in reaction to the direction of the anarchists, he did not change his opinion
about socialists standing for election. His attitude towards parliament
remained that of regarding any "hopes" for change to be accomplished
through the House of Commons as akin to "superstitions".75 This so-called
purist line continued to have a resonance for many socialists, even after the
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formation of the Labour Party. It was a view which remained influential even
among members of the HP, who could react against poor election results or
particularly offensive electoral alliances with calls for a return to the twin
basic tasks of education and agitation.76
In Britain most attention to the franchise came from within the Social
Democratic Federation, the other side of social democracy in the 1880s.
Despite the embarrassment of 1885, the SDF never rejected the "political"
road to socialism. In fact it saw the success of electoral politics as a hope
for the peaceful transition to socialism. To this end in 1894 the SDF called for
full adult suffrage:77
And why? Not because we look upon adult suffrage as a
fetish, to fall down and worship; not because we regard even
the fullest measure of political power as an end in itself, but
because we believe that here in England it is possible to effect
the peaceable transformation of society, and that here political
power may be a means to an end."
Despite hints of national chauvinism - the SDF resented the superiority of
many continental social democrats, particularly the Germans - the Federation
did put its finger on the lack of full democratic rights and pointed to foreign
examples of more equitable franchise and electoral systems. It argued that
the franchise system deprived socialists of their proper share of
representation. If the triple demand of, "Universal Adult Suffrage, Payment of
Members and Election Expenses out of Public Funds and Second Ballot", were
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met. Justice estimated that:
... there would be sixty or seventy Socialist members on
the floor of the House of Commons after the next general
election."
Whatever the basis of this calculation might have been - at more or less the
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same time Justice claimed that the SDF would have thirty or forty MPs if the
French electoral system operated in Britain79 - it is not the exact numbers
that are significant, and they were very likely wildly optimistic. What is
significant is that the SDF made the connection between full democracy and
socialist representation. What the SDF did not do, however, was to provide a
lead to a general movement demanding further franchise reform. On its own,
the SDF was too small to sustain such a campaign and its approach was very
much an insular one of using the issue to promote its own organisation. The
demonstration called by the SDF for Trafalgar Square in 1894 was not thrown
open to other forces but was a purely Federation affair, timed to coincide
with its Annual Conference and with the object of showing the national
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strength of the SDF. Not surprisingly, the "meeting" was not a success, even
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with a good turnout of members.
Nevertheless, the SDF did represent the potential of an alternative approach,
one which regarded the whole of the working class as its constituency. David
Howell has questioned the traditional view of the SDF as a, "narrow dogmatic
sect", and points out the local co-operation that often existed between the
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Federation and the ILP. The main item of debate between the parties was
the proposal to fuse into a United Socialist Party. This was a major issue in
the 1890s but was to re-occur, particularly from 1908 with Victor Grayson's
election success.In that year John F. Armour, the organiser of the SDP in
Glasgow, stood in Whitevale Ward on the WEC or "Forward" leet of
candidates. This was the only occasion that the SDP/SDF was so involved,
but they did have successes elsewhere in Scotland with their own
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campaigns. In 1910 John Maclean debated the issue of the Labour Party in
the pages of Forward with Thomas Johnston and called for the ILP to leave
the Labour Party and join with the Social Democratic Party (as it was now
called). Maclean argued that the SDP did work with the trade unions and
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encouraged membership and federation, and had run local candidates with the
help of the unions and co-operative societies. He then made a claim about
ft4
the basis of that electoral support:
It is a significant fact, also, that the larger portion of our
votes comes from those as yet unorganised, showing, no doubt,
a strange phenomenon that men unprepared to unite
economically or politically are still prepared to vote socialists
into power.
Maclean does not appear to have made any direct reference to the extent of
disenfranchisement but the issue remained a live one within his Party. At its
1913 Conference the leadership of (renamed) British Socialist Party (BSP) was
taken to task for having failed to promote a vigorous campaign for universal
suffrage as instructed by the previous conference.85 Significantly, the mover
of the resolution at the BSP conference was not British but a Russian Social
Democrat and veteran of the 1905 Revolution, called Peter Petroff, whose
closest associate within the BSP was none other than John Maclean. At this
point, however, all debate on the franchise was dominated by the suffragette
campaign for votes for women on the same terms as men. Like the Party
leadership, Petroff also opposed this demand but did so out of a genuine
commitment to universal suffrage. Against the legalistic arguments of
Hyndman that the brutal punishments meted out to the suffragettes was fit
and proper punishment for "criminals", Petroff demanded the women be
accorded the status of political prisoners and argued:86
... they [the BSP] should not shut their eyes to what was
going on and they should not be indifferent to the franchise
system in this country, which was one of the most backward in
Europe.
As we have seen the BSP/SDF was well aware of the inequalities of the
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franchise system, but it was also not immune to anti-feminism and in the
suffragette 'period' dragged it feet on the issue rather than attempt to exploit
the opportunity to highlight the true extent of total adult disenfranchisement.
Opposition to women's suffrage within the Labour Party was not confined to
right-wing trade union leaders; it was Harry Quelch, along with Hyndman the
most significant figure in the BSP, who was the mover of the adult suffrage
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amendment at both the TUC and Labour Party Conference.
In the opposite corner from the BSP, was the ILP which did support, as official
party policy, the suffragette demand for, 'votes for women on the same terms
as they are or may be granted to men'. As we saw in Chapter Five the ILP
gave consistent support to the women's suffrage movement, both nationally
and in Glasgow. The ILP took pains to argue that it was simply not true that
only middle class women would be enfranchised and, in a survey of Nelson in
1905, claimed that if the existing parliamentary qualifications for men were
applied to women, nearly all of the women who would be enfranchised would
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be working class. In 1906 Thomas Johnston, like Hardie a committed
supporter of the suffragette campaign, published a pamphlet. The Case for
Women's Suffrage His major argument in support was not based upon any
notion of natural or human rights but upon the American' model of no
taxation without representation. He listed the Three Reform Acts and the
classes enfranchised by each:89
But the women class - the women are still regarded by
the State as in the category of paupers, lunatics, infants and
criminals, they are still taxed and have no right to discuss the
spending of the money so raised. They are not citizens: they
are from the standpoint of the citizenship still slaves.
For Johnston it appeared axiomatic that paupers should have no rights of
representation, presumably because they represented a net drain on the
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exchequer. Johnston was a Fabian as well as an ILPer and the Fabians did
90
have a very 'disciplined' approach to the problem of poverty. Periodic
unemployment amongst the skilled trades could put even respectable working
men on the Parish. As we have seen (Chapter 3) this occurred in Glasgow
during the slump of 1905-1908 and the automatic result of men being
removed from the Register for either claiming parish relief or non-payment of
rates was regarded as having had an adverse effect on the Labour vote. Yet,
this recognition did not encourage any demand by the ILP for franchise
reform and removal of the stigma of pauperism'. At this time Labour in
Glasgow (and elsewhere) was fighting defensively on the grounds of financial
probity and was keen to assure the local electorate that its programme could
reduce the rates.91 Although this was a period of sharp increases in the rates
due to the increased statutory duties being placed on local authorities,
Labour's position cannot be regarded as simply a temporary adjustment to an
qo
increasingly hostile public climate. While being committed to improving
public services, Labour was also committed to a 'ratepayers' franchise. Even
as late as 1948 the Labour Government decided to retain the property
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qualification for local government elections. Such an approach was very
94
different from the views expressed by Peter Petroff:
People who had no voice in making the laws they were
expected to obey were living in a state of slavery.
Johnston's 'monetarist' approach to the franchise appears very unsocialist' in
contrast, yet it was a view widely accepted within the ILP. In terms of
attitude it went further than just the exact number of paupers but referred to
a much wider phenomenon, to "those who did not constitute a class within
the community", to use Martin Pugh's phrase.95 For most labour leaders the
very poorest section of the population were not regarded as part of the
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working class at all, certainly not part of the working class movement. They
constituted a sub-class, or a criminal class inhabiting the fringes of society,
not so much unemployed as unemployable. Writing in 1895 during his first
stint in Westminster as "member for the unemployed", Keir Hardie referred
specifically on the need to discipline the "loafers" or "work-shy" who were
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seen as contaminating the ranks of the genuinely unemployed:
Treat them as you will and, above all, see that it is made
impossible for them to propogate their species."
Such a virulent contempt for a "species" apart owed little to the New
Testament or the Brotherhood of Man. Hardie's strategy was based upon
appealing to the existing (for the most part Liberal) voters. The sub-class
were certainly not part of that constituency the ILP was aiming at.
Furthermore, since a simplified electoral and franchise system, giving every
adult the vote as of right and without any penalising conditions, would have
enfranchised those very people who were an affront to working class
respectability and independence, it becomes more apparent why reform did
not loom high on the HP's political horizons. Hardie expressed the matter
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succinctly enough:
It is the slum vote which the socialist candidate fears
most.
The 'slum voter' was used as a regular excuse for explaining away poor
performances by Socialist and Labour candidates. A municipal defeat in
Bradford brought forth this diatribe on the local population from the defeated
ILP candidate:98
... bitter, intolerant, unsympathetic and insolent, prone to
live on charity rather on the rights of manhood and womanhood
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... not until the death rate, the insanitation and the horrible
mode of life are changed, shall we ever see the South Ward of
Bradford taking an intelligent interest in the things mostly
concerning it.
If the existing working class electorate could not be relied upon to support
labour candidates, it was by no means self-evident that those who were
disenfranchised would be any more likely to. Furthermore, if reform only
served to increase the slum vote there appeared a greater chance that Labour
and progressive candidates generally would be net losers. The Boer War and
the patriotic miasma which engulfed the electorate gave ample evidence of
the triumph of ignorance and the 'slum' element coming into its own. At the
same time it was not only the slum dweller who was susceptible to jingo
QQ
appeals and, as for the ILP, as Howell has commented:
Fear of the masses was not restricted to manifestations of
jingoism. ILP spokesmen also evinced an almost neurotic
anxiety about disorder on the left.
For Labour leaders like Hardie and Johnston, votes for women on the same
terms as men was a more satisfactory outcome. The exclusion of the poorer
working class had always been accepted by labour spokesmen; the Second
Reform Act was based upon it. Appreciation of the subtleties of the
registration system was not confined solely to the political elite. In 1866
George Newton, Secretary of Glasgow Trade Council, wrote:100
I am not aware that any body has proposed
enfranchisement without a residential qualification, with this
proviso no scum would be entitled at any time, they do not live
in any one house long enough to qualify there, so there need
be no anxiety about them.
Newton was writing to Lord Elcho, a renowned reactionary, but whom Newton
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was attempting to involve in pushing trade union reform through parliament
after the failure of Richard Cobbett to get re-elected to the Commons.
Newton consistently followed a policy of moderation and assuaging the fears
of middle class sympathisers and this did leave him isolated at times from
the expressed views of the Trades Council. However, this does not mean that
his views on the "scum" were not genuine nor that he was unrepresentative
of Trade Union opinion. While the Trades Council supported manhood
suffrage, it nevertheless welcomed the 1867 Reform Act. This could be seen
as a further step in the right direction (even if the last "step" had been 35
years previous) but, in its immediate effect, the Act marked a differentiation
within the working class, including some in the political constituency of the
country while reinforcing the exclusion of others.
Apart from disabilities through non payment of rates and claiming poor relief,
it is clear that the main, indeed the all-important exclusion of men from
voting was the residential qualification. As we saw in the previous chapter, it
was effective in that the poorer working class areas of Glasgow had very
much lower levels of enfranchisement than the middle class suburban areas
and distinctly lower than the more recognisably 'artisan' areas. It was not that
labourers did not appear on the electoral register (any cursory glance at the
voters' roll gives evidence of their existence) but that they were less likely to
get, and stay, on the register. This was because the poorer members of the
working population tended to take shorter lets and to move house more
often. Nevertheless, anyone who moved house ran the risk of having their
name removed from the register and this could include around 30% of
electors in working class constituencies.101 As we saw in the case of
delegates to Glasgow Trades Council, there was a wide discrepancy between
the number of delegates appearing on the voters' roll in any one year and the
102
number appearing in subsequent years. Through record linkage we can see
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this process occur at an individual level, in the case of an ILP branch
secretary. In 1900 George Seagars was the secretary of the Bridgeton Branch
of the ILP and was on the electoral register for that year (i.e. 1899/1900). The
following year he had changed his address and his name no longer appeared
on the register (i.e 1900/1901) at either his old or new address, despite the
fact that he remained within the same ward and division, which should have
made it easier for him to retain his vote. However, the next year again
(1901/1902) Seagars' name re-appeared on the register for his 'new'
address.103
What the experience of Glasgow Trades Council shows is the general
tendency of the residential qualification to depress the number of working
class electors. What the individual example of George Seagars shows (as well
as confirming that tendency) was that such disqualification could be corrected
by individual effort, especially on the part of the skilled working man -
Seagars was an ironmoulder. So long as this was the case it was likely to
deflect any general demand for reform of the system. Through the sex and
property conditions attached to the suffrage we can say that the nature of the
franchise system was geared towards the model of being an adult man. The
most common qualification for the vote was that of householder and most
householders were, typically, married men with families of their own. The
limited involvement of women in the system only highlighted its masculine
bias, since women were only permitted the vote it they were single or
widowed, i.e. in the absence of a controlling male. The vote allowed a man to
'speak' not only for himself but also his wife and children. Being on the
electoral register was, therefore, a sign of maturity and respectability.
Because the vote was not available to everyone it was a public symbol that
here was a man who had his own home, paid his rates, was independent of
poor relief and was thus, by virtue of his own effort and worth, part of the
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political constituency of the countn/.
In contrast there were those who did not qualify for the vote, or were not
deemed 'worthy' of it: those who did not have their own home, did not pay
their rates, and/or were 'on the parish'. In other words, the poor. Public
discussion of poverty and the poor always made the distinction between the
'deserving' and 'undeserving'. In Glasgow, both the Presbytery Commission
on the Housing of the Poor of 1890 and the Municipal Commission of 1903-4
made a three-fold distinction, which was, broadly:104
1st. Decent, well doing people, kept down by poverty, but
who would gladly be clear of their sordid surroundings, and of
their bad neighbours. 2nd. Weak, shiftless, thriftless persons,
many of whom have fallen into intemperance. 3rd. A certain
proportion living in or on the borderland or crime.
The housing proposals of the Corporation were aimed primarily at the first
group, with a further distinction drawn within group two, and the last totally
excluded. This was a division which the Labour politicians appear to have
generally agreed with - John Wheatley's iB Cottages scheme just as
definitely excluded the "slum dwellers". (See Chapter Three.) Yet, what
proportion of the population did the 'dissolute and criminal classes' represent?
Booth and Rowntree's investigations attempted to come to terms with poverty
as a social phenomenon, and Rowntree's estimation that 27% of the
population of York lived in primary or secondary poverty may be taken as a
general indicator of a national pattern.105 As a proportion of the population
the 'dissolute and criminal' would have been much less than this.
While we cannot fix upon a figure, either nationally or for Glasgow, we can
point out the discrepancy between the likely proportion and the proportion of
adult working class men without the vote. As we have seen in the previous
chapter, the overall level of male enfranchisement in Glasgow was just under
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54% and, with the massive differences between rich and poor areas, the
working class level of enfranchisement would have been significantly lower.
Nevertheless, the political leadership of Labour - just like the working class
leaders of Liberalism before them - made no effort to reform the system. The
only point at which any effort was made was in using the registration courts,
mainly to get lodgers onto the voters' roll. It was even claimed that this put,
"adult suffrage within reach - barring married women."106 This, however,
remained an essentially individual response, taking a single person s case at a
time. Moreover, the lodger franchise was essentially a middle class vote
since, "very few working class bachelors would have had a room to
themselves."107 The lodger vote did increase in significance during this period;
in 1901 lodgers accounted for 6.32% of Glasgow's parliamentary electorate,
1 08
while in 1911 this figure had risen to 14.70%. More significantly, however,
is the fact that the general level of enfranchisement had not risen but
i nq
remained at the same level of between 53-54%. What prevented any
further steps on the road to democracy was the extent to which the franchise
would have to have been granted. It would have been almost impossible to
make any further alteration in the system that would have not have been
based on universal or, at least adult male suffrage. None of the political
parties, including Labour, were prepared as yet to take that final step. Labour's
inactivity over franchise reform can only be explained through an attitude that
did not regard the poor as part of the labour movement and which regarded
the 'slum dweller' with a mixture of superiority and fear.
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Conclusion and Epilogue:
Labour, War and the Mass Electorate
The object of this study has been to detail the political challenge of the
Labour and Socialist Movement in Glasgow prior to the First World War.
Attention has been focussed more or less exclusively upon electoral politics
since this is where Labour and Socialism - most succinctly represented by
the ILP - placed their efforts and their hopes. Both the achievement of
particular reforms and the ultimate goal of socialism itself, were regarded as
being realised only through the ballot box. The main effort was conducted at
the local level and, each year, the ILP - independently or in alliance with other
Labour' or Democratic' forces - stood candidates for Glasgow Town Council.
This electoral challenge was hampered by external restraints' - lack of
finance, limitations of organisation, problems of working class candidates
finding the time to attend Council meetings, etc.1 Hardly surprisingly, Labour's
impact was a limited one: at no election did Labour ever contest a majority of
the Municipal Wards, and at no time did Labour representation amount to
even one fifth of the total elected membership of the Council. There was,
however, a further and more crucial restriction upon Labour, which has been
the second major theme of this study: the nature of the franchise system and
the electorate it created. Given the disenfranchisement of women (wholly
from the parliamentary franchise and mostly from the municipal) and poorer
working class men, which meant that only between a quarter and a third of
the adult population had the vote, and that Labour attached no priority to any
further reform of the suffrage, the whole nature of Labour's electoral
challenge, and its ambition, is called into question.
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It has been our contention throughout that the electoral hopes of Labour were
crucially limited by the restrictions of the existing franchise system. In order
to 'test' this hypotheses we shall examine the political configuration of
Glasgow in the years immediately after 1918 and the passing of the Fourth
Reform Act. In order to remain true to the actual course of historical events
we shall also have recourse to discuss the impact of the First War upon
Clydeside. Before embarking upon this epilogue, which is intended to be read
as an integral part of the conclusion, it is necessary to reflect upon the
findings of the substantive basis of the study.
The 'modern' socialist movement emerged in the 1880s and can be seen as
having developed out of the 'land' movement and radical dissatisfaction with
'official' Liberalism. As Socialism became more defined in ideas (it was
resolutely marxist and revolutionary), and organisation (marked by the
transition of the Democratic Federation into the Social Democratic Federation),
it grew outwards from London and established itself in various parts of
Britain. In Scotland, Edinburgh took the initiative ahead of Glasgow though,
in time, it was the latter City which, "proved the most active centre of
Socialist agitation in the Kingdom."2 At this precise moment, however, the
SDF split and the breakaway Socialist League was born. Although there were
important differences of opinion within the London leadership these were not
discussed by the general membership. In Scotland, mainly due to the
influence of the Austrian exile, Andreas Scheu, the SL gained an early
advantage over the SDF.
The major problem common to both organisations was that of political
'agency', i.e. what to do beyond the effort of propaganda and 'making
socialists".3 All Socialists were ambivalent, if not outrightly hostile, to
'polities', by which was meant electoral politics. Their emphasis was upon the
social rather than the political, a position based upon their critique of the
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social consequences of capitalism and a realisation that a democratic
constitution was no guarantor of equality or justice. The SL expressed this
anti-parliamentarian bias at its most extreme and refused to countenance any
electoral activity or campaigns for specific reforms on the grounds that the
'dreaded palliatives' would only make the workers more willing to support the
existing capitalist order. This non-involvement, however, created a great deal
of tension among the League's membership, and eventually it collapsed.
The SDF did recognise the need for political work rather than simply waiting
on a cataclysmic upheaval and it remained an active force. It would not,
however, compromise over the demand for 'the socialisation of the means of
production, distribution and exchange', and its actual electoral impact
remained negligible. It was the Independent Labour Party which proved most
able to work with and through the existing forces of the working class and it
was largely through its efforts that a distinct labour electoral presence was
formed in this period.
The movement for independent labour representation took concrete shape
earlier in Scotland than in England, through the formation of the Scottish
Labour Party in 1888. The SLP was an expression of the political development
of Scottish Labour, but was also an indicator of the general weakness of the
Scottish Labour movement. This was most clearly shown by the uncertain
organisation of the Scottish miners, from among whose leaders - most
notably Keir Hardie - the motivation to challenge the Liberal Party arose.
Although a purely Scottish body and supportive of Home Rule, the SLP did not
advocate a separatist path. While more aware of distinctly Scottish concerns
than the Scottish Land 8< Labour League, the SLP did not offer any peculiarly
Scottish perspective on Labour politics. The significance of the SLP lies in its
providing the first step - no matter how uncertain or faltering - in the
organised expression of the movement for independent labour representation.
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That effort was conducted at both the Parliamentary and Municipal level, with
limited success. The latter area is the more interesting since the annual
elections to the Town Council permit us to detail more accurately Labour's
electoral and organisational development. The SLP/ILP was successful in
gaining influence over the Glasgow Trades Council which took the lead in
establishing the Workers' Election Committee in 1896, in order to promote
Labour representation on Glasgow Town Council. The WEC also involved the
Co-operative movement and Irish Nationalist organisations who, along with
the ILP (the socialist element) and the Trades Council, represented the
'combined forces of the democracy'.
This alliance was successful in getting Councillors elected - known
collectively as the Stalwarts - and establishing a distinct Labour element in
the Town Council. However, the coalition did not remain united for long and
one by one the constituent parts broke away, leaving the ILP as the sole
representative of 'Labour'. Although continuing to contest seats, the ILP was
unable to prevent Labour representation plummetting by the mid-1900s. Out
of this predicament the Glasgow Labour Party was formed which was able to
reactivate the alliance of forces behind the original WEC, although minus the
Irish. The Labour Party was more of a controlling body than the WEC had
been, and Labour representation did increase in the years prior to 1914.
Of all the forces involved in the WEC and Labour Party it was the ILP which
was the most important, since only it remained committed to continuously
working for independent labour representation. ILP membership was not
evenly spread throughout Glasgow, and its fortunes did vary in terms both of
members and branches. Nevertheless, an organised presence was maintained
in all the City's Parliamentary Divisions throughout the period, and every
November at least some candidates would be run at the municipal polls. The
membership of the ILP - as indicated by the occupations of Branch
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Secretaries - was broadly representative of the major occupational structure
of Glasgow: mainly skilled men (for the most part in engineering) and white
collar, clerical grades. Although the actual membership likely had a wider
social base than this, the occupations of the branch secretaries does indicate
a lack of involvement by women and unskilled male workers.
Labour representation was largely dependent upon the ILP identifying other
working class or democratic' elements with electoral campaigns. Indeed the
Stalwarts tended to follow the lead of the veteran Irish Nationalist and
radical-liberal, John Ferguson. The municipal poll of 1896 presented Labour
with a fortuitous set of circumstances which it proved capable of grasping
but, for socialists, there was a debate over the merits of working with
non-socialists and whether or not there was any value in returning Town
Councillors. This discussion echoed an earlier debate within the Glasgow SL
over concentration purely on propoganda, or playing an active, if not leading
role, in partial struggles by the working class. In 1896 the majority opinion
within the ILP was clearly for a broad alliance of forces to secure labour
representation. After 1900, in the face of a growing reaction against public
provision and rising rates, the ILP proved incapable of maintaining this
alliance, but its commitment to the principle of such a strategy remained.
Despite the fluctuating trends in the Labour coalition the issues pursued by
Labour/ILP candidates remained largely the same: improved wages and
conditions, and extended provision of publicly-controlled services. It was an
approach which emphasised the power of the local state and became
generally regarded as municipal socialism. Although specific elements of the
Labour 'programme' changed over time - most significantly the taxation of
land values was dropped as the basis of the financial underpinning of reforms
- it terms of general priorities there was little difference between Labour's
position by 1914 and the programmes developed by John Ferguson in the
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early 1890s. A constant concern had been housing, with the accent gradually
changing from control over rents to an emphasis on the actual building of
good quality houses. Popularised by John Wheatley, Labour's campaign over
housing was the single most important policy behind its increased
representation on the Town Council in the years immediately before the War.
Nevertheless, although by 1914 there were more Labour Councillors than ever
before, Labour remained a small minority in the Town Council and, with only a
limited electoral challenge (as at the Parliamentary level), could not have
hoped to form a majority.
This recognition of Labour's permanent minority position leads us to consider
more closely the existing political constituency and those excluded from it.
The role of the Irish in relation to Labour and Socialist politics has been
detailed at some length, an attention due to the great explanatory weight
placed upon the electoral allegiances of the Irish. Our findings reinforce the
view of the Irish as providing an element of support for Labour in Scotland,
rather than as acting as a divisive force with a crippling effect upon Labour
until after the resolution of the Home Rule question.
The Irish Nationalists in Glasgow offered only conditional support to Labour.
Nevertheless, aware of the working class complexion of their community and
aware that they were not strong enough to secure representation on their
own, there was a clear tendency for the Irish vote to be cast in support of
Labour candidates. Under the WEC the Irish were an integral part of the
democratic alliance behind Labour. The denial of constituent rights for the
Irish within the Labour Party was resented, but this did not negate the fact
that Irish workers were continuing to vote Labour. Furthermore, the
prominent positions taken by men such as John Wheatley indicated a more
general involvement of the Irish within the Labour and Socialist movement.
The perceived unity of the Irish vote has been seen as crucial to Irish political
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influence, but not only is the unity of this vote questioned but so also is its
actual strength. Overwhelmingly of the poorer working class, the Irish would
have suffered disproportionately from disenfranchisement and, this being so,
the Irish vote could not have had the determining influence so often
attributed to it in the pre-1918 period.
The most notable exclusion from the suffrage was that of women - total in
the case of the Parliamentary franchise, and extremely limited as regards the
Municipal vote. Their role in the Labour and Socialist movement was
extremely constrained as regards both actual participation and in the
expectations of the part to be played by women. This was not a static
situation, however, and women did make significant advances throughout the
period under discussion. The women's suffrage movement in Glasgow
enjoyed close links to the ILP which, of all the Socialist and Labour
organisations, had the most supportive policy on votes for women and did
most to encourage direct female activity alongside men. At the same time
the suffrage movement did not involve working class women and did not
become a 'test' question for Labour generally. Beyond the formal
commitment to sex-equality lay male attitudes on women's inferiority and on
an arrangement of domestic life that demanded that the wife and mother
remain at home to provide 'comfort' to the male breadwinner. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the domestic concerns of working class housewives
did not rank highly among Labour's priorities, but there were indicators -
particularly over housing - that such concerns could become live political
issues.
While the exclusion of women from the vote on the grounds of gender is
ciearly understood, it is also the case that large proportion of the adult male
population was also disenfranchised. Given this, it was necessary to examine
Glasgow's electorate in some detail. Wide variations in enfranchisement rates
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were seen to operate between different parts of the City, both among the
Parliamentary Divisions and, even more clearly, between the smaller Municipal
Wards. Using indicators of Housing and Health conditions at the Ward level
correlations were made between social class and levels of enfranchisement,
showing that the franchise system operated against the working class areas
as compared with middle class areas, and also against the poorer working
class areas in relation to the better-off, or artisan, areas. The differential
within the working class was further shown through the enfranchisement
levels of delegates to the Glasgow Trades Council, where it was seen that
skilled men were more likely to be on the Electoral Register than unskilled or
even semi-skilled workers.
Labour's position on the franchise was apparently contradictory - on the one
hand it viewed the suffrage as no longer an issue, as though full democracy
had already been achieved while, on the other hand, through its support for
adult suffrage it recognised not only that women were disenfranchised but so
also were many men. Our explanation of this position has emphasised the
reality of divisions within the working class itself and how these divisions
'fitted into' the reformed franchise system as constructed by the Acts of 1832,
1867 and 1884/5 which, through all its modifications remained based upon a
property-related concept of citizenship.
Apart from the SDF, no Labour or Socialist body proved willing to mount a
serious campaign for full adult suffrage. Partly this was due to a genuine
belief that constitutional politics were of little or no value to the working
class, and that social issues were really what mattered. However, it remains
the case that Labour accepted the divisions within the working class between
skilled and unskilled and between 'respectable' and 'residuum' - and the basis
of the British franchise system. As such Labour made its appeal largely to
the organised working class, while remaining suspicious about the political
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behaviour of the poorer working class. So long as this attitude remained
Labour would never demand a complete reform of the suffrage. Yet, as in the
case of the Irish, the poor generally, and of women, there were clear signs
that these 'constituencies' provided a latent reservoir of support for Labour.
Labour's position by 1914 is thrown into sharper relief when contrasted with
its political situation in the immediate post-war period, i.e. after the creation
of a, more or less, democratic electorate.4 However, the passage of the Fourth
Reform Act took place under exceptional circumstances which are impossible
to ignore and it is, therefore, also necessary to discuss the radicalising effects
which the First World War had upon the working ciass of Glasgow.
There now exists a substantial and growing literature on "Glasgow
Socialism".5 The most commented-upon work, and that around which most
debate revolves, is I S. Mclean's, The Legend of Red Clydeside6 This
demolition job on the "myth' of the Red Clyde denies the significance of the
revolutionary left in Glasgow and, more generally, the war-time struggles
which gave birth to the "legend" of an intensely class-conscious City and a
near-insurrectionary moment. The myth of a 'missing' revolution, however,
was hardly a very robust one, based largely upon biography, if not
hagiography.7 Other writers, particularly Joseph Melling and Joan Smith,8
accept the displacement the revolutionary left but still emphasise the
importance of political consciousness and organisation. In this perspective it
is the ILP which has moved centre-stage, as the largest and most influential
of all the Socialist parties, and the creator of the Labour Party 'on the ground'
in Glasgow.
The de-bunking of the myth has been taken furthest by Christopher Harvie.
But to say, as he has done, "Forget Red Clydeside",10 is tantamount to
creating a new orthodoxy, or myth about Glasgow which denies it any
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radicalism and even regards it as, more or less, a—political. The most recent
study of Scottish political and electoral history has clearly shown that the
most significant development in post-WWI Scotland was the size and stability
of the Labour vote by 1924 in the Central Belt.11 And the jewel in Scottish
Labour's crown was Glasgow, where the Party won 10 of the City's 15
Parliamentary seats in the General Election of 1922.
Labour and the Mass Electorate 1918-1924
The 1922 Election stands as, perhaps, the greatest single landmark in
Glasgow's electoral history; from having only one of the City's M.Ps. Labour
suddenly held two-thirds of Glasgow's parliamentary representation. The
results of this election and the phenomenal scenes of celebration as the
successful candidates boarded their special train for London and Westminster
are just as much part of the legend of Red Clydeside as the Rent Strikes or
the 40 Hours Strike.12 That the M.Ps. did not live up to the ambitious claims
they made on their departure does not deny the significance of the moment
itself. At the same time the result of the election can be seen as somewhat
fortuitous, an over-estimation of Labour's actual level of support permitted by
the first-path-the-post electoral system. Labour's share of the poll, in the 12
seats contested by it, was a little over 50%, a level it remained at, more or
less, in 1923 when it retained ten seats.13 In the General Election of 1924,
however, although Labour's share of the vote declined only slightly, it lost two
seats, so that the representation of Glasgow was then a more equitable 8
seats for Labour and 7 for the Conservatives. In the elections of 1922 and
1923 Labour had benefitted from a series of split votes between
Conservatives and Liberals. In 1924 this no longer operated and Labour had
to stand in straight fights against Conservative and Liberal candidates. The
two seats lost by Labour in 1924, Maryhill and Partick, had previously had
anti-Labour majorities if the Conservative and Liberal votes were combined.
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What 1922 represents is the Labour Party emerging as a major political Party
in its own right, subsequently confirmed by the elections of the following two
years. Table 1 illustrates this point by showing Labour's performance in
Glasgow at the General Elections of 1918 to 1924.































NOTE: In 1918 two independent labour and one British Socialist Party candidate are counted as
Labour. In 1923 one Communist Party candidate is counted as Labour. In none of these cases
did an official' Labour Party candidate stand.
In terms of its percentage share of the vote Labour's performance in the three
elections of 1922, '23 and '24 was very consistent. Once the fewer candidates
in 1922 are taken into account, then Labour's total vote and average vote also
show little variation. It seems safe to assume that the basic level of electoral
support for Labour was solid. What stands out from this pattern and is in
need of some explanation is the Election of 1918. For I.S. McLean, Labour's
poor performance in the General Election of 1918 is of fundamental
importance in disproving the militancy of "Red Clydeside":14
The 1918 election result is the greatest obstacle in the
way of those who over-emphasise the continuity between
wartime and post-war radicalism.
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For Mclean, it is the discontinuity pre and post-1918 which is significant and
he attempts to locate the growth of the Labour vote almost exclusively in the
years after 1918. The main reasons he adduces to have been the cause of
Labour's development were housing and the Irish.15 The main objection to this
approach is that it signally fails to see the wood for the trees. If Labour in
Glasgow thought it could win five seats (though regarding only two as
definite) this ought to be regarded in relation to Labour's position immediately
prior to the war when, in the whole of Scotland, Labour had only three MPs.
Had there been a General Election in 1914 it is extremely unlikely that this
representation would have been added to or that any further breakthroughs
would have been made in Glasgow or the Clydeside area.16 In the General
Election of December 1910 Labour stood two candidates in the Glasgow area
who polled 5,701 votes between them. In 1918 there were 14 candidates who
can be regarded as 'Labour' who polled almost 90,000 votes and averaged
over 6,000 votes. Although only one Labour MP was actually returned on
each occasion, in terms of ambition Labour was operating on two completely
different levels.
Moreover, the smallness of the Labour vote in 1918 relative to 1922 and
thereafter, can be explained by other reasons which are, in fact, supplied by
Mclean himself. The 'national' appeal of Lloyd-George and the Coalition for
having 'won the war' would likely have produced a swing in their favour.
More fundamentally, however, was the nature of the electorate itself in 1918.
Mclean points out that since 1910, "the electorate had changed immensely;
perhaps three out of every four voters were new",17 though he makes nothing
of this in terms of analysing The Growth of the Labour Vote." Apart from
normal demographic developments there was the new reality of a mass,
democratic electorate; simply put, the 1918 General Election was the largest
(in terms of voters) and the most representative (in terms of class and
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gender) that had ever been held in British history. As such is hardly surprising
that Labour's vote should have risen so much. What was apparently surprising
was that it did not increase by even more.
The intended enfranchisements of the Fourth Reform Act, however, did not
come into effect immediately or completely. There were insufficient
arrangements made for allowing servicemen to vote, and many servicemen
and other non-householders lost' their votes due to the inadequate
preparation of the electoral register.18 In consequence the actual poll in 1918
was comparatively low: a turnout of 56.79% in that year, followed by 76.31%,
68.73%, and 77.25% in 1922, '23 and '24 respectively. Glasgow's first register
of voters under the Representation of the People Act included over one
hundred thousand men who were on naval or military service, one fifth of the
total electorate.19 It has always been regarded that these 'missing' voters,
particularly the soldiers and sailors, would have been more likely to have
voted Labour than any other Party. Forward estimated that only a quarter of
the "soldier electorate" actually voted, but that of those who did the majority
supported Labour. Only in Hillhead, "a district from which the officer class
would be drawn", was there a large soldiers' poll. There is no way that such a
claim can be definitively proved but it can at least be examined more closely.
Table 2 divides all the votes cast in the elections of 1918-1924 into a basic
Left/Right categorisation. On the 'Left' are all the Labour candidates plus
independent labour, independent socialist, communist. On the 'Right' are all
Conservatives, Liberals, independents, and various Coalition candidates.
330









% OF % OF TOTAL






AVERAGE % OF % OF





NOTE: Only those seats in which there was an identifiable Left/Right contest are included: this
means 14 in 1918, 12 in 1922. and 15 in both 1923 and 1924
Table 2 allows us to grasp the essential dichotomy of post-war Glasgow
politics, which was essentially that between Conservative and Labour.21
Combining all 'left' votes together does not add much to the total Labour
vote, but the addition of Liberal votes does add considerably to the
Conservative total. Up to 1924 it is clear that Labour benefitted from a split
'property' vote, but in that year all of the contests were two-headed, with
Labour v. Conservative in 13 seats and Labour v. Liberal in 2. The most
interesting feature of this table is the lack of variation in the Right vote
between 1918 and 1924; the fall of c. 45,000 votes from 1918 to 1922 would
largely be accounted for by the fewer contests in the latter year. While the
Right share of the vote fell by around 20% from 1918 to 1922 - and the Left
vote increased by the same percentage - the Right vote, expressed as a
proportion of the electorate did not vary but remained almost exactly the
same at 37%. It would appear to be a fair assumption to make, that the Left,
or the Labour Party, did not benefit from a shift in the electorate between
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these two dates, but received an almost completely new source of votes. If
the 1918 election had been fought on a turnout similar to that in 1922 (i.e.
76.31% overall) this would have given a total vote of 376,454 or, 96,293 votes
more than were actually cast. This figure corresponds closely to the 81,811
'extra' votes Labour received in 1922 (though spread over two fewer seats). If
these 96,293 fictitious votes are added to the Labour total in 1918, this gives
an average Labour poll of 12,901, which is close to the 1922 Labour average
of 13,886, and exceptionally close to the 1924 average (for 15 seats) of 13,160.
(1923 is not such a good year for comparison because of the lower turnout
than 1922 and 1924.) Hutchison has commented upon Labour's performance
in the 1922, '23 and '24 General Elections that, "the remarkable feature is the
stability of Labour's vote despite the shifting weight given to different issues
in different places."22 If we are correct in our analysis of the 1918 General
Election, i.e. in terms of the electorate, then Labour's vote can be taken as
read from 1918. This suggests that Mclean's view of a major development in
support for Labour after 1918 is essentially misplaced.
The results of the Municipal elections in post-war Glasgow also tend to
contradict Mclean's argument. As a consequence of the extension of the City
in 1912 there was an eventual re-drawing of the ward boundaries and all
three seats in the total 37 wards fell for re-election in 1920. This presented
Labour with a similar opportunity to 1896 - the last Municipal 'general'
election - when the Workers' Election Committee (WMC) succeeded in
forming a Labour presence on the Town Council. The first post-war elections
actually occurred in 1919, although given that the successful candidates
would only have one year on the council before re-election, rather than the
normal three-year term, they were not so keenly fought as usual. Just as the
ILP had taken advantage of the same situation back in 1895 and had managed
to return two members, so 1919 was a particularly successful year for Labour.
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There were ten contested wards and Labour candidates stood in them all,
winning eight; three sitting councillors were returned and five new seats won.
In addition four sitting members were returned unopposed.23 This meant that
the Labour group had reached an all-time high of 24, but in the following year
Labour representation took a quantum leap forward when 44 seats (out of a
total of 111) were won. Although this still meant that Labour was a minority,
and remained so until the 1930s, it also meant that Labour in Glasgow could
seriously consider the possibility of forming an administration. Furthermore,
this success was achieved on a more restricted franchise than that which
operated at the Parliamentary level. In the electoral register drawn up at the
end of 1918 there were 77,697 fewer municipal voters than there were
parliamentary.24
It is extremely difficult to make any direct comparison between Labour's
electoral performances pre and post-1918. This is partly because of the
change in the franchise and subsequent rise in the electorate but also
because, prior to 1914, Labour actually stood in such few seats. However, at
the Municipal level Labour did mount an annual challenge and did enjoy some
success in returning candidates and, despite the extensions and re- divisions
of boundaries, this does provide a basic point of continuity. Table 3 attempts
to permit a rough comparison on the basis of Labour representation in 1920,
1914 and 1896/7. The first column refers to the results of the Municipal
Election of 1920 when the three seats in every ward were contested, column
two shows Labour representation up to and including the Election of
November 1914, and the final column shows Labour successes in the
Elections of 1896 and 1897. In 1896/7 there were only 25 Wards, by 1914
there were 37 and, although there was no further increase, there was a
re-definition of boundaries and the replacement of some old' wards by new
ones in 1920.25 Nevertheless, given that the wards are grouped roughly by
 
334
TABLE 3: LABOUR REPRESENTATION IN GLASGOW WARDS 1920. 1914, 1896/7
Wards No. Of Labour Councillors
1920 1914 1896/
1. Shettleston &
Tollcross *** k k -
2. Parkhead * * * - -
3. Dalmarnock ** * ** k
4. Calton * 0 k k
5. Mile End ★ * * ** k k
6. Whitevale 0 0 0
7. Dennistoun 0 0 0
8. Provan * - -
9. Cowlairs ** * * *
10. Springburn ** * * *
11. Townhead * * ** *
12. Exchange 0 0 0
13. Blythswood 0 0 0
14. Anderston * * 0
15. Sandyford 0 0 0
16. Park 0 0 0
17. Cowcaddens 0 0 0
18. Woodside ** * * 0
19. Ruchill * * - -
20. North Kelvin 0 - -
21. Maryhill * * 0 0
22. Kelvinside 0 0 0
23. Partick West 0 0 -
24. Partick East 0 0 -
25. Whiteinch 0 0 -
26. Hutchesontown ■kit k * k * *
27. Gorbals ** * 0 0
28. Kingston * * 0 0
29. Kinning Park 0 * -
30. Govan ** * ** -
31. Fairfield kk k * * -
32. Pollokshields 0 0 0
33. Camphill 0 - -
34. Pollokshaws 0 0 0
35. Govanhill 0 0 0
36. Langside 0 0 0
37. Cathcart 0 0 0
TOTAL 44 19 10
( 40%) (17%) (13%
NOTE: Each represents one Labour Councillor; indicates that the Ward, or an equivalent,
did not then exist; figures in parentheses give Labour representation as a proportion of the total
Town Council membership.
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There are two significant points that emerge from Table 3. One is that
Labour representation had moved onto a new level post-1918 - to a point
where it held 40% of the seats on the Corporation - which had simply proved
beyond it before the war. The second is that the pattern of Labour
representation remained largely the same. Broadly speaking, Labour tended to
be successful in areas in 1920 where it had previously enjoyed some success
beforehand: thus the East End Wards (1-6), the Northern Wards (8-11, plus
19), South-Side (26-29) and Govan (30-31). At the same time, where Labour
had previously drawn a blank it continued to do so: in middle class wards like
Dennistoun (7) and Park (16), the business centre (12 and 13), the West End of
Kelvinside and Partick (22-25), and the suburbs to the South (32-37).
Overall it remains the case that politics in Glasgow were transformed
between 1914 and 1918. The straightforward or, classic, explanation of this
transformation points to the social and political dislocations of the First World
War leading to an increase in the role of the State in the economy and a
rapidly developing and more assertive Labour movement.26 In direct political
terms Labour replaced the Liberals as the main opposition to the
Conservatives, as party politics took on the parameters of a two-way division
that reflected the division between Capital and Labour. However, the actual
impact of the War has been seriously questioned.
The Effects of the First World War
Just as lain Mclean discounts the impetus of war-time militancy as being
responsible for the subsequent rise of the Labour Party, so Matthew et al also
downplay the significance of the War in the process by which Labour
'replaced' the Liberal Party. They find that the claims of the "war argument"
are unproven and conclude that, "the events of the war were only subordinate
factors in this change."27 The importance of their contribution is that it
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focusses attention specifically upon the franchise and the electorate, rather
than taking the 1918 Reform Act for granted or simply giving a cursory nod in
2 Q
its direction. And as such we agree with their statement:
We cannot say how many votes the introduction of
universal franchise was worth to Labour, but we can say that it
was a critical element in the emergence of the party as a major
political force.
Nevertheless, can it be said that the Reform Act, on its own explains the rise
of the Labour Party? Despite some caveats, this is basically the view put
forward by Matthew et al. When they say that the Labour and Conservative
Parties were better able to, "exploit a fully democratic franchise", they also
state that this would have operated equally prior to 1914 as it did
post-1918.29 At the same time they add the rider that, "to ignore
30
chronological developments would be absurd", but, it needs to be asked,
can the passing of the Fourth Reform Act be separated from the War itself?
The enormous movement of both civilians and soldiers quickly made existing
electoral registers redundant and made the preparation of new registers
almost impossible. The necessary period of residence for qualification
became a nonsense during war-time but, since this had been the major
obstacle to the poorer working class from registering, any shortening of the
period of residence became tantamount to a major suffrage reform.
Moreover, given the 'national' effort behind the War, mobilising all classes and
sections of the community, including women, who then could be denied the
vote, a basic mark of citizenship? Speculations on a special soldiers franchise
were popular amongst Conservatives but foundered on the awkward likelihood
of giving large numbers of men a temporary vote which would then at some
point be taken away from them. It may have been that, by 1914, a further
reform of the suffrage was likely but, it was only as a consequence of the
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War that it became inevitable.
It is unfortunate, therefore, that there has been little attempt made at
integrating the massive enlargement of the electorate in 1918 with an analysis
of the radicalising influence of the war upon the working class. The most
substantial treatment is that provided by Hutchison in his treatment of
Labour's emergence in the decade 1914-1924.31 Without attempting a detailed
analysis here we can offer some comment upon Labour's new-found electoral
strength through continuing our discussion on women, the Irish and the
poorer working class in general and the role of the ILP. This will also reflect
back upon the position of the Labour Party prior to the War.
The Female Electorate
First among the new constituencies confronting Labour in 1918 was the
female electorate which accounted for 194,332 or 37% of Parliamentary
voters. At the local government level there were even more female voters,
219,743, who had, with over 49% of the votes, more or less parity with the
men.32 All Parties, whether or not they had been hostile to women's suffrage,
soon understood the necessity of appealing to the 'women's vote'. The
Labour Party had the benefit of its pre-1914 commitment to female suffrage
and close links with the 'constitutional' National Union of Women's Suffrage
Societies (NUWSS), and in Glasgow close links had been maintained with the
'militant' Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). (See Chapter Five.)
However, it is unlikely that these previous associations were of particular
benefit to Labour, electorally, from 1918 on. This is because - in Glasgow at
any rate - the whole focus of women's politics shifted away from a largely
middle-class dominated concern over equal rights, to the reality of working
class working and (particularly) living conditions. The agent of this change
was the famous Glasgow Rent Strike of 1915.33
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The major centre of the Strike were not in the poorer working class areas but
in the engineering and shipbuilding areas of Govan, Partick and Shettleston.
These were also areas with a strong ILP presence and where there was
experience of female self-activity, mainly through the Co-operative Women's
Guild. The Kinning Park Women's Guild, which covered Govan and was the
first Guild established in Scotland, seems to have provided a significant
number of Strike leaders, while the Co-operative Society itself had already
produced a large number of Labour Councillors.34 Pat Dollan claimed that the
Strike actually began with the decision of Kinning Park members in South
Govan not to pay demanded rent increases of 3/1 per month.35 As we have
seen, the independence of the Women's Guild was severely curtailed by male
notions of women's proper place and concerns in the movement. Nevertheless
the Guild did make progress in broadening the field in which their
involvement and contribution was recognised and it did provide a basis for
women to learn about organisation and to develop skills and self-confidence.
In the years preceding the War women's activity in the Labour movement
generally had begun to increase, with the formation of branches of the
Women's Labour League and, most significantly, the Glasgow Women's
Housing Association (GWHA).
Born out of the ILP's campaign over housing the GWHA quickly grew and, by
the end of 1914, had an extensive network of branches throughout the City
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and a membership in the hundreds. Although the overall housing campaign
remained under the control of men such as John Wheatley and Andrew
McBride who had more prominent places in public life and in key institutions,
the GWHA was important in publicising Labour's case within working class
communities and particularly amongst women and was crucial as regards the
actual conduct and organisation of the Rent Strike itself. The GWHA was a
purely women's organisation and its method of activity was geared to
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reaching working class women, especially housewives. During the Strike
regular meetings were held in local halls in weekday afternoons - the time
being significant because men would be at work and unable to attend. In
addition "Close" Committees were organised which held smaller more informal
kitchen meetings amongst tenants to discuss the immediate situation and
organise their defence; the movements of factor and landlord were easily
monitored and each tenement close or stair quickly made impregnable.
If it was the threat of massive disruption in industry that was crucial in
convincing the Government to act and pass the Rent Restriction Act, this
does not mean that the Rent Strike was significant only as a sort of marginal
contribution to the class struggle being fought at the point of production. For
most women and, in fact, whether married or not, the home was their point of
production and the class struggle waged over housing had as much, if not
more, direct political significance as any industrial struggle.
Even before the Rent Strike the ILP was making the connection between
Housing and female support for Labour. At the beginning of 1915 Forward
argued that:37
Housing is, above all, a woman's question. Women have
enough votes and influence to turn the balance in favour of the
Labour Party - which is the only housing party - in two-thirds
of the wards in Glasgow.
Given that the female electorate accounted for less than a fifth of the total
municipal vote this suggests that most emphasis as being placed upon
women's "influence". With the extension of the franchise, however, women
became an electoral force in their own right, and constituted a majority in
OQ
eleven of Glasgow's 37 Wards. Both by its policies and its method of
activity. Labour was well-placed to appeal to this electorate. The intensely
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local and direct nature of the organisation behind the Rent Strike was capable
of being utilised for other purposes. The leading women figures of the Strike
became prominent soon after in the peace movement. They joined the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WIL), a largely middle
class body which was active mainly through large set-piece public meetings,
but, in addition, they also formed their own Women' Peace Crusade (WPC)
which carried on the spirit and style of the Rent Strike. Demonstrations of
women and children were held, meetings took place in the afternoon (with
organisation meetings closed to men), and with the main propoganda effort
conducted at street- level in working class neighbourhoods. The adaptation
of such methods to electioneering was quickly made and quickly proved
effective. In the Municipal election of 1919 the sitting Labour Councillor for
Woodside, George Smith, was regarded as in being in a possibly vulnerable
position since he had been gaoled as a conscientious objector during the
War. However, he won by the quite comfortable margin of over 600 votes, a
qq
victory partly attributed to:
Councillor Smith's practice for months past of regularly
holding meetings during the afternoons in the back-courts,
whence he addresses the housewives at their kitchen windows.
At the same time individual women began to take more prominent roles
within the Socialist and Labour organisations. At the Annual Conference of
the Scottish ILP in January 1919 Helen Crawfurd was elected on to the
Executive, polling more votes than anybody else apart from James Maxton 40
In the same month Agnes Dollan became Labour's first woman candidate for
the Town Council (at a by-election in Partick),41 and at the Municipal Election
of 1920 two women were elected as Labour Councillors, one of whom was
Mary Barbour.42 All three had taken leading roles in both the Rent Strike and
the WPC. This emergence of women into political life - as individual actors
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and as mass participants - can be seen to have fundamentally altered the
nature of elections and electioneering.
Labour's Electoral 'Machine' and the Irish
For Matthew et al the rise of Labour and the demise of the Liberals was
primarilly due to the extension of the franchise and the emergence of the
new, mass electorate. While Labour and the Tories could appeal to this new
constituency in "vulgar" ways, more at the level of rhetoric than policies, the
Liberal Party needed, "an informed and intelligent electorate." Liberalism could
only have survived under the nineteenth century franchise system:43
with that electorate, one large enough to be responsive to
particular legislative proposals, but not yet swamped by Bright's
'residuum'. The 1918 Act, however, did more than just treble
the electorate: it transformed its character by significantly
lowering its political awareness. Not only was the new
electorate divided by class in a way that increasingly excluded
the Liberals, but it was less likely to respond to politics that
demanded a high level of political intelligence.
This national perspective finds an echo in Mclean's study of Glasgow politics
in the immediate post-War years, in particular his emphasis of upon the
creation of a Labour Party "machine" which was geared to, and successful in,
turning out the working class electorate.44 Whether or not these writers
consciously attach pejorative meanings to their descriptions of the electorate,
there comes across a very definite image of an ignorant, docile mass,
responsive to subliminal-type appeals to its sense of common identity, which
could be herded into the polling booths relatively easily. A different
perspective is suggested by Hutchison who develops the discussion of the
post-1918 electorate in a more interesting way in his comment that, "the very
techniques of traditional political debate seemed ill-adjusted to new
conditions." However, "Labour45
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had developed techniques to reach the voters in, so to
speak their natural habitat rather than the artificial context of
large meetings,"
Labour candidates and propagandists addressed impromptu gatherings both at
home and at the workplace, making it easier for people to actually hear what
was being said and to ask questions in such a 'normal' environment. For
women in particular, being spoken to in the security of their everyday
surroundings and amongst their neighbours would have been much more
likely to give them the confidence to express their own opinions than in the
intimidating atmosphere of a public hall. Rather than see women and the
poor as "ignorant", it should be understood that, having been denied a say in
the political life of the country for so long, they were hardly likely to share
the established views of how proper political debate should be conducted.
Although Labour undoubtedly benefitted most from the extension of the
franchise, it still had to overcome its own ambivalences towards the "slum
dwellers" and women voters. Mclean points out the continuing superior
attitude of Thomas Johnston, editor of Forward, to the inhabitants of the
poorer working class areas. Even in 1921 Johnston continued to regard
Labour's support as mainly based in the better-off artisan Wards while, "the
slum areas are represented by Capitalists on public bodies."46 Maclean sees
the results of the Municipal Elections between 1919 and 1922 as evidence
of:47
how the Labour vote spread from 'labour aristocratic'
districts to 'unskilled' districts to produce a recognisable
forerunner of modern voting patterns.
For Mclean the agency of this "shift" was the Labour machine which in the
extension into the unskilled areas, eventually encompassed the Irish
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"machine". As regards the Irish, Mclean cites their allegiance to Labour as
occurring only after Labour began to downplay its anti-drink stance following
the prohibition referendum in 1920.49 The major flaw in this schema, however,
remains Mclean's insistence upon locating Labour's development firmly after
1918. While he provides much interesting information on the disputes and
arrangements between the Irish and Labour in a few Wards, Mclean's
somewhat microscopic view fails to encompass the wider picture. As we have
already shown, Labour already enjoyed support before the War in poorer areas
like Hutchesontown and the East End, as well as in more artisan areas. And in
the pre-1914 period the Irish electorate was constantly divided over the
question of supporting Labour candidates at Parliamentary elections and
showed an even stronger tendency to vote Labour at the Municipal polls.
From as early as 1895 the UIL (or then INL) had actually been part of the then
"Labour Party" - the Workers' Election Committee (WMC). Despite their
opposition to the WMC policy of municipal control of the liquor traffic, the
Irish remained an active part of the Committee and worked for all the Labour
candidates, despite the Co-operators' refusal to support those candidates, all
Irish, who had any association whatever with the drink trade. Even with the
break-up of the Stalwart alliance Irish support for Labour did not end - as
both the Blackfriars & Hutchesontown and Camlachie Parliamentary elections
of the 1900s showed. The emergence of the Glasgow Labour Party and its
replacement of the "forces of the democracy" approach to local Labour
politics did threaten a more fundamental division as the Irish were denied any
autonomous affiliation to the Party. However, the prominence of
Irish-Catholics like Wheatley in both the ILP and Labour Party, and Labour's
ability to win elections with or without 'official' Irish endorsement, pointed the
way to the future relationship of the two - in which the Irish would be
integrated into the Labour movement. This process was accelerated by the
Easter Rising and the supercession of the Irish National Party by Sinn Fein.
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Even before the General Election of 1918 the Glasgow Observer had thrown
its weight behind Labour as, "Ireland's Only Hope".50
At the same time the Irish were becoming aware of just what an impact the
Representation of the People Act was going to have upon the electoral
strength of the working class in general and their own community in
particular. The Act was:51
certain to add vastly to the voting power of the workers,
and should prove of immense value to the Catholics of this
country, who are in the majority of cases in the ranks of the
toilers. ... for the first time the Voting Power of the Irish in
Scotland can become proportionate to their number.
Another article in the Observer in August 1918 referred back to previous
sympathy offered by local Labour representatives to the Irish-Catholic
community and looked with favour upon Labour's current programme:52
What is in it to which an Irishman cannot subscribe? In
each and every reform tabulated the Irish toiler is keenly
interested, for is he not virtually - yes, actually - "the hewer of
wood and the drawer of water"? As to Ireland, their platform is
- "The right of self-determination for all peoples." Surely that is
all-sufficient for anyone ...
Given expectations of a possible four-fold increase in the Irish vote it would
have been surprising had there not been some thoughts of running
independent Irish candidates53 but, apart from a few Municipal contests, this
was never attempted systematically. It was clear, even before the War was
over, that the Irish would ally themselves with Labour. The emergence of
Irish Nationalists as members of the ILP and Labour candidates after 1918
should not be regarded with surprise or suspicion, especially since most - if
not all - of them appear to have been members of the Home Government
Branch of the UIL, the most consistently pro-Labour of all the Irish
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organisations in Glasgow.54
It was the ILP which provides the continuous link between Labour as a
political force in the 1880s to its electoral triumphs in the 1920s. Already
dominant in Glasgow Socialism prior to 1914, the War only increased the HP's
strength and influence and it continued to grow after 1918. By 1924 the
Glasgow Federation could boast that:55
The Glasgow ILP is now the "People's Party". Its influence
and usefulness predominates in every phase of public life of the
City. We are stronger, numerically, than ever we have been.
Our representation on Public Bodies is higher than at any
previous period.
This was not mere self-aggrandisement. Even its enemies recognised the
ILP's influence, even if they were hardly complimentary about it. The Glasgow
Herald commented on the eve of the Municipal election of 1923:56
The official Labour' candidates are almost, if not entirely
composed of members of the Independent Labour Party, a
Socialist organisation comparatively small in numbers but active
and aggressive, and exerting an influence far out of proportion
to its numerical strength.
Judged against the Capitalist' Parties the membership of the ILP appears
quite small,57 which reflects the higher cost that political activity demanded of
the working class. However, compared to other Socialist organisations the ILP
appears impressively large.58 It is clear that the ILP was growing and was
forming branches in new areas of the City, and that its ambitions had been
considerably enlarged. As before, the electoral unit remained the basis of
branch organisation and by 1924 the ILP had 34 branches in the City and was
aiming for 37 - one for each Municipal Ward. The connection between Labour
electoral success and ILP activity, which we saw in the pre-war years,
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remained, summed up in the official Party comment on the 1923 Municipal
polls, "the Wards in which we have continued successes have all strong ILP
branches."59
While many other sections of the Labour movement were involved in election
campaigns it was the network of ILP Branches - and there were no Labour
Party 'branches' as such - which provided the engine of the Labour machine.
Unfortunately our information on the occupations of ILP activists does not go
beyond the pre-war period but there is no reason to assume that it did not
remain largely dominated by skilled and clerical grades. The expansion of
Party organisation into the southern suburbs suggests a possible expansion of
lower middle class involvement, though the formation of branches in the
Gorbals and Cowcaddens suggests that semi and unskilled workers were also
joining. Enthusiasm on its own, however, could not guarantee electoral
success. Despite Govanhill's emergence as one of the largest ILP branches in
the 1920s, that Ward remained stubbornly hostile to Labour at the polls as did
the rest of suburban Glasgow. The 'slum' Wards of Gorbals and Cowcaddens,
however, soon became bastions of Labour representation, the former at the
Election of 1920 and the latter by the mid-'20s.
Towards a More United Working Class Politics
Just as fears of the reactionary tendencies of the slum-dwellers were proven
to be basically groundless with the advent of a democratic franchise so, at a
more general level, the very categorisation of 'slum-dweller' or 'residuum'
became increasingly inappropriate when applied to what was becoming a
more homogeneous working class. In the 1900s the wages gap between
skilled and unskilled had, if anything, widened but, during the War the wages
of labourers began to increase relative to those of tradesmen. The examples
of three industrial groups in Glasgow show a marked reduction in differentials
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between 1914 and 1920. In 1914, while labourers were on 60% of the wage
of a turner or fitter, in 1920 they were receiving 80% of the skilled man's
wage: Between bricklayers and their labourers the ratio of 62% in 1914 had
risen to 84% in 1920: and for shipwrights and their labourers the gap had
narrowed from 55% to 76%.60 Even before 1914 wages had been rising faster
than rents but under the Rent Restriction Act they rocketed ahead. The
freezing of working class rents during the War had been of clear benefit to all
grades and when restrictions were eventually lifted all sections of the working
class felt the consequences.61
The expansion of the Trade Union movement which occurred between 1910
and 1914 was further accelerated by the War and by 1920 membership had
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doubled to a new high of over 8 million. The Co-operative movement also
grew rapidly, if not at quite as fast a rate as the Unions. Between 1914 and
1918 membership of Co-op Societies in Scotland increased from 467,270 to
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590,710. The unequal treatment received by Co-operative stores in the
distribution of food and treatment of personnel over conscription at the hands
of the middle class dominated bodies set up by the Government, led to
increased demands for political activity, culminating in the formation of the
Co-operative Party in 1917,64 which, in practical terms, operated as part of
the Labour Party. As far as Trade Unions are concerned Scottish membership
figures have not been separately collected or extracted from U.K. totals but it
seems safe to assume that, as before, Scotland shared in the general trend.
By analysing figures produced by the STUC in 1925, Hutchison indicates that
trade unionism in Scotland was highly concentrated: 80% of male trade
unionists were in 36 out of a total of 227 unions. Furthermore there was an
apparent correlation between areas of high unionisation and areas of Labour
electoral success and, since the majority of new members came from among
the semi and unskilled, Hutchison points out that:65
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It was this section of the working class who had been
most likely to be excluded from holding the franchise before
1918, and accordingly their mass accession to the electorate
under the Fourth Reform Act had a considerable impact on the
political balance in constituencies, especially urban seats.
Even with the return of unemployment in the 1920s, the fall in real wages and
a sharp drop in trade union membership, the overall position of the working
class stood at a higher level than it had done prior to the War. The
experience of a total-war economy, with full employment, the virtual
disappearance of casual poverty, and Government regulation of much of
industry, meant that notions of respectability which had been divisive in that
they had emphasised individual solutions to general problems had become
less realistic. The attention of the working class became increasingly
fifi
focussed upon the active role of the State. Between 1914 and 1918 the
political and social world of Labour had been dramatically altered.
It is impossible, therefore, to consider the political consequences of the
Reform Act of 1918 separate from the effects of the First World War.
Nevertheless, there are still some marked continuities between pre and
post-War politics. Although in 1914 the Liberal Party was united and
dominated its much weaker "ally", there was an identifiable trend towards a
greater class polarisation in politics and a drift of the 'wealthy' classes
towards the Conservative Party.67 In Glasgow, local politics were becoming
increasingly identified in pro and anti-Labour terms. It was Labour which was
identified as bringing 'politics' into the essentially non-political world of
municipal government, and this, in turn, stimulated the formation of
middle-class pressure groups such as the Citizens' Union, the Vigilance
Association, and Trades Defence Association.68 After the War and inspired by
fears of Bolshevism and the increased demands of Labour, such bodies
received a new lease of life and coalesced into the Moderate Party, in which
349
Liberal and Conservative could unite in opposition to Labour at Municipal
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Elections. The great worry of the "ratepayers" was that the profligate
masses would enforce, "extravagant and ruinous expenditure" upon those with
property, a threat made all the greater under the new, mass electorate. The
Scottish Middle Class Union had a simple solution: since of the 20 million
electors only 3 million actually paid income tax, the vote should be restricted
to tax payers only.70
Labour policies pre-War, e.g. the Eight Hour Day, Municipal 'fair wage'
contracts, would have needed the active intervention of the State, either
national or local, to be effective. All reforms aimed at improving wages, work
conditions, health and housing, demanded public funding and each and every
one, therefore, infuriated middle class opinion. Wheatley's argument to utilise
the Glasgow Tramway surplus to pay for the construction of artisan cottages
was still unacceptable, since it was yet another case of municipilisation' and
a further inroad into the market, and the middle class view of the tram
surplus was to use it to reduce the rates.
Even before the War housing had emerged as the major plank in Labour's
local programme, and housing conditions provide a clear guide to Labour's
support. As we have seen, those Wards with the highest proportion of 1 and
2 apartment houses displayed the greatest propensity to return Labour
candidates, providing a clear indicator to Labour's future likely growth.
Despite the fact that Labour's views on housing were aimed only at providing
good quality housing for the artisan' class, and expressly excluded the 'slum
dwelleT, the Wards where Labour actually returned candidates prior to the
War were a mix of artisan and poorer working class. Housing provided the
issue which, above all, the working class could be united around and indicated
that the 'slum dwellers' were just as likely to vote Labour, given the
opportunity, as the "respectable" artisans of Govan or Cowlairs. The pre-War
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support for Labour amongst the Irish must also be viewed in class terms, i.e.
as primarilly a poorer working class vote. Similarly, the political behaviour of
working class women during and after the War appears to contradict Labour
fears that women would be more likely to vote Conservative.
At a formal level the Labour Party could be regarded as the true and
consistent champion of democracy and, morally, as the true beneficiary of the
extension of the franchise in 1918: Labour had, after ail, constantly supported
full adult suffrage. Yet, as we have seen, the adult suffrage resolution was
principally a blocking manoeuvre against the demand for votes for women.
Even the decision of the 1912 Party Conference to, "oppose any franchise bill
that did not include women",71 did not mean that Labour was committed to
achieving suffrage reform: from South Africa to conditions in the Postal
Service there was always an immediate issue that demanded a higher
priority.72 The Fourth Reform Act owed almost nothing to the Labour Party
but was one of the consequences of the War. The inequities of the franchise
system did not confront Labour as an external restraint which had to be
overcome in order to realise its ambitions. Since Labour's ambitions were
located within the existing framework of society it saw no pressing need to
disturb the social and constitutional arrangements by which that society was
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